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In this thesis I study the place metaphysical speculation of the Dao or of God 
has in the political and social theorizing of two great philosophical traditions as 
developed by its respective scholars and commentators: Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory 
as defended by the New Classical Natural Law Theorists (especially John Finnis), and 
Wang Bi’s commentarial reading of the Laozi or Dao de Jing.   
Finnis’ recent refreshing interpretation of Aquinas’s natural law theory offers a 
coherent and compelling reading of the thomistic texts. Because Finnis recasts 
Aquinas’ ideas in the clear and lucid structures of analytic philosophy, natural law 
theory is able both to defend itself well against unwarranted criticism, develop itself 
with critical self-reflection and engage other influential (analytic) philosophies in 
order to further stretch its philosophical limits.  Its potential as a credible and stable 
philosophical system that is at the same time open is not just immense, but has also 
been actualized to a great extent.  While Lee Yearly’s Mencius and Aquinas does 
mention natural law theory in passing, to date the new classical natural law theory has 
not seriously engaged Chinese philosophy.  My thesis is a first attempt to push the 
frontiers of the new classical natural law theory in the direction of the oriental east.  
I have chosen to compare natural law theory with the Laozi because amongst 
the many Chinese philosophical traditions it is one of those that maintains there are 
some natural moral norms.  More importantly like Aquinas, it seems to have a strong 
metaphysical component.  Its speculation on the Dao as the origin and source of the 
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myriad things suggests that it has a conception of a creator, even if impersonal.  Not 
surprisingly the reason the Jesuits gave for translating the Laozi into its first western 
Latin version, submitted to the British Royal Society in 1788, was to show that the 
ancient Chinese knew of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnate God.  I have 
chosen to focus on Wang Bi’s interpretation of the Laozi because like Aquinas’ 
Thomism, Wang Bi’s reading of the Laozi has a strong critical and speculative 
element, as opposed to other readings that reduce the text to religion.  Set in the Wei-
Chin period where scholars practiced ching-tan (free/pure discussion/talking), Wang 
Bi did not hesitate to tease out and develop critically the logical connections and 
implications of the Laozi text, especially when it comes to speculating about the Dao 
and its political insights.  For this reason Wang is often credited as one of the pioneers 
of the Profound Studies movement (xuan xue).  Through this comparative study, we 
may better see how classical natural law theory sits with an influential school of 
thought in the (Neo) Daoist tradition.  (After that, perhaps we may continue to 
research its compatibility with other Chinese traditions).  
Because the connection between metaphysics and political theory is often not 
clear, this study hopes also to illuminate the relation between them.  For some time 
metaphysics was thought to have been a basis for natural law theorizing but Finnis has 
argued that this is not so.  Since Wang’s Laozi has much to say on the Dao and the 
modeling of the Dao, is metaphysical research also some form of premise for political 
theorizing?  What else, if any, is the place of metaphysical research for the political 





I begin my comparative study with the argument in Section I that both 
traditions do not develop metaphysical claims in order to infer political strategies. 
Rather the reverse is true, though in rather different ways.  Thus Section II: Natural 
Law starts with self-evident precepts and moves towards a metaphysics of God, 
whereas Wang’s Laozi begins with a study of human behavior, develops political 
conclusions and integrates metaphysical claims of the Dao with the political doctrine 
of non-intervention through a clever play of literary metaphors, and offers an 
“inferential trace” to the Dao as the ultimate origin or source of the desired community 
and of words and names.   I will include an analysis of the strong similarities between 
the metaphysics of the Dao and the thomistic metaphysical doctrine of God.  
Further under Section III, I will suggest how although both traditions share 
similar negative strategies informed by their appreciation of the limits of the use of 
coercion to create the desired society, there remain differences when it comes to 
applying positive strategies. These differences are not the result of metaphysical 
premises of God or the Dao, but are the result of different theories of what constitutes 
authentic moral action.    
 
Finally, Section IV will explain how metaphysics re-enters in the natural law 
theorists’ political theorizing: by attending to the realization that practically reasonable 
political action is an analogous likening and fulfillment of God’s very own Normative 
Being and Will, the natural law political theorist has a new motivation to act 
reasonably in politics:  to imitate God.  This however, does not feature very much in 
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Wang’s Laozi, which seems to recommend that the metaphysics of the Dao be 
forgotten once the central political doctrine is grasped.   
The purpose of this study is to compare two prominent and influential 
philosophical traditions which have a strong metaphysical component. My hope is that 
such an “excursion on the Way (Dao)” would be useful for scholars, especially my 
fellow natural law theorists, friends and colleagues, as well as those fellow scholars of 
the Daoist tradition, when each attempts to dialogue with the other in this age of 
globalization wherein the East daily meets the West, and vice versa.    
Just as well, readers from outside these two traditions will find interesting the 
very different approaches with which these two traditions see the role and place 
metaphysics has for political theorizing.  These ideas can help inform their own 
political theorizing.  In particular, policy makers in the political arena will be alerted 
to the practical implications which metaphysical propositions (whether positive or 
negative) may have on the construction of the desired society.   These connections are 
largely captured in Section II of this thesis.   Equally interesting would be Section III, 
which lays out the efficacies of different policies in the construction of the desired 
society. 
Finally politicians and policy makers with a religious bent will much 
appreciate Section IV, and there find inspiration for reinterpreting their vocation of 
good governance as a participation of a greater nobility.  
I would not be so bold as to say that this study or thesis has covered all 
grounds, and there remains much room for further research.  Still I believe that I have 
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addressed the more prominent issues relevant to the contemplation of the relation 



















The Non-Derivation of Ethics and Politics From Metaphysics In John Finnis 
 
Introduction 
In this opening chapter I will lay out the basis of the ethical and political theory of 
John Finnis’ New Classical Natural Law Theory. I show that in Finnis, ethical and 
political precepts are not derived or inferred from (a) metaphysics (of God). I also 
argue that Finnis’ interpretation is largely consistent with the traditional concerns and 
assumptions concerning the philosophical connection between ethics and human 
nature.  In Finnis, saying that we do not derive the first principles of natural law from 
metaphysics or from a theory of human nature does not commit us to the position that 
the natural law is independent of human nature or metaphysics, or that these are 
irrelevant.1
 
John Finnis’ New Classical Natural Law Theory 
Ever since the papal encyclical Aeterni Patris by Pope Leo XIII of happy 
memory which commissioned the revival of scholastic philosophy, the philosophy of 
St. Thomas Aquinas had been studied by Catholic intellectuals with renewed interest. 
                                                 
1 Parts of this chapter has been previously submitted as the final chapter of my 
1997/1998 Honors Thesis, On the First Principles of Natural Law, submitted to the 
National University of Singapore. 
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In that encyclical letter given in 1879, the Roman Pontiff had explicitly urged the 
study of St. Thomas, having ranked him as “the chief and master of all [the scholastic 
doctors]”2 .  
Since then, a tradition of scholarship has developed which is called Thomism3 
alongside a particular criteria for determining if any philosophical doctrine may be 
received under its banner and whether its professor may be considered an orthodox 
Thomist. And because popular reading understands St. Thomas as having integrated 
Aristotle's philosophy into his thought 4 , the tradition is also understood to be 
Aristotelian-Thomistic.  
                                                 
2Leo XIII, "Aeterni Patris: The Study of Scholastic Philosophy", in The Great 
Encyclicals Letters of Pope Leo XIII. (USA: TAN Books and Publishing, 1995). p. 48  
3 Whether there is such a thing as Thomism is itself a matter of debate among scholars. 
Some argue that there is no such thing, that St. Thomas himself was not a Thomist, 
and that to aspire to Thomisms or such like is a betrayal of the spirit of the Angelic 
Doctor. Nevertheless, let that not bother us. The common opinion is that there is a 
Thomism.  
4  Of course, as Alasdair MacIntyre has argued, St. Thomas integrated both Platonism 
(under the guise of St. Augustine) and Aristotelianism into his thought. See his After 
Virtue. 6th ed. 1996: Duckworth (UK) St. Thomas is popularly associated with 
Aristotle because he was the first to seriously integrate Aristotle, as compared to his 
contemporaries who stuck with St. Augustine only. Hence compared with them, St. 
Thomas was very much more Aristotelian. Yet a proper reading of St. Thomas based 
on the last 40 years of research suggests that his philosophical insights might also have 
a (Neo-) Platonic as well as an Aristotelian base. See John. D. Caputo, Heidegger and 
Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, op. cit., pp 125-8. Also, Kevin 
Corrigan's article in The Thomist, "A Philosophical Precursor to the Theory of 
Essence and Existence in St. Thomas Aquinas" where the real distinction of St. 
Thomas is linked to the Enneads of Plotinus., p. 219-240.  
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John Finnis works from that tradition. And in Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
John Finnis maintains that Aquinas teaches there are many underived first principles 
of natural law: 
“…Stone [asks:] ‘Have natural lawyers shown that they can derived 
ethical norms from facts?’ And the answer can be brisk: They have not, 
not do they need to, not did the classical exponents of the theory dream 
of attempting any such derivation. ..[It is not] true that for Aquinas 
‘good and evil are concepts analysed and fixed in metaphysics before 
they are applied to morals’. On the contrary, Aquinas asserts as plainly 
as possible that the first principles of natural law, which specify the 
basic forms of good and evil and which can be adequately grasped by 
anyone of the age of reason (and not just by metaphysicians), are per se 
nota, (self evident and indemonstrable). They are not inferred from 
speculative principles. They are not inferred from facts.  They are not 
inferred from metaphysical presuppositions about human nature, or 
about the nature of good and evil, or about the ‘function of a human 
being’, nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature or 
any conception of nature. They are not inferred or derived from 
anything. They are underived (though not innate). Principles of right 
and wrong, too, are derived from these first, pre-moral principles of 
practical reasonableness.”5  
                                                 




To say that these principles are not derived means that (following Aquinas) 
one does not develop a metaphysical theory of God or any thing else, and then deduce 
ethical precepts from that metaphysics. Instead, starting with these un-derived 
principles of practical reason, we then derive all other principles of morality, including 
socio-political policies or precepts. In other words, we never start philosophically with 
metaphysics and end with an ethics.  We begin already with self-evident principles of 
ethics: “Such and such a good ought to be sought and done”. 
In the context of the tradition, the new classicists, John Finnis and his 
collaborators Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, have been subject to such criticism 
for their interpretation of St. Thomas that they have denied any association with that 
tradition. In “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends”, under a heading 
“Please Note Well”, they declare,  
“While this paper proposes philosophical clarifications and arguments 
rather than textual interpretations, it uses some language common in the 
(broadly speaking, Thomistic) natural-law tradition from which we 
developed that theory. But what we say here differs in various ways from 
the theories articulated by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and others.”6  
Self-Evident Precepts and Human Nature 
                                                 
6  Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, 
and Ultimate Ends in Natural Law" in Natural Law: Volume I. (ed.) John Finnis. 1991: 
Dartmouth (UK), p. 237.  
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The primary charge against the new classical reading, amongst other things, is 
that it denies that ethical principles are founded on human nature. Henry B. Veatch, 
one of the new classicists' most vehement critics7, complains,  
“True, there is a sense in which our human moral obligations can scarcely 
be said to be “inferable” from a knowledge of human nature. And yet 
Finnis is surely going too far when he would apparently conclude from 
this that “the norms referred to in any theory of natural law” are not to be 
regard as being even “based upon judgments about nature (human and/or 
otherwise)” (NLNR, 1980. p. 35)".8
But it will not be too difficult  to point out that Finnis never concluded what 
Veatch accuses him of concluding. Out of context, the phrase “based upon judgments 
about nature” is ambiguous and Veatch capitalizes on that for his equivocation. 
“Based upon judgments about nature” can mean “inferred from judgments about 
                                                 
7See also Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory, 1987: Univ. 
Notre Dame Press (USA) which argues that the new classicists fail to “interrelate 
systematically practical reason with a philosophy of nature" (p.8). Also see Robert P. 
George's reply in "Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory" in University of Chicago 
Law Review, (55), 1988. Includes a reply also to Lloyd L. Weinreb's Natural Law and 
Justice, which criticizes the new classicists on this and other counts.  
8Henry Veatch, "Natural Law and the 'Is' - 'Ought' Question: Queries to Finnis and 
Grisez" in Swimming Against the Current in Contemporary Philosophy, (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1990). p. 300. Footnoted to this very same 
quote is the following: "Be it noted that Finnis and Grisez would not argue that ethics 
is independent of metaphysics merely in the way which, say, physics is independent of 
metaphysics. For in addition, ethics is to be distinguished from metaphysics, they 
would say, in the way in which a practical science is different from, and hence 
independent of, any theoretical science…" So by "independent of" Veatch means 
something more than just mere differentiation. 
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nature” or “having an ontological connection with judgments about nature.” While 
Finnis means the former, which renders Veatch's statement an uninformative tautology, 
Veatch makes him out as concluding the latter.  
Finnis' reply is embarrassing. With “an invitation to Professor Veatch to read 
what we [Finnis and Grisez] have written”, the apology goes:  
“Henry Veatch's “sharp questions” are directed to those who deny that 
morals and ethics have any basis in nature or the facts of nature; to those 
who “insist that ethical principles can have no grounding in fact and 
nature”; to those who suppose an “absolute independence of ethics as over 
against metaphysics, or of moral with respect to a knowledge of nature,” 
so that “principles of morals and ethics are really not to be thought [of] as 
being in any sense principles of being or of nature at all”. Veatch's 
questions and objections, therefore, are not properly directed to either 
Germain Grisez or to myself. Neither Grisez nor I subscribe to any of the 
foregoing denials, affirmations, and suppositions; indeed, we reject them 
all. Neither of us has published anything which might reasonably be 
interpreted, in its context, as involving or entailing any such view.”9
Veatch is not alone, of course. Anthony J. Lisska has his own “worries”: Can 
one have an Aristotelian meta-ethical theory without a consistent metaphysics of 
                                                 
9John Finnis, "Natural Law and the 'Is' - 'Ought' Question: An Invitation to Professor 
Veatch" in Catholic Lawyer, (26) 1981, p. 266.  
 7
 8
human nature?10 Is Finnis correct in suggesting that the role of human nature is not a 
necessary condition for natural law ethics? 11 Then, rebuking what he supposes is 
Finnis' position, he quotes two noted Thomists to justify his position against Finnis:  
“In his The Tradition of Natural Law, Yves Simon suggested that a theory 
of universals, or essences, is a necessary condition for an elucidation of the 
concept of natural law:  
Let us confess that it is meaningless to argue seriously about natural law 
without having ever raised the question of universals. It is obvious that the 
theory of natural law opposed by the nominalist tendency and probably 
would be impossible by a strictly and consistently nominalistic philosophy, 
if such could exist.  
In Man and the State, Maritain argues explicitly for the concept of essence 
as a necessary condition for understanding Aquinas on natural law. He 
writes:  
What I am emphasizing is the first basic element to be recognized in 
natural law, namely the ontological element; I mean the normality of 
functioning which is grounded in the essence of that being: man.Let us say, 
then, that in its ontological aspect, natural law is an ideal order relating to 
                                                 
10Anthony J. Lisska, Aquinas' Theory of Natural Law, (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
1983), p. 140. 
11 ibid., p. 148 
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human action, a divide between the suitable and the unsuitable, the proper 
and the improper, which depends on human nature or essence and the 
unchangeable necessities rooted in it.”12
Precisely. The irony of it all is that these auctoritates really support rather than 
contradict the new classical reading. The point that Yves Simon and Maritain is 
making is that the principles of natural law presuppose a human nature or essence. 
This is an ontological point. We are talking about what is the case, objectively, from a 
third-person-point-of-view. To talk about principles of natural law is to talk about a set 
of objective ethical principles which are somehow fixed. If they are fixed, then it 
implies there must necessarily be an essence in man, a stable “what-ness” in man, so 
that it may give rise to this fixed set of ethical principles called natural law. At the 
metaphysical or ontological level then, the Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law theorist 
is always implicitly committed to essentialism. 13 Thus Simon rejects a natural law 
with a nominalistic, non-essential ontology and Maritain talks about natural law 
depending on “human nature or essence and the unchangeable necessities rooted in it”.  
But the new classicists do not deny this. Compared with the above ontological 
point, theirs is epistemological point, namely, that our knowledge of the principles of 
natural law does not presuppose our knowledge of human nature or essence. This is 
perfectly consistent with the ontological point in the preceding paragraph which 
Simon and Maritain made. As a matter of fact, the ontological point is implied because 
                                                 
12 ibid., p. 149-50 
13 I owe this insight to Alan Brown. 
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as was said above, to assert such a thing fixed as natural law in man is to assert 
something essential in man.   
To see the implication, let us use an example. Suppose I walk into the room, 
and starring at the floor I see some tiles. Now, if I were to smash the tiles up, I would 
see beneath them the concrete ground. Now, epistemologically, the tiles were prior as 
compared to the concrete grounds. But the concrete floor was beneath the tiles, 
supporting the tiles. And so ontologically, or “in the order of generation” as the 
scholastics are wont to say, the concrete ground was prior as differ from the tiles. 
Without the concrete ground being there first, the tiles could never be in place. Indeed, 
the existence of the tiles is determined by the existence of the concrete ground. Yet I 
see the tiles first before I actually discover the concrete ground underneath them. 14 
Another (perhaps better) example is to consider the eye and its seeing. For the eye, the 
light and data that enters the eye has epistemic priority, yet were it not first that the 
eye had a retina, it could never see. In fact the eye will never see its own retina, so that 
the retina is forever epistemically last, yet it is there ontologically prior to everything it 
sees, i.e., to the light which enters the eye, which, as is obvious, is epistemically prior 
as contrast with the retina.  
                                                 
14 This example is adapted from Fritz Wenisch's “A Defense of Dietrich von 
Hildebrand's Approach to Ethics” in ALETHIEA, (5): Truth and Value, 1992. The 




So it is with the case of human nature/essence and the principles of natural law. 
While the principles of natural law have epistemic priority, human nature/essence has 
ontological or metaphysical priority. Robert P. George puts it very well:  
“Knowledge that comes as the fruit of practical reflection becomes 
available to (i.e., provide data for) speculative inquiry (e.g., in metaphysics 
or theology). On the basis of one's practical grasp of the intelligible ends 
of human acts, one may derive propositions about the nature of human 
beings. The point is that in the epistemological mode of inquiry, our 
(practical) knowledge of human good(s) is methodologically prior to our 
(speculative) knowledge of human nature. The latter knowledge 
presupposes the former: It is not, as neo-scholastics suppose, the other way 
round.  
Let us shift for a moment to the ontological mode. Here, if we reflect on 
Aquinas's methodological principle, it is clear that the human goods are 
goods for (i.e., fulfillments of) human beings precisely because human 
beings have a nature as they do. As Finnis says, “[t]he basic forms of good 
grasped by practical understanding are what is good for human beings 
with the nature they have.” Were human nature otherwise, human goods 
would be correspondingly different. In this sense, the basic goods depend, 
ontologically, upon human nature. So in the ontological mode of inquiry, 
an account of the human goods will refer to human nature: “Why are these 
the ends fulfilling of human beings?” “Because human nature is 
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constituted as it is.” But this answer in no way entails that our knowledge 
of the ends as human fulfillment is derived from prior speculative 
knowledge of human nature.” 15
 
Self-Evident Precepts and A Metaphysics of God 
I think the Robert P George’s conclusion is sound. We may develop George’s 
analysis. We are interested in whether a metaphysics of God enters anywhere into the 
picture; I argue that metaphysics is a corollary, and is not irrelevant. If an account of 
human nature or a created world of which human beings and human nature are a part 
entails some ontological Creator, which we call God, then ontologically God is even 
prior to human nature, which He creates.   Hence ontologically, our knowledge of the 
precept of natural law is last, whereas God is first.  Because: God first existed, and 
then caused human being and human nature to exist, which in turn makes possible the 
experience of the natural law by human beings.   We are all familiar with Aquinas’ 
quinque viae for an uncreated Creator of all creation, of all dynamism, and of all 
progressions from potentialities to actualities.   In a later chapter I offer my own 
natural law version of an ontological argument for God’s existence, and where God is 
a Normative Being. (See Chapter 6) There we move from practical reasons backwards 
towards an affirmation of such a Normative Being’s existence.  The way to see this is 
to understand that metaphysics features at the end of the order of knowing.  But even 
                                                 
15   Robert P. George, "Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory" in University of 
Chicago Law Review, (55), 1988, p. 1416 
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if it is that which is last known, that does not mean it is unrelated to that which is first 
known.   Furthermore, while articulating an ethics or political theory does not require 
prior knowledge and affirmation of any metaphysics of God, an explicit denial of 
God’s existence undermines ethics and politics. (See chapter 6 and 8). The point 
remains that in the thomistic tradition, claiming that the natural law is self-evident in 
no way entails that a metaphysics of reality or of God falls completely out of the 
picture.   
Conclusion 
I have argued that Finnis’ natural law theory, following Aquinas, does not 
derive its practical precepts from any form of metaphysics of God or of human nature.  
This does not mean however, that it is completely disconnected with metaphysical 
claims of God or of human nature; as shall be shown, metaphysical claims of God 
have their important place. We are ready to turn to Daoism.  Like Finnis’ treatment of 
Aquinas’ ethical and political theory, I will argue in the following chapter that Wang 
Bi’s Laozi does not derive political principles from a metaphysics of the Dao, as some 
scholars suppose.   Rather, by carefully unpeeling the layers of metaphors he reads in 
the text, we see that Wang Bi’s Laozi starts with a social analysis of human behavior 
and derives political policies based on that analysis.   However, Wang also cleverly 
integrates metaphysics into his analysis, using metaphorical literary devices.  The rest 
of this thesis will explore all these issue surrounding the purpose and place of the 




Sagely Politics as Modeling of the Dao in Wang Bi’s Laozi 
 
Introduction 
This thesis compares natural law theory with Wang Bi’s reading of the Daode 
Jing (Laozi).   Wang Bi was born in 226 and lived only 23 years of age, to die in 249.  
In that short life, he had earned a reputation for being a young genius. He Shao’s 
biographical notice16 writes:  
“Wang Bi revealed his intelligence and wisdom even when still a 
child.  By the time he was only about ten years of age, he had already 
developed a liking for the Laozi, which he understood thoroughly and 
could discuss with ease…” 
Wang Bi’s Laozi has much to say about the Dao.  Scholars have always been 
interested in how the Dao is related to the political theory in the Wang Bi Laozi.   
Some scholars argue that the metaphysical claims about Dao are premises for 
developing the political theory.  I disagree.  In this chapter, I will argue that Wang’s 
Laozi does not attempt to derive political or ethical precepts from a metaphysics of the 
Dao.    
 
Modeling the Dao in Wang’s Laozi 
                                                 
16 C.f. Richard John Lynn. Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the 
Tao-te ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi. Richard John Lynn (transl.), (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 11.  Hereafter quotes as The Classic. 
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A T Nuyen expresses nicely the frustration of the serious student of the Laozi as 
he engages this classical work:  
 
“The Daode Jing is an enigma.  The reader encounters the sense of enigma 
in its very first two lines.  This sense of enigma is maintained throughout 
the work as it seemingly fluctuates between the metaphysics and the 
ethics.  What is the relationship between the metaphysical discussions and 
the ethical teachings?  Is the Daode Jing an attempt to show the way of the 
invisible way, to name the unnameable name?...”17   
 
Part of its illusiveness is the precise connection between the metaphysical or 
cosmological pronouncements of the Dao and its normative recommendations, on top 
of the already well known paradox of proclaiming that its pronouncements about the 
Dao do not quite get to the real Dao.  In this chapter, we will try to shed some light on 
the first question.  Here, we are principally concerned with Wang Bi’s Laozi.  
  
Some interpretations of the Daode Jing read the text as suggesting that one 
imitate the ways of Heaven, the Dao.  However this modeling of the Dao can be taken 
in at least a couple of ways.   One way is to read the Daode Jing as developing a 
metaphysical account of the Dao for delivering normative principles, applicable to 
politics.  Rudolf Wagner’s most recent book Language, Ontology and Political 
                                                 
17 c.f. A T Nuyen, “The Dao of Ethics: From the Writings of Levinas to the Daode 
Jing “, in Journal of Chinese Philosophy  27:3, (September 2000), 287-298 @287 
 15
 16
Philosophy in China: Wang Bi’s Scholarly Exploration of the Dark clearly sees things 
this way.  He writes: 
 
The Wang Bi Laozi…propose that the ruler look at the fundamental 
dynamics governing the relationship between the One and the Many, 
between the Dao or Negativity and the ten thousand kinds of entities, in 
order to understand the laws of this relationship and map out a course of 
action that consists of imitating and translating into the human world the 
way in which the One actually manages to be and remain the One of the 
Many, their “That-by-which”.  The Wang Bi Laozi therefore deals with the 
problems of ontology, the relationship of Being and Entity, the One and 
the Many, and Negativity and the ten thousand entities only because and 
only insofar as it is necessary in order to extract these laws.  These can be 
and are to be translated into a successful course of action by the ruler.  
The Wang Bi Laozi is prescriptive political philosophy based on analytic 
ontology.   When summarizing the essence of the Laozi, Wang Bi does not 
talk about Negativity, the Dao, or the Sage.  The grammatical form of this 
summary—and he claims that the Laozi can be summed up in one 
phrase—is prescriptive, not analytic.18
                                                 
18 Rodulf Wagner,  Language, Ontology and Political Philosophy in China: Wang Bi’s 
Scholarly Exploration of the Dark, (NY: SUNY, 2003) 212-213, Italics.  Rudolf G 
Wagner is Professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Heidelberg.  He is also the 
author of The Craft of a Chinese Commentator: Wang Bi on the Laozi (NY: SUNY, 
2000).  Emphasis is mine. In these two recent books on Wang Bi, Wagner offers a 
detailed analysis of Wang Bi’s art and technique as a commentator, of his philosophy 




Wagner rightly notes that Wang Bi’s one phrase summary of the essence of the 
Laozi, given in the Outline Introduction to the Laozi, is prescriptive: “it does nothing 
more than encourage growth at the branch tips by enhancing the roots”.  Wagner also 
correctly notes that Wang’s explication of that prescription, viz. that one ought to 
encourage growth at the branch tips by enhancing the roots, has little to do with 
Negativity, the Dao or the Sage.   This is a very important observation.  Indeed Wang 
Bi goes on not about Negativity or any form of Daoist ontology. Instead his 
explanation runs more like a social analysis.  He simply points out the kinds of effects 
that follow from social (dis)incentives like punitive action or the gifts of honor, name, 
reputation or prestige for conforming to moral rules.  If the ruler were to employ these 
kinds of social policies, people might behave morally, but ultimately, insincerely.  
And insincere moral behavior, or what is the same, moral acts aimed not at moral 
ends, is really no authentic morality at all.    Such political policies are hence self-
defeating and futile. Wang then goes on to infer other possible things that the ruler 
might do to remedy this in-authenticity, and in turn the poor consequences of such 
inauthenticity.  He concludes: the ruler ought to abandon the kind of paternalistic 
interference that punishes immorality through the law and rewards morality through 
honors.    
Intermittent that social analysis, he speaks of the Dao of pristine simplicity, 
which he understands at least as a kind of symbolic analogue for the policy of 
repudiating (specific kinds of) social and political interference.  And so Wagner is 
                                                                                                                                            
marked a watershed in the history of Chinese philosophy and of his political 
philosophy for which his ontology provided the model and logic. 
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right to note some form of ontological, if you must, parallel between the Dao and the 
Sage Ruler’s modus operandi.  Clearly this parallel is undeniable.   
However, what seems to me incorrect is that Wagner reads the parallel as some 
form of inference or derivation, of the kind of an argument from analogy.  He reads 
the speculation on the Dao as constituting some form of premise for inferring the 
desirable political policies.   But Wagner himself notes that Wang’s own summary and 
explication of that one phrase which captures the essence of the Laozi is sparingly 
metaphysical.  This appears to me as a clue that the metaphysics or ontology of the 
Dao is not the philosophical basis for the social policies that Wang reads the Daode 
Jing as finally prescribing.  
Wagner’s own analysis should have alerted him to this hermeneutic possibility.  
Elsewhere in that same chapter on Wang’s political philosophy, Wagner writes: 
 
What form could and should the conscious application of the Dao’s 
interaction with the ten thousand kinds of entities take?  What does it 
mean to “reject” and “abandon”, to “discard” and “cut off” the very means 
that common sense would suggest as the instruments of securing the 
ruler’s life and position and social order?  Obviously there is little question 
of the ruler’s stepping down and actually being “lowly,” “orphaned,” 
“solitary,” as there is of the Dao relinquishing its role as the origin and 
support of the ten thousand kinds of entities.  The solution must lie in the 
ruler’s remaining in his position but consciously projecting himself in a 
manner that would make him One over the Many, and not One among the 
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Many.  In this exploration, Wang Bi has little to go by in the Laozi itself.  
The development of a political theory out of the Laozi that can be applied 
to and translated into practical policies must be considered one of Wang 
Bi’s main intellectual contributions.19
 
Wagner then goes on to explain that for Wang, the public performance of the 
ruler should be to manifest simplicity in order not to stir up the desires of the people, 
which if aroused would lead to competitive contention and disorder.  Filling in such 
connections between the ruler’s social polices and performance and the kinds of social 
effects that follow truly is one of Wang’s main intellectual contributions.  But Wagner 
credits Wang not only with developing and drawing the kinds of causal relationships 
between social policies and their respective effects, but also of inferring these 
recommended social and political policies from the ontology of the Dao: 
 
What began as a highly sophisticated philological and philosophical 
inquiry into the That-by-which, with its double characteristics of being the 
condition of the possibility of the ten thousand kinds of entities and being 
utterly elusive and “dark,” has developed into a philosophically guided 
politological analysis of societal dynamics and an applicable set of 
policies.20
 
                                                 
19 ibid., 202 
20 ibid., 209 
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This however is not entirely on the mark.  As has already been pointed out, 
Wang seems to develop his argument for the social policies which he eventually 
recommends by simply mapping out the kinds of causal connections between the 
ruler’s acts and policies and their effects on the people.  In other words for Wang the 
said policy recommendations really are justified based on the good effects that follow 
from them.  The metaphysics of the Dao, i.e., how the Dao operates, does not seem to 
be the reason for the recommended policies.  As Wagner’s analysis unwittingly 
reveals, one does not decide what the Sage ruler must do (in imitation of the Dao) by 
examining the Dao.  Rather: one begins by examining the kinds of effects that would 
follow if one acted on a particular social policy.  Why should the ruler not literally 
step down, live in isolation, etc, as Wagner so quickly rules out?  I suggest: only 
because there is no political causality between doing so and benefiting the people.  In 
other words, the final and only justificatory basis for deciding what is to be done 
always points back to practical policies and their social effects, not to the metaphysics 
of the Dao.   
Perhaps the speculation on the metaphysics of the Dao might be a 
supplementary justification.  But even this too cannot be. We can see how 
philosophically any attempt to infer a social policy from a Daoist ontology is a failure.  
The conclusion that would follow from this kind of a metaphysics-to-social-policy 
move is generally non-sequitur; the move from up there to down here is fraught with 
difficulties. Suppose we tried to infer some form of policy on the part of the Sage ruler 
from the metaphysics of the Dao.  Taken in context, one would examine how the Dao 
works and then try to infer from this how the Sage ought also to work.  And of course 
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the implicit premise is that the sage operates in a fashion similar to the Dao, since the 
Sage models the Dao.  This seems to be what Wagner has in mind.  He thinks Wang is 
taking the Dao as an exemplary pattern with which to derive similar applicable norms.   
Thus, 
 
There are two standard forms of this imitation structure [between the Sage 
and Heaven].  The first takes the form “the spontaneously Great Ones 
(Heaven, Earth, Dao and so forth) are/do X, that is why the Sage does x1,” 
x1 being a derivative or imitation of x.  The Sage’s “taking Heaven as 
model” or “harmonizing his capacity/receipt with [that of] Heaven and 
Earth” is expressed through the “that is why” linking the section about 
Heaven/Earth and the Sage, respectively….The second states, usually as a 
paradox, some form of operation of the negative opposite, which is the 
characteristic of the relationship between the One and the Many, and ends 
with “that is why the Sage…”21
 
But it becomes apparent that one can infer everything and nothing from the 
metaphysics of the Dao.  All one knows is that the sage ruler will imitate Heaven (or 
the Dao).  Since the Sage and the Dao are certainly not the same type of entity, the 
imitation cannot be univocal.  Which means to say: it cannot be an exact, replicative 
imitation.  So the imitation is analogical, which means that the sage will operate in a 
way similar to the way the Dao operates.  But to speak of “similarity” is to say that 
                                                 
21 ibid., 179 
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there are some ways which are the same, and other ways which are different.  So the 
next question is: Which are the same, and how are they the same?  Which are the ways 
of the Dao that the ruler should model, and how shall he model them?   Cast in the 
jargon of Wagner’s analysis, we could ask how does one derive x1 from X?  I argue 
that the move from X to x1 is necessarily arbitrary.     
Consider the following example.  Suppose I said that Mary has a cousin who 
looks like her. Mary has long, blond hair, big brown eyes, a high nose, high 
cheekbones and rosy cheeks, is 1.6 meters tall and slim.  Mary’s cousin’s name is 
Peter.  What would Peter look like?  We cannot except with arbitrary choice choose 
whatever we will choose of Mary’s likeness to reproduce in our profile of Peter, 
because whatever we leave out could equally well be included in our conception of 
what Peter may look like.   Should Peter have blond hair, a high nose and brown eyes? 
Well, there is no reason to think that Peter may have only one or two of these qualities, 
or that Peter may have any other plausible combinations.  But that is not the only 
difficulty. Peter and Mary are generally of the same type, i.e., human beings, though 
not of the same gender.  Suppose I said that Mary has a dog which also looks like her 
(though not to her distress).  Things get even more complicated, because then we 
would have to try to figure out not only what, but how that which is replicated is in 
fact replicated.  Brown eyes are straightforward, but suppose we think that the dog 
would also have features like those of Mary, who has a high nose and a certain 
construction of cheek bones.  How would a dog have a “high nose”?  Would it tip 
upwards, or would it merely be long so that it extends somewhat beyond the mouth? 
Or its facial structure: how would it be similar to Mary’s?  How can a dog have “high 
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cheekbones”?  Will it have a wide face that parts at the eyes, or will it have cheeks that 
shift the eyes upwards?  Suppose further: not only do Mary’s cousin and dog bear a 
likeness to her, she even owns a car that has an uncanny semblance to her.  Now this is 
where it gets really tough: Mary is an organism and the car is a machine.  How will the 
car’s external features replicate the likeness of Mary’s high nose and facial 
construction, her slim build and her height?   I will leave it to your imagination.  But 
that is the point: imagination.  There is no trustworthy inference here.  It is at best an 
inductive leap, and the leap is wider as the genetic distance between the two entities 
being compared increases.    
Reverting then to the Dao and the Sage, we have here two kinds of entities 
genetically very, very distant. How will the Sage imitate, model, bear an analogous 
likeness to (the way) the Dao (operates)?  It is anybody’s guess. To say, as Wagner 
makes Wang out as saying, that one could infer the particular policies from (the way) 
the Dao (operates) seems to me impossibly non-sequitur.     
 
Let me venture my interpretation.  I suggest that the practical policies of the 
Sage are not derived from a metaphysics of the Dao.  As Wang’s own discussion 
amply evidences, they are obtained from a non-ontological, practical analysis of the 
social consequences and effects of various kinds of political action:  
 
The sage does not establish punishments and names in order to impose 
restraints on the people. [If one tries to control the people with 
punishments, cleverness and treachery will surely arise; if one tries to 
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define with names how people should behave, order and consideration will 
surely be lost]22  Nor does he create promotions and honors in order to cull 
and discard the unworthy. [If…the splendors of reputation and conduct are 
publicized and exalted, one will cultivate that which can exalt him in hope 
of the praise involved and cultivate that which can lead to it in expectation 
of the material advantage involved.  Because of hope for praise and 
expectation of material advantage, he will conduct himself with diligence, 
but the more splendid the praise, the more he will thrust sincerity away, 
and the greater the material advantage, the more contentious he will be 
inclined to be.  The heart felt feelings that fathers, sons, older brothers, 
younger brothers should have for one another will lose their authenticity]23 
He enhances the natural state of the myriad folk but does not serve as the 
starting point for them…Because he does not exalt the worthy and the 
resourceful, the common folk do not contend.  Because he does not value 
goods hard to get, the common folk do not become thieves.  Because he 
does not allow them to see desirable things, the hearts/minds of the 
common folk are not subject to disorder…24
 
To be sure, Wang does ask that we keep in mind the Sovereign Dao when we act 
or say anything.  He asks that we recall that the Dao is the ontological cause of all (the 
dynamisms) of the myriad things, including human beings: “In what one says, do not 
                                                 
22 Wang Bi, The Classic, op. cit., “Outline Introduction”, 34. 
23 ibid., 39 
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put the progenitor at a distance, and in what one undertakes, do not neglect the 
Sovereign [Dao].”25  But effectively in the case of human beings this comes down to 
saying that we should keep in mind human nature’s mode of operation, and how that 
can inform politics. For: human nature is itself a product of the Dao, so being attentive 
to human nature is in a sense being attentive to the Dao.  This is the closest that one 
can get to the claim that the Dao can help inform our construction of social policies.   
Still, this is not so much deriving social and political policies from a metaphysics of 
the Dao so much as deriving policies from a philosophical anthropology while at the 
same time appreciating the Dao as the origin of that anthropology.  The metaphysics 
of the Dao is here philosophically redundant.  In its essence, the policies are the fruit 
of a purely non-metaphysical, social analysis, built on an attentiveness to human 
nature and its mode of operation, rather than the way the Dao operates.  Even if we did 
not know that the Dao was nameless and formless, was not benevolent, etc, the 
arguments that the Sage ought to practice a policy of wuwei and ziran would have still 
gone through.  That conclusion was premised on the structures of human behavior, 
i.e., human nature, rather than the structure of the Dao and its comings and goings.  
Section 47 and Wang’s commentary bring out all this nicely: 
 
[Laozi:] Know all under heaven without even leaving your gate; see the 
Dao of Heaven without even peering out your window. [Wang Bi:] Matters 
have a progenitor, and things have a master.  Although roads differ, they 
all bring one back to the same place, and, although there might be 
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hundreds of ways to deliberate, there is an ultimate congruence in thought.  
The Dao has its great constancy, and principle has its great perfection, so 
“hold on to the Dao of old to preside over what exists now.”  Although we 
live in the present, it is possible for us to know how things were at the 
beginning of time.  Thus one can know [the Dao] without leaving his gate 
or peering out his window.  
[Laozi:] Thus it is that the sage knows without making a move and names 
without seeing.  [Wang Bi:] Because the sage grasps the principle of things 
perfectly, although he does not make a move, he is able to know what 
happens just by his power of inference.  Because he recognizes the 
progenitor of things, although he does not see what happens, the principles 
of right and wrong are his to name. 
[Laozi:] He brings about the completion of things without taking 
deliberate action. [Wang Bi:] He understands the nature [xing] of things 
and does nothing other than stay in accord with it.  Thus although he does 
not take deliberate action, he brings about their completion.26
 
Does this mean therefore that the metaphysics of the Dao has nothing to do 
with the social philosophy?  Not entirely.  For: when placed side by side, there are 
many analogical parallels to be drawn between the Sage’s political modus operandi 
and the way the Dao operates.   Indeed, it is now that there can be sensible talk of the 
Sage modeling the Dao. With the metaphysics of negativity and the Dao on the one 
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hand, and the Sage’s political strategy on the other (non-metaphysically, socially 
obtained), we have now two things before us to compare.  They are not totally 
identical, but there are some interesting similarities to be drawn.  As I read Wang, 
these parallels are for him not merely ontological, but much more interestingly, 
semantic.  Wang’s reading of the Daode Jing brings out the kinds of semantic 
analogies, or puns, if you like, between descriptions of the Dao and descriptions of the 
Sage’s political strategies.  Such analogies include improper analogies which are 
really equivocal and hence are more metaphors than analogies of proportionality, to 
borrow a neo-scholastic distinction. By “metaphor” I mean the use of a word to refer 
to something else that the word was not originally a signifier of in its original context.  
The Sage’s modeling or imitation of the Dao and Heaven is hence so broadly (and 
interestingly too) conceived that it goes beyond the ontological parallels, but includes 
the kinds of descriptive similarities that exist—descriptions which are semantically 
identical but nevertheless equivocal.   That is to say, they describe totally different 
events and states of affairs, but they share the same kind of description.27  Let me 
bring out the prominent ones. 
                                                 
27 see also Alan Chan, Two Visions of the Way: A Study of the Wang Pi and the Ho-
shang Kung Commentaries on the Lao-Tzu, (NY:SUNY, 1991) 45-57 which so 
carefully argues that for Wang Bi, the terms or concepts like “wu” and “li” do not 
necessarily have positive metaphysical (ontic) referents.  Rather they are heuristic or 
explanatory terms expressing the relation between the Dao and the world. I agree with 
Chan in the first following sense: that these concepts do not necessarily have 
metaphysical referents, because sometimes they have non-metaphysical referents.  
Rather, these are terms with broad possible meanings, and so can metaphorically and 
hence equivocally capture non-metaphysical claims, such as political strategies or 
social policies, or analogical parallels between the Dao’s and the Sage’s operative 
modes.   In this sense Chan’s claim that such terms do not necessarily extend to the 
ontic is true, and I agree.   But still such terms do at times capture metaphysical 
insights about the Dao, namely its formlessness (and thus namelessness), and it would 
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The ontological similarities are more apparent.  With something of a kind of 
naïve argument for the existence of a transcendent being, the Daode Jing argues that 
some kind of transcendent being or principles (the Dao) must exist, because there are 
these effects: the ten thousand entities or myriad things are caused to exist, and caused 
to fulfill their natures or dynamisms.  Here there is a kind of simple effect-to-cause 
inference.  And, this Dao does not cause the ten thousand things to fulfill their natures 
or dynamism with any obvious form of interfering activity: in fact it seems rather 
hidden.   And to add to its hidden-ness is the fact that the Dao has no phenomenal 
shape or form, and cannot be sensed, heard, touched or tasted: 
 
[Laozi:] When we look for it but we see it not, we call it the invisible.  
When we listen for it but hear it not, we call it the inaudible.  When we try 
to touch it but find it not, we call it the imperceptible.  Because these three 
aspects of it are impossible to probe, it remains a single amorphous unity. 
[Wang Bi:] It is shapeless, leaving no image, and soundless, leaving no 
reverberation and reaches absolutely everywhere.  We cannot get to know 
it and even less know how to give it a name derived from how it looks, 
sounds or feels.  Thus, because it is impossible to probe, it remains a 
single, amorphous unity. 
                                                                                                                                            
be wrong for Chan to say that such concepts do not extend to metaphysical claims.  
However Chan’s point is not that they do not extend to making metaphysical claims, 
but rather that these metaphysical claims about the Dao are not ontically positive, but 
really negative claims.  They tell us what the Dao is not, or what it lacks (namely, that 
it lacks a form). (p. 50) In this sense Chan says that concepts like “wu” have no 
metaphysical extension.  If taken in this sense, I also agree with Chan, and I concur 
with him when he says that insofar as “wu” is concerned, “logically the idea of 
substance is not intrinsic to Wang [Bi’s] analysis” (p 51). 
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[Laozi:] Its risings cast no light, and its settings occasion no dark.  On 
and on it goes, unnamable, always reverting to nothingness. This we refer 
to as the shape of that which has no shape, the image of that which has no 
physical existence. [Wang Bi:] You might wish to say it does not exist, but 
everything achieves existence because of it, and then you might wish to 
say that it does exist, but we do not see its form.   This is why the text 
refers to it as “the shape of that which has no shape, the image of that 
which has no physical existence”.28
 
Similarly, because the Sage is aware (by way of a non-ontological social 
analysis) that policies of social interference are really self-defeating and socially 
frustrating, he does not engage in them.  For: intensifying punitive action—even if 
mainly paternalistic—will just  encourage the subjects to devise more cunning ways to 
avoid the laws, and promises of honors for compliance lead to insincere and corrupt 
motives. And just as the Dao is hidden, out of sight, so too the sage does his best to 
stay out of the public eye.  For: the Sage Ruler knows that common folk are eager to 
pursue his ideals to win his favor.29 His public proclamations of his likes and dislikes, 
which come through in his differentiations of what is good and bad lead people to 
comply to these standards of behavior for non-moral reasons, and thus authentic 
morality is not encouraged.  Hence like the Dao, he does not engage in unnecessary 
social interference, and keeps a very low profile. And for doing so, the people under 
his governance or care in fact flourish:  they do not wrangle in competitive strife to 
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29 ibid. 159, 183 
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win honors, or become more cunningly perverse through devising ways to get around 
the law, and thus society will benefit from avoiding the kinds of moral perversion that 
would follow from such striving.   
Hence putting the Dao and the Sage side by side, we see how they in fact 
parallel each other in their modes of operation.  And thus we have the famous straw-
dogs passage, showing how the Sage ruler models Heaven and Earth. Since Heaven 
and earth take their models from the Dao,30 by extension, the Sage models the Dao.  
For the way of the Daoist Sage-Ruler, of Heaven and Earth, and of the Dao is to not 
engage in conscious effort (wuwei), the latter understood specifically as not applying 
policies of behavioral manipulation and not simply doing nothing.  
 
[Laozi:] Heaven and Earth are not benevolent and treat the myriad things 
as straw dogs.  [Wang Bi:]  Heaven and Earth allow things to follow their 
natural bent and neither engage in conscious effort nor start anything, 
leaving the myriad things to manage themselves.  Thus they are “not 
benevolent.” The benevolent have to establish institutions and influence 
behavior, for they are prone to use kindness and make conscious effort.  
But when institutions are established and behavior influenced, people lose 
their authenticity, and when subject to kindness and conscious effort, they 
no longer preserve their integrity.  If people do not preserve their integrity, 
they no longer have the capacity to uphold the full weight of their 
existence.  Heaven and earth do no make grass grow for the sake of beasts, 
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yet beasts eat grass.  They do not produce dogs for the sake of men, yet 
men eat dogs.  Heaven and earth take no conscious effort with respect to 
the myriad things, yet because each of the myriad things has what is 
appropriate for its use, not one thing is denied support.  As long as you use 
kindness derived from a personal perspective, it indicates a lack of 
capacity to leave things to themselves.  
[Laozi:] The Sage is not benevolent and treats the common folk as straw 
dogs.  [Wang Bi:]  Because the sage makes his virtue conform to that of 
Heaven and Earth, he likens the common folk to straw dogs.31
 
And there are more parallels. But beyond this the parallels drawn by Wang’s 
Laozi need to be grasped as parallels that are not just ontological correspondences. 




Our analogies so far have been ontological.  If we extend the analogies beyond 
the ontological, interesting ideas emerge.  The Dao is nameless and formless.  But the 
sage is also formless and nameless—not ontologically, but politically.  Because the 
sage avoids interventionist politics, he avoids forming or shaping his subjects through 
punitive rules or the law.  He does not seek to “cut things” into the desirable shapes or 
forms. Thus he is “formless”: 
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He [the Sage] follows the natural bent of the people, neither formulating 
nor implementing…Instead, he should follow the nature of the people and 
not try to carve them into shapes according to forms external to them32
 
Again, he avoids explicitly intervening to encourage moral conformity by 
distributing honors, promotions and prestige, i.e., he avoids establishing “names” 
(ming: honors, prestige).  Thus he is nameless.   By being formless and nameless, i.e., 
by not trying to enforce morality or desired social norms, he avoids promoting the 
kind of competitive wrangling that is morally insincere and aimed merely at seeking 
the goods of honors and avoiding punitive consequences.  He avoids breeding a nation 
of people who are simply pretentious do-gooders but who are doing good for the 
wrong (or at least, less than ideal) non-moral reasons (e.g., for obtaining material 
advantage, reputation and esteem, etc).  Wang’s commentary on Section 38 of the 
Laozi delivers these ideas clearly: 
 
It is because one functions not by using forms and rules and by not using 
names that it becomes possible for benevolence and righteousness, 
propriety and etiquette to manifest and display themselves.  If one upholds 
the people with the great Dao and presses on them with the nameless, they 
will have nothing to exalt their hearts and their hearts/minds will have 
nothing to scheme for.  As each person tends to his own proper affairs and 
acts out of his own sense of sincerity, the virtue of benevolence deepens, 
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the practice of righteousness rectifies itself, and propriety and etiquette 
become pure accordingly.33
 
Notice here how these two attributes, “formlessness” (wuxing) and 
“namelessness” (wuming) refer to very different qualities when applied to the Dao and 
to the Sage.  When applied to the Dao they refer to its metaphysical structure.  When 
applied to the Sage, they refer to his political strategies, and not to his metaphysical 
structure.  Thus when the Dao and the Sage are said to be formless, “formless” here is 
used equivocally, and likewise for “nameless”.  Compare this with the earlier 
corresponding parallel drawn between the Dao and the Sage where both are said to be 
practicing wuwei, i.e., not engaging in conscious effort. There at least “wuwei” is 
analogical, for it describes the way the Dao and the Sage similarly operate.  The 
parallels were still ontological, because they were parallels of the way both the Dao 
and the Sage act and behave. Here, however, ontological parallels are not the interest. 
Instead, the comparative parallel points out how two very ontologically distinct 
beings, qualities or occurrences are covered by the same descriptive term. What seems 
to be happening here is that Wang’s Laozi is constructing metaphors or puns.  Wang is 
trying to describe different ideas with the same term or phrase.   He is picking out two 
different phenomena and describing them with the same words or phrases.  When 
applied to these two different phenomena, the descriptive words or phrases operate 
equivocally.   The metaphysics of the Dao no more signifies ontology; it now 
references political theory.  It is used as a metaphorical code for the political doctrine. 
                                                 






These are of course not the only instances of such metaphorical parallels.  If 
one examines Wang’s Laozi one will see Wang pointing out many such metaphors in 
overlapping layers, and intermingled with the metaphysical or ontological parallels.  I 
have been far from exhaustive.  Still, we are ready, at this point I think, to appreciate 
what I believe to be Wang’s grasp of the full meaning of the two opening stanzas of 
the Daode Jing: Dao ke Dao, fei chang Dao; ming ke ming, fei chang ming. 
What is clear from Wang’s commentary is that these two stanzas refer to the 
formlessness of the real Dao, and hence its namelessness. 34   They capture a 
metaphysical truth about the Dao, its ontological structure and the inability of 
language to describe it precisely.  Hence if you could describe through speech a Dao, 
that “Dao” cannot be the unchanging, constant Dao, itself indescribable: Dao ke Dao, 
fei chang Dao. Again, if you could give it a name, then that name that you gave to the 
Dao could not be an accurate name, because the Dao, being formless, has no 
corresponding name: ming ke ming, fei chang ming.  
Yet that is not all that is said.  They also capture political insights.  These 
ontological claims about the Dao are a kind of metaphor or imagery for a whole set of 
political wisdoms, themselves arrived at on the basis of a purely social analysis.   For 
just as the terms “nameless” and “formless” express the metaphorical analogies or 
merely semantic parallels between the metaphysical structure of the Dao and the 
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Sages’ political strategy, so also the metaphysics of the Dao is expressed by two 
stanzas.  Notice that my claim is not merely that the two stanzas capture the political 
insights, but that the metaphysics of the Dao captures metaphorically these political 
insights.   Let me explain. 
It is easy to see how the two lines express in some manner the political and 
policy insights of Wang’s Laozi.   Here and there the Laozi speaks of the Sage as 
practicing the teaching that is not expressed in words.  As could easily be gathered 
from Wang’s own social analysis, if one tries to speak or preach (Dao) moral behavior 
(Dao) through a policy of institutional intervention, then you will not in fact get 
authentic morality, or at least you will not get morality that lasts (chang Dao).  So that 
morality (Dao) that you can get from such institutional preaching (Dao) is not the 
unchanging and authentic morality (chang Dao): Dao ke Dao fei chang Dao. Again, if 
one promoted or praised (ming) the morally worthy (ming), then the worthy would be 
overcome with seeking praise and soon lose that true moral worthiness. In other 
words, the moral worthiness (ming) that is praised or honored with promotions (ming) 
just would not be the kind that is true, authentic moral worthiness, or at least it would 
not be the kind that lasts (chang ming): ming ke ming, fei chang ming.  
But I think there is a deeper and more interesting metaphorical analogy than 
this in the text of Wang’s Laozi, very cleverly brought out by Wang’s own 
commentary.  This metaphorical analogy is that between the metaphysics of the Dao, 
as explicated by Wang, and the political and policy insights of the Daode Jing.  
Meaning, the political insights are captured not merely semantically by the two 
opening stanzas, but by the metaphysics of the Dao expressed by these two stanzas.  
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The two stanzas express a sophisticated metaphysical account of the namelessness and 
formlessness of the Dao, which in turn is a kind of metaphorical imagery for the 
political insights of the Daode Jing. 
We have pointed out how the Sage is formless and nameless because he does 
not promulgate many rules to cut people into forms and does not use promises of 
prestige or names to persuade people to behave well.  We could be more specific.  
Because the sage knows that the ruler’s proclamations of good and bad have the effect 
of influencing the common folk to conform to these ideals for non-moral or insincere 
reasons, he avoids these proclamations.  Effectively it means that he avoids making 
normative differentiations.  That is, he avoids spelling out to the public what he means 
by “good” or “bad”. For a normative differentiation attempts to delineate specifically 
what “goodness” or “badness” refers to.  This does not mean that he is normatively 
neutral.  What it does mean is that he avoids making known his judgments of what is 
“good” and “bad”, so that the common folk cannot know them.  But one need not 
restrict “making known” to the verbal, because the performative also reveals. So by 
extension, he avoids actions which make known what he thinks are morally 
praiseworthy qualities, such as “benevolence”, “righteousness” and “propriety”.  Such 
actions include establishing institutions or enacting policies which exemplify or 
promote these qualities, or these “forms”.  For: it becomes quickly apparent to the 
watching common folk that such “forms” are what the Ruler thinks are good or worthy 
qualities, which he himself embodies and thus esteems, and wishes to inculcate in 
others.   
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It is important to note also that what he wishes the common folk to not know 
are his judgments of morality, of good and bad.  This is not the same as saying that he 
does not wish them to know what is morally right or wrong; quite the contrary.   Nor 
is this saying that he would suppress the teaching of morality.  These states of affairs 
are not mutually exclusive.  Someone else other than the Sage Ruler could teach 
morality, and the common folk could all be morally informed, but all the while they 
may not know what the Sage Ruler’s moral opinions are.  The purpose of leaving his 
judgments on these notions muddled (not in himself but) amongst the common folk is 
that it discourages conformity to these qualities or replicating these moral acts for 
ulterior, non-moral motives rather than for their own sakes.   Hence paradoxically, by 
not making known his judgment on what are moral virtues, authentic morality 
flourishes.  In this way, those who would be called or named “moral” are now truly 
moral, as their names suggest. Thus,  
 
When the Dao is rejected as the means to uphold [the people] and 
discarded as the means to sustain their lives, use is then made of the 
concrete forms it takes and application of what the intelligence perceives 
of it.  If [it takes the form of] benevolence, one shows it esteem.  If [one 
takes the form of] righteousness, one wrangles about it.  If [one takes the 
form of] propriety, one makes it an object of dispute.  Therefore the 
deepening of the virtue of benevolence is impossible for one who uses [the 
form of] benevolence; the rectification of the practice of righteousness is 
not achieved by one who uses [the form of] righteousness; and the 
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purification of propriety and etiquette is not attained by one who uses [the 
form of] propriety.  
It is when one upholds them with [the people] with the Dao and 
unites them and controls them with the mother that benevolence may be 
manifest but there is no esteem of it, and righteousness and propriety may 
be displayed but there is no wrangling over them.  It is by making use of 
the nameless that names become honest and by making use of the formless 
that forms become perfect.  If one preserves the child by holding fast to the 
mother and makes the branch tips flourish by enhancing the roots, forms 
and names will all exist, but anomalies will not occur.35
 
If we place this social analysis alongside Wang’s metaphysical commentary on 
the ontology of the Dao, the metaphorical parallels become clear.  Wang’s Dao is 
nameless because it is formless, metaphysically.  Yet the myriad things, which have 
forms and thus are nameable and so have names, are completed and perfected in 
existence by this formless and nameless Dao: 
 
 Dao ke Dao fei chang Dao; ming ke ming, fei chang ming 
The Dao that can be rendered in language and the name that can be given 
it point to a thing or reproduce a form, neither of which is in its constancy.  
That is why it can neither be rendered in language nor given a name. 
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 …before it has forms and when it is still nameless, it serves as the origin 
of the myriad things, and once it has forms and is named, it matures them 
as their mother.  In other words, the Dao, by being itself formless and 
nameless, originates and brings the myriad things to completion. 36
 
Like the Dao, the Sage Ruler is formless and nameless, and completes the 
myriad things, which have forms.  But all these have to be grasped in a different sense, 
i.e., in terms of Wang’s social analysis: the Sage Ruler does not use (institutional) 
forms, xing (of moral qualities), and so he is formless. Because he does not use any of 
these forms, he does not reveal his honoring or esteeming (ming) of any of these 
forms. Hence he is nameless.    Nonetheless, the moral forms become authentic, 
perfected, and the names become honest, in the sense that people develop the true 
actualities which the moral names name.    
 In other words, the metaphysics of the nameless and formless Dao as the origin 
and completing principle of the myriad things with forms and names becomes a kind 
of imagery for the social teaching that the wise Sage Ruler uses, avoiding forms and 
names, and is hence nameless and formless, with the effect that forms and names 
come to exist and are perfected.   Hence the metaphysical speculation of the Dao 
becomes a kind of metaphor which captures in an equivocal manner, but no less 
interestingly, the Daode Jing’s social doctrine of effective governance.  This, I dare to 
conclude, is the only place of the metaphysics of the Dao in the social and political 
thought of the Daode Jing—not for deriving the practical policies, but for capturing in 
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a metaphorical manner these practical policies.  At least, this is the way I think Wang 
saw it.37  
The reasons for thus mapping the social doctrine of the Daode Jing could be 
various: perhaps it was to enable its easy remembrance, like some form of memory 
key where each aspect of the metaphysics of the Dao could associatively recall some 
aspect of the social doctrine; perhaps the interest was purely contemplative, to see how 
the Sage Ruler curiously parallels the cosmic order; or perhaps it was pedagogical, 
because it aroused curiosity and edged the reader on with its amazing cosmic 
parallels.38   My guess is that for Wang, the author of Daode Jing had a little of all of 
these in mind.  But whatever the intent of the author, the fact remains that there is this 
metaphysical map, which captures the social doctrine of the Daode Jing, and Wang’s 
particular contribution to all of us readers of this classic ancient text, young as he was, 
was the gift of his genius that surfaced it, and much to our delight.  As he said it, “let it 
be those who think in terms of corresponding analogies, and none will fail to take 
                                                 
37 It is useful just to note that while I argue Wang does not derive ethics or political 
policies from metaphysics, I mean precisely that he does not derive it from a 
metaphysical doctrine of the dao.  There is still, in a certain sense, some form of 
derivation of political doctrine from a metaphysics of human nature  or philosophical 
anthropology.  This is because he makes observations of human behavior and infers 
what works and what does not when enforcing various political strategies to make 
them moral. In this sense he is informed by a metaphysics of human nature, even if not 
a metaphysics of the Dao.  I am thankful to David Wong for alerting me to this. 
38 see ibid, 34.  See also Lynn’s footnote 45 on pg. 44 which quotes Zheng Xuan and 
Kong Yingda’s Record of Rites:  “Thus it is that the teaching of the noble man is 
metaphorical.  It leads but does not drag you, is strong but does not force, and starts 
you off but does not take you all the way.  Because it leads but does not drag, you go 
along harmoniously.  Because it is strong but does not force, you go along easily.  
Because [it] starts you off but does not take you all the way, it makes you think...”  
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delight in the correspondences its thought makes and, as such, grasp the concepts they 
seek in it.”39
 
Continuity and Change 
 
I have tried to illuminate the double-layeredness of Wang’s reading of the 
Laozi.  My theory, as I have argued, is that there is always a metaphorical parallel to a 
speculative reading of the text.  Underlying and perhaps superimposed onto the 
metaphysical reading is the political or pragmatic reading.  However the political or 
pragmatic doctrine is never derived from the metaphysical doctrine.  This is my main 
departure from Wagner’s Wang Bi study.  I will offer one more reason why my 
interpretation is better: because it coheres better with the results of recent research in 
Daoist scholarship.  
Chad Hansen in his 1992 influential work, A Daoist Theory of Chinese 
Thought argued against the “name-change hypothesis” and suggested that the many 
metaphysical or mystical readings of the first two lines of the Laozi misrepresents the 
true point of the Laozi, which is really a theory about practice or activity. Applying a 
distinction between the metaphysical-Dao and performance-Dao, he suggested that 
Laozi’s message was not about the indescribability of a metaphysical entity called the 
Dao, but really a claim that any spoken teaching is not (always) the Dao that should 
guide our practical performances.  Contrary to the claims of the name-change 
hypothesis, “Dao” has not, Hansen argues, somehow evolved from a term designating 
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performance or behavior to some kind of onto-theological entity. That is, Laozi’s 
teaching is not that we should be skeptical about attempts to describe the One 
Metaphysical Entity called the Dao, but a skepticism about claims by teachers to teach 
through speech the Way (Dao) or the right way we should behave.  It calls into 
question not metaphysical or onto-theological discourse. Instead, it calls into question 
guidance discourse.  In other words, for Hansen, Daoism is not about metaphysical 
onto-theology.  It is about language and politics, and has never quite deviated from 
this.40  Thus Hansen: 
“Strangely, practically everyone agrees…that [the first line of the Laozi: 
Dao ke Dao fei chang Dao] asserts the ineffability of the metaphysical, 
mystical object called Dao.  That is, the first line…speaks of something of 
which it claims it cannot speak.  That consensus is wrong.  The first line 
does not assert that anything is ineffable.  It entails neither the existence 
nor the ineffability of a single metaphysical or prescriptive Dao…In 
Chinese, modifiers precede the terms they modify. One grammatically 
acceptable parsing Dao ke Dao is as a verb-object.  (Remember that 
subject terms are optional in classical Chinese.) Hence: speak the 
speakable. The conclusion may be, first, that doing so is not constant 
speaking. (Remember that Dao speaking is guiding speech.  Guiding 
speech will change.) Or it may be, second, that doing so would not yield a 
                                                 
40 see Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, (NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 216 
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constant performance Dao.  The passage reminds us of the interpretive 
problem: no linguistic guides give constant guidance.”41  
According to Hansen’s study, the implicit supposition in Daoism is that 
language has practical or behavioral consequences.   Language divides reality by 
constructing distinctions. Often these divisions are not purely neutral and non-
evaluative.  When reality is cut up as either X or not-X, things falling under one type 
are then preferred and the other not. So to divide has the practical effect of evaluating.  
To say that something is this or that is implicitly to present it as desirable or not, or 
what ought to be or what not, or what ought to be done, and others not, what is good 
and what is bad.  Daoism’s point is that these linguistic divisions are often artificial 
and conventional, and following that, the many forms of evaluations.  Its point is that 
we should be skeptical about the evaluations that follow from these linguistic 
divisions, and to realize that they are not always invariant.  These evaluations, buried 
in the spoken language, do not yield that constant invariant performance-Dao. The 
“Dao” that is speakable or spoken does not (always) yield the constant invariable 
(performance) Dao.  Hansen’s research is an illumination for Daoist scholarship.  I 
quote: 
“Interpreters have long puzzled about the practical, political focus of the 
text.  If the central doctrine is metaphysics, what is all this political advice 
doing?  We avoid this interpretive quandary if we do not treat the central 
doctrine as mystical metaphysics but as linguistic skepticism.  That 
skepticism arises against a background assumption that language is a 
                                                 
41 ibid, 215-216 
 43
 44
social mechanism for regulating people’s behavior.  The political doctrines 
thus play a role in the Daode-Jing’s pragmatic theory of language.  Their 
point is to illustrate the inconstancy of any guiding terms and discourse.  
He illustrates his point in the common language of Chinese philosophical 
reversal of conventional political and moral attitudes.  He reverses 
conventional values, preferences, or desires.  His advice signals, as well, 
continuing acceptance of the Ru-Mo psychological model.  Whatever 
practical outcome we achieve will flow from social leaders. This part 
allows the Daode Jing to be used by political theorists as advice to the 
ruler. 
“This practical advice is the Daoist reversal of opposites.  Political 
advice is only one manifestation…The pragmatic (as opposed to 
metaphysical or semantic) difference between each pair of opposites lies in 
out preferences.  A single distinction creates both names.  We learn some 
pattern of preference or desire for one and aversion for another. Laozi’s 
political doctrine illustrates the inconstancy of names and Daos’ consisting 
of names.  He shows us that we can reverse all those conventional 
preferences.  They do not provide constant guidance.  There are cases 
where opposite guidance (reversing the value assignments) is better.42
 
As we saw above, Wang’s reading of the Laozi makes a similar point.  He too warns 
of the kinds of influences that differentiating speech has on people listening, especially 
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when these differentiations are promulgated by the Ruler. At the same time, like 
Wagner, I am convinced Wang’s theory has an explicitly metaphysical or onto-
theological component.  What then shall we say of Hansen’s claim that the 
metaphysical onto-theological reading of original Daoism is incorrect, and by 
implication, my or Wagner’s interpretation of Wang’s own reading of the Laozi?     
Hansen’s study was of course on Shen Dao and the Laozi text itself, and not 
Wang’s commentary.  Still, his study raises interesting issues for Wagner. Because: if 
the constant “Dao” is truly the performance-Dao, then under Wagner’s interpretation, 
Wang’s commentary has altered the Dao’s original meaning and arrived at a novel 
interpretation and perhaps wrongly understood of the “Dao”.  Recall that for Wagner, 
Wang starts off with the metaphysical reading of the text, speculating on the constant 
“Dao” as non-being (wu) and giving rise to the plenitude of beings (you).  The 
metaphysical reading of the constant Dao then becomes a general premise for inferring 
or deriving political principles.  Under Wagner’s reading, the constant “Dao” has no 
double meaning—it refers to some form of onto-theological source of the plenitude of 
beings.  This reading of the constant “Dao” as a metaphysical or mystical Dao then 
excludes the notion of the constant Dao as the performance Dao, i.e., the performance 
Dao which Hansen thinks is the Dao of the Laozi.   In other words, it seems to me that 
Wagner’s reading suggests Wang has made a radical break from authentic Daoism. 
The kind of name-change of the “Dao” that Hansen sought to argue against would in 
fact be realized in Wagner’s Wang Bi commentary.   
My reading, however, pictures the development of Daoism differently.  While 
like Wagner I defend the ontological reading of the constant Dao in Wang, I am able 
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at the same time to maintain a stronger continuity of the Hansenian, if you like, or the 
authentic reading of the constant Dao as the performance Dao in Wang.  In other 
words, compared with Wagner’s reading, my story is that there is a strong continuity 
from the original meaning of the Laozi (under the Hansenian reading) through to 
Wang’s own commentarial reading. I do maintain that there is an additional reading of 
the constant Dao in its metaphysical slant, superimposed in the very same text.  Still, 
the reading of the constant Dao as “performance Dao” with its pragmatic or behavioral 
slant is not replaced or rejected: it persists in Wang.  You may already see how this 
this is the case.  According to my theory of the use of metaphors in Wang’s 
commentarial reading of the Laozi, the two interpretations of the text and of the “Dao” 
are not mutually exclusive.  As I have tried to demonstrate above, the text can 
accommodate both understandings of the constant Dao, with their two respective 
meanings.  By reading the words or phrases of the text as metaphorically capturing a 
second layer of meaning, Wang Bi’s interpretation of the Laozi finds in the Daoist 
classic both lines of thought about the constant Dao: first the Unnameable as a 
metaphysical ontological source (metaphysical/mystical Dao) of all beings and 
secondly that authentic morality (performance Dao) that cannot be spoken or taught.    
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that Wang’s Laozi does not read his political theory as a 
derivation from a metaphysics of the Dao. Wang’s complex and intriguing reading of 
the Laozi impresses me as a philosophical and literary masterpiece. At the center of it 
all is his theory of language: that there is a certain relation between names, 
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designations, forms and actualities.   In the next chapter, I hope to discuss the origins 
of Wang’s theory of language, and to flash out clearly how it serves as the key to his 
very original and fascinating commentarial reading of the Laozi, which has the Dao as 
the source of his desired political society, thus integrating a metaphysics of the Dao 











Tracing the Dao in Wang Bi’s Laozi 
 
Introduction 
This chapter starts by tracing the historical development of the theory of language in 
Chinese philosophy in order to uncover the philosophical antecedents and possible 
influences of the linguistic epistemology of the 3rd Century Chinese commentator of 
the Daode Jing, Wang Bi (AD 226-249). This will help us arrive at a description of 
the basic tenets of Wang’s theory of language. As we shall see, Wang Bi’s theory of 
language builds on the correlative theory of names (ming) and actualities (shi) of Dong 
Zhong Shu (BC 179-104) and Xu Gan (AD 170-271). These latter theorists departed 
from a nominalist theory when they insisted that names have a real ontological and 
epistemic dependence on actualities (shi) by way of the form (xing).  They therefore 
concluded that we could trace a name back to its correlated form or actuality. Wang’s 
own linguistic epistemology is heavily influenced by that.  I will argue that his very 
unique original reading of the Daode Jing is influenced and made possible by his 
theory of language.  As I will demonstrate, Wang has a metaphorical reading of that 
theory of language, and that allows him to “infer” the form or actuality of a name, 
through political reflection all the way to the Dao as its source, thus ushering the 
school of profound discourse (xuan xue). 
 




We start with the classical period of Chinese Philosophy, about 500 BC to 150BC.  In 
fact, one could well begin with Confucius (551-479 BC) and his theory of the 
correction of names (zheng ming).    In the Analects 13.3, we read:43
 
Zilu said, “If the Lord of Wei left the government in your hands, what 
would you attend to first?” 
 The Master said, “It would be the correction of names, I should 
think.” 
 Zilu said, “Are you really so out of touch with things?  Why 
would you correct names?” 
 The Master said, “How boorish you are! In matters that he 
knows nothing about one would expect the gentleman to show some 
reserve.  If names are not correct then affairs are not brought to 
fruition; if affairs are not brought to fruition then ritual and music will 
not prosper; if ritual and music do not prosper then punishments and 
penalties will be inappropriate;  if punishments and penalties are 
inappropriate then the people will not know where to put hand and 
foot.” 
 
There are interpretative disagreements regarding what exactly Confucius meant by the 
term “correction of names”. Still, for Confucius it is clear that the “correction of 
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names”, or having the names corrected, rather, leads to right social and political order. 
Commentators gloss their interpretation of what is specifically at stake in the process 
of zheng ming in either one of the two ways.  The first, typical of Sima Qian, 
understand Confucius to be referring to zheng ming in the context of social relations.  
For them this passage is to be understood in the context of actual historical events in 
which the passage is set.  In particular, this interpretation understands the social roles 
of ‘father’ and ‘son’ to be the referents of the names, ming.  In the Shiji, the Historical 
Records, Sima Qian explains, just before quoting the above passage from the Analects 
13.3: 
 
At this time, the father of Lord Zhe of Wei was unable to be installed 
[as Lord of Wei] and he remained outside of Wei.  The Feudal lord 
repeatedly expressed the view that Zhe should yield the throne to his 
father.  Further, many of Confucius’ disciples were serving in Wei and 
the Lord of Wei wished to obtain Confucius’ political services. 
 
The story goes like this. In 496 BC, Prince Kuai, the father of Zhe and the son of Duke 
Ling, then Lord of Wei, was exiled after an unsuccessful to kill his mother, wife of 
Duke Ling, for rumors of her adulterous affair with Song Chao.  During this time 
Duke Ling died (493 BC), and when his heir apparent, Ying, turned down the offer to 
cede the throne as Lord of Wei, the grandson and the son of Kaui, Zhe took over the 
throne instead, and became Lord Zhe of Wei.  But rightfully, Zhe is the son of his 
father, Kuai, the latter who should inherit the throne to Wei.  Yet when Kuai came to 
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reclaim his throne, he was crushed by an army sent by Zhe.  In a sense, father and son 
had their names “mixed up”, as it were, since the son Zhe, had taken himself to do and 
be what was his own father, Kaui’s rightful role, i.e., to cede the throne. Hence the 
Shiji continues with Confucius’ recommendation: that one should correct names, 
zheng ming—meaning correct the names of those two historical persons, Zhe and 
Kaui, who had wrong mixed up their names, “father” and “son”.44  
So for Sima Qian zheng ming refers to Confucius’ desire to dispute Zhe’s 
legitimacy, and to have him, who is posing as father through claiming the father’s 
rightful throne and wrongly naming himself “father”, be re-installed as a “son”, and 
therefore have Kuai re-instated to the throne as a “father” who had the right to the 
throne.  This interpretation is hence socially specific, and deals with getting social 
relations right.  In a word, to put each one in his place as his real name indicates.  If 
you are a “son”, you will be where a “son” should be, and not pretend to be named 
“father” and stand where a father should be, as it were.  
 
Other  commentators, as early as in the Han dynasty, however, extend the referents of 
the names or ming beyond social roles, to “any and all things generally,”45 perhaps 
mistakenly.  Hence Dong Zhongshu writes, 
 
The Spring and Autumn Annals differentiated the distinguishing marks 
of things so as to correct the names of things46
                                                 
44 see ibid., 35-8 
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Mistake or not, this is where things begin to become exciting for our narrative, 
because this extension of the referent of names (ming) to all things leads the way to 
the Neo-Confucian-nominalist theory of naming that will become school of thought 
that Gu Xan and Wang Bi will resist.  As John Makeham points out, when “the 
Confucian concept of ming, understood as refering to a broad rang of entities, had 
become sufficiently popular, a new interpretation of zheng ming evolved which 
eventually became the other standard traditional Chinese gloss of the term.”47 For 
example, Zheng Xuan, who exemplarizes that interpretation, writes,  
 
Zheng ming means the correction of ‘written words’.  In ancient times 
they were called ming, now they are called zi. Li ji says, “Where there 
are more than one hundred words (ming) they are written on bamboo 
strips.”  Confucius saw that the teachings of his time were not being put 
into practice and therefore wished to correct the misinterpretation of 
written words (wen zi).48
 
Now several things are appearing here in the evolution of the Confucian doctrine of 
the rectification of names.  Firstly we recall that the notion of names has already been 
extended to referents other than social relations.  Secondly, and very importantly, as 
the above indicates, Zheng Xuan, as most Han commentators, understood Confucius 
to be the master who came to offer social and political corrective to what seems to be a 
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rather undesirable social-political situation. Hence, the Confucian enterprise was 
prescriptive, in that it sought to bring about something better according to Confucian 
ideals.  As a matter of fact, Confucius sought to look back into tradition and restore it 
in the unhappy present in order to recreate the more ideal conditions which existed in 
the past.  What is the case now in the unhappy present is not at all important, but 
rather what is important is what the ideal ought to be, and how that ideal was to be 
realized.   Therefore the Confucian enterprise was concerned with influencing rather 
than passive reception; it was prescriptive rather than descriptive.   The whole grain of 
the Confucian enterprise was to re-create an ideal to replace the present reality. Hence 
taken in this context, the above text from Zheng Xuan means that he saw Confucius 
desiring through zheng ming the prescription of the right names, i.e., the correct 
carrying out of the teachings and words which had been recorded and now were not 
being carried out (presumably because of misinterpretation).   The analyses of the 
problem concluded that names and words have been misread (and hence were 
incorrect), so that the wrong teachings were conveyed and wrong practices followed.   
Through zheng ming, getting the names right, i.e., getting the words rightly 
interpreted, the right practices would follow.   
If we append to this reading the first point about the fact that the referents of 
names had been extended to all things, then we can see immediately how this 
Confucian doctrine of zheng ming is a signal antecedent to a more general nominalistic 
theory of names which understands names as having an ontological and epistemic 
priority over actual reality:  given that the Confucian enterprise is prescriptive rather 
than descriptive, and is aimed at transforming reality then merely passively accepting 
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it, then for Confucius, the realities or actualities (understood as what things really are) 
should follow the names, rather than vice versa.   Meaning to say, in the Confucian 
material logic, realities follow upon the names, and names have a logical priority and 
determining function on one’s conception of reality—reality understood originally as 
social and political, but extended to the actual state of all things besides. Thus John 
Makeham, 
 
Names, not actualities, were Confucius’ primary concern.  He did not 
regard names as passive labels but rather as social and hence political 
catalysts.  This was a function of the performative role that names were 
perceived to play in the networks of social patterns and human relations 
that constituted the underlying structure of li.…It is this notion that in 
naming one can thereby cause something to be brought about which 
lies at the heart of what I term “nominal prescriptivism”: the use of 
names to prescribe entities or affairs.49   
 
Such an all embracing nominalism is found more explicitly in the works of the Neo-
Mohist logicians and the Neo-Confucian Xun Qing’s Xun Zi.  So Xun Qing writes, 
 
A name has no intrinsic appropriateness; rather, the appropriateness of 
a particular name is demarcated by being ordained (ming lit., to cause 
to be brought about by naming).  The demarcation having been fixed 
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and its custom established, then the name is called appropriate.  Should 
a name then differ from custom, it is called in appropriate.  A name has 
no intrinsically corresponding object; rather its corresponding object is 
demarcated by being ordained.  The demarcation having been fixed and 
its custom established, then it is called the object’s name.50
 
This clearly reveals that for Xun Qing, names are conventional signs and their creation 
is not so much dependent on the object as rather marking out the objects. Hence names 
have dependent priority over the object, in the sense that names do not correspond to 
or depend on some intrinsic structure or ontological basis in the objects.  This comes 
through quite well also in the Mohist notion of knowledge, which is understood more 
in terms of marking out reality or picking out objects using the name, rather than 
naming from the things themselves.  So names here have priority in discovery; objects 
are discovered according to names or definitions, rather than that names are defined 
according to (what I would call naturally, ziran, demarcated) objects—as one might 
observe later in the Daoist essentialists.  Knowing is more an art of constructing 
reality, than discovering naturally determined definitions. In this way, as in the 
following passage, even if someone did not know anything, by being able to 
demarcate these unknown objects, as “unknown” suffices as knowing.  Here 
knowledge suffices when using names you could pick them out, even if in admittedly 
not knowing these, it implies that the object does not “inform” you, as it were.  Clearly 
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the emphasis is not on knowing in the sense of letting the object or reality determine 
knowledge (and therefore names), but rather that the subject determine reality through 
naming, in this way sufficing for “knowledge”. Hence, the Mohist Summa: 
 
Canon B 48 
Knowing what he does not know.  Explained by: picking out by means 
of the name. 
Explanation 
If you mix together what he does know and what he does not know, and 
ask about them, he is obliged to say, ‘This I do know, and this I do not 
know’.  To be capable of picking out the one and disclaiming the other 
is to know them both.51
 
We may adapt the Chinese jargon ming and shi  as indicating the polarities of the 
name and the named objects respectively, and here for Xun Qing and the Mohist, we 
say ming do not depend on shi. As a matter of fact it seems fitting to credit the Neo-
Mohist logicians for coining the standard jargons of this semiotic of names (ming) and 
entities (shi), a ming-shi jargon that was to be carried through into future linguistic 
debates. In the Neo-Mohist Explanation to Canon A we read, 
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That by which something is called is its ming; what is so called is a 
shi.52  
 
While ming rather straightforwardly signifies a name for a state of affairs, shi evolved 
from originally signifying ‘particular objects’ in the Xunzi and the Mohist nominalist 
discourse towards the later essentialist notion of what Makeham calls ‘actuality’. On 
the nominalist meaning of shi as concerned with particular objects, Makeham’s 
explains:  
 
The shi graph is composed of a roof with good below.  The primary 
meaning of this ‘full house’ image is being ‘full of’, ‘filled with’, ‘inner 
substantiality’.  This meaning is also implicit in the word fu, ‘rich’, 
‘wealth’, which Xu Shen uses to gloss shi.  He in turn glosses fu as bei, 
‘to be provided/endowed with’.  This meaning is again evident in the 
case of the word ri, ‘sun’, which Xu Shen glosses as shi, ‘being filled 
in’, as opposed to yue, ‘moon’, which he glosses as que, 
‘lacking’…From this primary meaning arose the extended meanings of 
‘replete’, ‘complete’, ‘solidness’, ‘substantiality’, and ‘filled out’.  
These meanings share the common sense of ‘substantial manifestation’.  
Shi, meaning ‘fruit’, is derived from this sense of substantial 
manifestation.  As an application of this sense of substantial 
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manifestation, throughout the summa shi is used consistently to mean 
particular objects or entities.53    
 
Indeed as it is used consistently in the Mohist Canon, it refers to particular entities or 
objects. A text from the Explanation to Canon A 78 bears this out: 
 
‘Thing’ is the universal name; any object necessarily requires this 
name.  Naming something ‘horse’ is an example of a generic name; one 
necessarily uses this name for those things which are like the object.  
Naming something ‘Cang’ is an example of a private name; this name 
is restricted to this object.54
 
But this simple meaning of shi as particular objects took a more sophisticated turn 
with the essentialist thinkers, beginning perhaps in the late 3rd Century BC with 
“Daoist and Huang-Lao-Centered syncretic writings,”55 which began to distinguish shi 
from the particular object itself.  Shi began to be understood as at least conceptually 
distinct from the object as such.  What then is this shi which gets to be distinguished 
from the object then?  Previously there was no philosophical interest in the subject’s 
ontological status in itself, since names demarcated, as it were, their ontological 
structure—in the sense that names marked out what they are.  And in fact, there was 
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the explicit denial in Xun Qing, as we saw, of any intrinsically ontological markers for 
names, for it was not as if there was a name there to be found or discovered in the 
object.  Rather names were determined by the human subject. In the essentialist 
tradition, this is rather reversed.  Now names are found with the objects, and follow 
upon the objects, and depend on the objects. But if now this is reversed, so that names 
have to be determined by the objects, then there in the objects we must posit some 
ontological principle which would indicate that to such an object belonged this name 
rather than another.  This ontological principle, which determines the intrinsically 
appropriate names, is shi.   And, names follow upon shi rather than the other way 
around.  In Guan Zi’s ‘Xin shu shang”, we read, 
 
Things inherently have form, and forms inherently have names. If the 
names correspond (dang), then such a person is called a sage.56  
 
Here the form in the thing is results in the appropriate name in the thing.  If these 
ontological structures like forms which determine the names are referred to 
collectively as shi, then we to discover ming we must figure out the shi.  As Guan Zi’s 
‘Bai Xin’ writes,  
 
Trace things back to their origins and determine what their shi are;  
make one’s foundation that which give birth to things.  If you want to 
know something’ image, then you search its form.  If you follow 
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something’s distinguishing marks, then you will come to know its 
essential qualities; if you search back to its starting point, then you will 
come to know its name.57
 
Here to know the name, essential qualities or image, one searches for its starting point, 
distinguishing marks, form of a thing respectively.  The later three belong to the more 
apparent, which helps to reveal the hidden earlier three.  What is clear is that the 
names are not conventional, but are grounded in the thing itself. In the same way one’s 
visual image of the object is not one’s invention, but determined by its form or shape. 
Again, the essential qualities are not humanly defined, but are present objectively but 
discoverable by following its distinguishing marks.  “In the same way shi is essential, 
being the germ or that which is at the core of things.”58 In using shi to signify that 
which is essential or the core of objects, shi takes on a distinct meaning from the 
meaning of shi as objects as such (as was in Xun Qing) in which shi inheres. Shi now 
is in the objects—as a structural principle—rather than the objects themselves—as a 
composite whole constituted by that structural principle shi in question.59 Makeham 
translates shi here as ‘actuality’, meaning: ‘that without which an entity would not be 
what it is,’ or ‘that by virtue of which an entity is what it is’.60  
 
While in Guan Zi we find the emphasis of naming according to the shi, still 
there is no further explicit speculation as regards why this might be normatively 
                                                 






sanctioned, nor why this was what is “right”61—at least not as strongly as we might 
find in the syncretist Dong Zhong Shu, who goes further to ground the appropriateness 
of the priority of actualities over the names in the Will of Heaven.  Thus, his Sheng 
cha ming hao writes, 
 
The [standard of] correctness for names and appellations is found in 
Heaven-and-Earth; Heaven-and-Earth provide the ultimate correctness 
for names…Although names and appellations have different sounds, 
yet their basis is the same; both are cries and calls which serve to give 









All things come into existence carrying their own name; the sage names 
a thing in accordance with its image.64
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On the one hand, like Guan Zi, names derive from having an ontological dependence 
in the shi.  So objects, having shi, come in a package already with an appropriate 
name.  But references to Heaven’s intentions take this one step further in providing a 
justification for recognizing this and according names with its given shi.  Hence one 
cannot say, “so what if names come with shi? What is it that obliges me to name 
according to shi?”  In fact there seems no particular sequence in which “things as they 
are” obliged one normatively to act in a certain way, or to do things in a certain way.  
One might borrow from the analytic jargon and say we have here something of an is-
ought gap: granted names come with actualities, but this does not mean I ought to 
name in accordance with actualities—even if it seems the natural (ziran) thing to do, 
as Guan Zi might say, but which could mean nothing more than that we have been do 
this without much thought, rightly or wrongly. Yet as Makeham explains, Dong 
Zhong Shu articulates a theory in which names rightly follow upon shi, actualities, and 
this is proper because it is ultimately Heaven’s intention that the shi of things would 
have its appropriate name. Hence there is a kind of cosmic sanction regarding the 
essentialist procedure of naming: in ruling the names according to actualities, one 
would accord to Heaven’s intentions—namely that such an actuality should have such 
an appropriate name.   So the fact-value gap is bridged with a further premise: this 
reveals Heaven’s Will and one ought to do the Will of Heaven.  Names through in 
actualities come ultimately from Heaven, and one ought to accord in naming with the 




But a second and important refinement, especially insofar as this is assimilated 
by the later Xu Gan and Wang Bi, is that even while Heaven determines the 
appropriate names for each actuality, there is a stage in Dong Zhong Shu wherein the 
process of naming requires the sage coin the names according to his discretion.  Here 
Dong Zhong Shu recognizes the stages of the naming procedure in which there is a 
place for man to do his part, even if this part is to be done according to Heaven’s 
intentions.  Here Dong Zhong Shu goes beyond Guan Zi in his detailing this need for 
human co-operation and the part that man plays.  In a parallel discussion on human 
nature, where he points out that human nature as inherited from Heaven is good, still it 
needs to be perfected in that direction of goodness on the part of man.  Hence Heaven 
may grant something and intend something, but Heaven does just so much, and to 
have the intention completed, man has to do his part in accordance with that intention.  
What heaven gives is necessary but not sufficient to bring about the point or the 
perfection of that gift; we need man to do his part. Thus he writes, 
 
Goodness is like a kernel of rice; human nature is like a stalk of rice.  
Although a stalk of rice produces kernels of rice, yet it may not be 
called a kernel of rice.  Similarly, although human nature produces 
goodness, yet it may not be called goodness.  Kernels of rice and 
goodness are the external completion of that which is inherited from 
heaven; they do not fall within the realm of that which is done by 
Heaven.  That which is done by Heaven extends to a certain point and 
then stops.  That which lies within this realm is referred to as belonging 
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to Heaven; that which lies outside is referred to as belonging to the 
‘kingly teachings’.  Although the kingly teachings lie outside human 
nature, yet human nature must advance in that direction.65
  
Hence Dong Zhong Shu is attentive to the distinction between the basic endowments 
granted by Heaven which propel us in a certain direction, and the final result, which 
requires human assistance in bringing it about according to that direction. Man has to 
play his part where Heaven stops.  Yet nonetheless in playing his part where Heaven 
stops, for Dong Zhong Shu, it is axiomatic that he should discern Heaven’s intention 
and bring about the original endowment to completion according to that intention.   
Bringing this back to his theory of naming, Heaven determines things with their shi, 
and with it their appropriate names, but stops at the actual coining of names, which 
must be done by the sage—yet the sage must do so according to Heaven’s intention, 
which is that names follow shi, and not according to his subjective conventions. As 
Makeham explains, 
 
Initially Heaven’s will is made manifest as actualities, and then these 
actualities produce names.   The actual coining of the names, however, 
is left to the sage or sage king.  The same principle that applies to 
kernels of rice and human nature applies analogously to names: “That 
which is done by Heaven extends to a certain point then stops.  That 
which lies outside is referred to as kingly teachings.”  Thus while in 
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Guan Zi the sage apprehends correct names, in [Dong Zhong Shu’s] 
Chun qiu fan lu the sage also coins names.  In both cases, the sage 
plays the role of a ‘mid-wife’, but only in Chun qiu fan lu is it evident 
that he also chooses the particular words to be used in naming.66
 
Let us pause here and summarize how the theory of names has evolved thus far, 
because this will generally be carried through Xu Gan and Wang Bi.  Two things must 
be held in mind: firstly, that the relationship between shi and ming is such that the 
ming must follow and accord with the shi, since to each shi there is a (Heaven 
intended) appropriate name.  Secondly, even though (as Heaven intended) each shi 
comes with its appropriate name, still the coining of names is where Heaven stops at, 
and where the sage must do his part.  
What I want to draw the reader’s attention to is the following. On the one hand 
there is the insistence of intrinsically appropriate names for their respective actualities. 
On the other hand, there is also the admission that the sage has to do his part in 
coining the names—yet note this: this coining while left to the sage is not arbitrary nor 
conventional, nor subjective in the sense that the sage is licensed to name as he 
wishes, but more specifically and differently, he does his part in coining the names 
according to the shi of things, as Heaven intended.  These two general orientations of 
such a correlative theory with some minor modifications I will try to show to be in 
Wang Bi. A quick look at a near contemporary of Wang Bi, Xu Gan (170-217), who 
died just ten years before Wang was born will help corroborate this.  “After Dong 
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Zhong Shu and before Xu Gan, no Han thinker can be identified as having more than a 
trivial contribution to the tradition of ming shi discourse.”67 Because Xu Gan’s theory 
of naming derives much from that of Dong Zhong Shu,  this helps to further 
corroborate the thesis that Wang Bi’s theory of names was correlative in that it was set 
in a time when correlative theories was influential, as was in the case of Xu Gan. So in 
Xu Gan we read,  
 
A name is that which is used to name an actuality.  When an actuality 
has been established, its name follows after it; it is not the case that a 
name is established and then its actuality follows after it.  Thus if a long 
shape is established then it will be named ‘long’ and if a short shape is 
established then it will be named ‘short’.  It is not the case that the 
names ‘long’ and ‘short’ are first established and then the long and 
short shapes follow after them.68
 
I think this passage from Xu Gan establishes that he subscribes to a correlative theory 
of naming akin to Dong Zhong Shu, as opposed to the nominalist type espoused by the 
Mohists and Xun Qing.  There seem to be some differences between Dong Zhong Shu 
and Xu Gan’s notion of shi, so that in the latter it came to include a principle of 
development, and not just a static core, as it were.69   But this difference is united in a 
common intention: that however one understands shi, shi always retains that meaning 
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of an inner essential core which ontologically determines the subject (in which it 
inheres), whether this is essential core is developmental or static.  Thus the basic 
epistemic orientation of the ontological dependency of names remains: ming follows 
from shi.    
Now for Xu Gan this is not merely a theoretical, descriptive exercise in 
semiotics, but has social relevance: he was eager that a persons’ name (ming) should 
correlate and derive from his real abilities or actuality, his shi.  Hence the 
philosophical idea that “ming follows from shi” can be broadened beyond its more 
restricted meaning in semiotics.  It also stood for the normative idea that one’s name 
or reputation should or ought to accord with one’s true abilities or capabilities.   
 
 By the time we come to Wang Bi, he would have been likely familiar with the 
whole debate on names and actuality from Confucius through to Xu Gan.  He would 
have been at home with the idea that the linguistic debate on names is not all there is; 
there is always the political component. Therefore, it is not unlikely that his own 
ming-shi theory has broader philosophical implications outside of semiotics.  Like Xu 
Gan, he may have been concerned that one’s name or reputation should correspond to 
one’s true abilities, though this must be said with qualification. (The situation with 
Wang is more complex, because he has a more sophisticated appreciation of social 
behavior.  Wang is attentive to how the publication of reputation (name, ming) can 
often tempt people to seek to replicate such reputation.  While this would pose no 
general problem for the cultivation of skills or technical abilities, the cultivation of 
moral virtues for the sake of fame or reputation can be self-defeating.  And moral 
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actualities rather than technical abilities are of primary concern for Wang. Hence even 
if someone is really moral Wang would be reserved about making his moral actuality 
(shi) known.  It would therefore be more accurate to say that for Wang, he would not 
want reputations to be assigned to persons who do not deserve them, but neither would 
he be eager to publicize truly corresponding reputations.) 
 So that philosophical idea that ming follows shi can be broadly taken to 
express a normative social doctrine:  that a person’s moral reputation ought not to be 
wrongly accorded to persons without true moral worth.  But just as well, the more 
restrictive meaning of insisting that ming follow shi is a descriptive claim about the 
correlative linguistic theory of names.  Here I think we are on very secure ground.  
Whether it ought to be or not, clearly for Wang, the names do in fact correlate to a 
certain actuality, a certain reality, and is not something which is random or frivolous.  
In his Laozi Zhilue, he presents explicitly the correlative theory of naming: 
 
All names arise from forms [phenomenal manifestations, (xing)]; never 
has a form arisen from a name.  Therefore if there is this name, there 
must be this form, and, if there is this form, there must be its separation 
[fen] [from all other forms].  If “benevolence” [ren] cannot be called 
“sagehood” [sheng] or “intelligence” [zhi] called “benevolence,” each 
must have its own actuality.70
 
                                                 
70 Wang Bi, “Laozhi zhilue (Introduction to the Laozi)” in The Classic of the Way and 
Virtue, Richard John Lynn (trans.), (NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1999), 39.  
Henceforth, Introduction. The Laozi text and commentary will be henceforth 
referenced as The Classic. 
 69
 70
This passage clearly indicates that for Wang Bi names are not conventionally 
determined, but are determined depending on the shi of things, on which basis he can 
say that one cannot trade a name for another, since names have to accord with their 
actualities, and are determined by depending on these actualities, and not according to 
the fancy of the person.  Again, names arise from xing, not the other way around, for 
“the name arises from how it appears to us”71   So in effect for Wang Bi the shi is 
manifested through the xing, and the names are determined according to the xing.  
Thus names ultimately are dependent on the shi through the xing, and the names are 
dependent immediately on the xing.   Hence he can say that if there is this name, there 
must be this form (xing), since the form is the source of the name.  Names come from 
somewhere objective, and this somewhere is the form.   
But surely this cannot be right for all words—after all, there are some words 
which are simply the product of convention.  Not everybody goes about naming 
something by examining its xing or phenomenal manifestation—often times we adopt 
a name or word for something because that is the way it has been called.  Granted.  To 
accommodate this latter class of words which are conventional in order to distinguish 
it from the determination of names which follow from phenomenal manifestations 
(xing), Wang Bi calls it “designation” cheng: 
 
To name [ming] is to determine [ding] objects [bi]. To designate 
[cheng] is to follow what objects are conventionally called.  A name 
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arises from the object, but a designation issues from the subjective 
[wo].72   
  
Now the designation is said to be subjective because when I designate 
something, I simply follow a convention and not the objective xing.  Compared to 
naming, it appears that it is up to me (wo) that the designation is what it is; I am not 
immediately constrained by the objective form in the thing itself, as I would be in 
naming.  After all, in choosing to adopt a conventional designation, I have implicitly 
chosen to follow convention even if the words fail to name or correspond to the 
phenomenal xing, if there is one. 
  But the subjectivity of designations cannot be overstated. Subjectivity is not 
arbitrariness.  We should be clear that designation is subjective comparatively, not 
absolutely. For despite its (comparative) subjectivity, designation for Wang is not 
divorced from objective reality simpliciter.  It is only divorced from the objective 
reality qua form or shape. Thus he writes, “…designations do not arise without 
cause.”73    To best see this, let us turn to Wang’s treatment of the designation of the 
Dao.   
Because designations have no corresponding xing, it becomes particularly 
useful for expressing how we can “talk about” the Dao.  Since names follow upon the 
form, if something has no form or xing, it cannot be said to have a name. Now the Dao  
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has no form, and because the Dao is formless, it has no name.  Thus, Wang, 
commenting on section 25 of the Laozi: 
 
Text  : We do not know its [Dao’s] name. 
Comment : Names [ming ] are used to determine forms [xing], but 
amorphous and complete, it has no form, so we cannot make any such 
determination. Thus the text says, “we do not know its name.74
 
Still, even if one cannot name the Dao because the Dao has no corresponding xing, 
one can still designate it: 
 
Text: [We]…style it “Dao” 
Commentary: Names [ming] are used to determine forms, and style names 
[zi] are used to designate [cheng] attributes [ke].  To speak of “Dao” 
[Way] is derived from the fact that absolutely nothing fails to follow it and 
because, of all the terms that might be used to address the “amorphous and 
complete,” this one has the broadest meaning.75
 
The text makes it clear that when styling something, one is designating and not 
naming it.  And so “Dao” is the style name, the designation.  But see how the 
commentary goes on to explain why it is styled or designated (even if not named) 
“Dao”. In designation, one is not engaged in a random act of signification.  One is still 





guided by the truths about the object of designation.  One may not be guided by truths 
about the form or xing of the object. Still one is guided by the truth about how it 
affects other things.  That is, if we cannot name an object, say the Dao, in terms of its 
form or xing, (as it were, in itself), we could still describe the object in terms of its 
properties or attributes viz. how it is related to other things and so in terms of these 
other things.  For: to say that x is that which is related to y in such and such a manner 
is to express x in terms of y. The designation is thus derived from these properties it 
has.76  
In other words, the fundamental difference between a name and a designation 
is better expressed as a difference between a word which corresponds to a xing and a 
word which does not correspond to a xing.  While the latter is comparatively more 
subjective than the former, neither of them is divorced from reality.   Whether it is a 
matter of naming or of designating something, there are objective standards to go by 
and to guide.   
 
Therefore we may sum Wang’s theory of language in this way.   Every word 
corresponds to a certain reality or an actuality (shi).   In the case of a name (ming), the 
correspondence is mediated by a phenomenal manifestation, a xing.  In the case of a 
designation, the correspondence is not mediated by a xing.  But whether there is or is 
not a xing, the basic essentialist ming-shi theory of language holds true for Wang.  
Names and designations are both rooted in some reality (shi), and correspond to it.   
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Wang’s theory of names and designations is essentially, like that of Xu Gan, 
correlative and realist. 
 
Wang’s Correlative Semiotics is the Key 
 
Wang’s theory of language has many important philosophical and interpretive 
implications.   Firstly, as seen above, the distinction that Wang has between 
designation and naming helps him get around the tension of speaking about the Dao 
and affirming that the Dao cannot be spoken of.  We cannot name it, but we can still 
apply designations to it.  We will return to this with greater detail in a later chapter. 
 Secondly, this very correlative theory of names fits in very nicely with Wang’s  
metaphorical reading of the text.  This is, that it equivocally captures the Wang’s 
justification for his social-political doctrine of non-interference.   The  ming-shi 
correlative semiotic or theory of names is used to capture metaphorically his idea that 
promises of prestige do not encourage authentic moral character development is at 
once subtle and beautiful.  The last chapter’s merely brief mention of this warrants a 
second detailed look. 
It took me a while to notice how Wang explicitly reads the ming-shi semiotic 
as a metaphor, but when I saw it, it was just unmistakable. Wang’s Introduction to the 
Laozi often playfully reads the ming-shi semiotic as a metaphor for his social doctrine 
that giving people titles of prestige to tempt good behavior does not cultivate the 
desired moral character:  “All names arise from forms; never has a form arisen from a 
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name”77  We know that for Wang the word ming (names) means also prestige or 
reputation.  Xing (form) in turn means more than just the physical shape or form.  It 
refers also to the character of a person.  Hence, Wang speaks at times of not using the 
law to cut people into shapes, i.e., into the desired character.  Thus the talk of the form 
never arising from the name is the metaphor for the idea that good character can never 
be elicited by the offering of rewards of reputation or prestige.  That is, in this context, 
its important point is not merely semiotics, though it may appear to be on first look.  
Its other point is Wang’s social and political doctrine of non-interference.  
We can see clearly this play of metaphors by analyzing the context of his 
discussion.  Here after the discussion of the causal relation between the form and the 
name, he urges the ruler to “repudiate Sagehood”, i.e., to discard the very inferential 
skills of a Sage which enable him to discern the ultimate causes of a thing.  The Sage, 
he says, should not apply those inferential skills when it comes to “exhaust[ing] one’s 
sagely brightness in scrutiny of  [depravity] and dry[ing] up one’s intelligence and 
power of inference [lu] in how to control it”78  .  Thus just a while ago Wang 
commends us to imitate the Sage by inferentially seeking the true ultimate cause(s) of 
an effect. Yet now in the context of scrutinizing behavior he ask that the Sage “who 
can employ skills and devises that extend discernment and discover secrets”79  not 
apply his intelligence and inferential skills.   In other words, be a Sage qua someone 
with great inferential skills only in the context of discerning the Dao as the cause of 
effects, but abandon being such a Sage when it comes to scrutinizing undesired 
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behavior in order to censure it.  Do not use one’s Sagely intelligence in the latter 
situation.   The context surrounding the discussion of the names and form is hence 
this: Wang is prescribing what is politically beneficial and what is not. But notice how 
Wang relates this discussion with the semiotic point that names never give rise to 
forms: “So, when we read the phrase ‘repudiate sagehood’ in the light of this 
comparison of actualities and determination of names, can there be any doubt what it 
means?”80  What it means is immediately given in explicit detail: 
 
“If the virtues of honesty and the uncarved block are not given prominence 
but the splendors of reputation and conduct are instead publicized and 
exalted, one will cultivate that which can exalt him in hope of the praise 
involved and cultivate that which can lead to it in the expectation of the 
material advantage involved. Because of hope for praise and expectation 
of material advantage, he will conduct himself with diligence, but the more 
splendid the praise, the more he will thrust sincerity away, and the greater 
his material advantage, the more contentious he will be inclined to be.  The 
heartfelt feelings that fathers, sons, older brothers, and younger brothers 
should have for one another will lose their authenticity.  Obedience will 
not be grounded in sincerity, and kindness will not be grounded in 
actuality.  All this is brought about by the publicizing of reputation and 
conduct.”81  
 





This whole paragraph is completely captured by the metaphor of the form never 
arising from the name.  Here the “names” or prestige viz. the “publicizing of 
reputation and conduct” fails to give rise to the relevant “form” or desired moral 
character.   And just as a name that exists without having arisen from a form will not 
be traceable to an actuality, so also someone who seeks and achieves a reputation or 
name for any moral character will have ironically not acquired the character; in fact he 
will likely have lost it, if he had any of it to start with.  For such a person, who may 
now have made himself a name for that certain moral trait, his moral trait would 
paradoxically not be traceable to its only true source, its actuality.  And the 
implication is that since it did not arise from its only possible source or actuality, it 
cannot be authentic; it is bogus morality.   Clearly for Wang the discussion of names 
and forms or actualities is not merely about semiotics but really also a metaphor for 
the point that the offering of rewards of reputation and prestige will not bring about 
true moral goodness. 
 
Thirdly, this correlative theory of language makes possible the speculative task 
of the sage who, as explained in the preceding discussion, is that intellectual genius 
who has great competence in drawing inferences. But this trades not on the differences 
between naming and designation, but on their similarity.   For: whether the words are 
names or designations, words have an ultimate corresponding actuality in reality.  And 
since words have a corresponding reality, the sage can try to discover what are the 
meanings of these words.  Not as if: looking up the dictionary.  Rather: trying to grasp, 
or to infer what are the realities viz. some social or moral phenomena.   The effort is to 
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try to move from the word, whether a name or designation, in the direction towards 
the reality which the word covers or signs.    
Some inferences are rather elementary.  Consider the following. A certain 
word has a corresponding meaning or referent.  But any particular word (type)82 is 
differentiated from another particular word (type).  Since each word corresponds to its 
own particular actuality or reality or meaning, then for every word, corresponding to 
these two words, there will be also two different and distinct meanings or actualities.   
So the first task in getting to any one of these actualities is to avoid confusing them 
with another actuality.  If someone mistakes a word (say, A) for another word (say B), 
then inevitably he will seek the wrongly corresponding actuality or meaning.  Suppose 
A corresponds to the actuality α and B corresponds to actuality β. He will mistake A 
for B, and say that the meaning of A is that of B.  In this way, he will also take the 
corresponding actuality of A for the corresponding actuality of B.  In other words, 
when seeking the corresponding actuality of A, he will think that B is really A, and 
trace B’s actuality to A, which means that he will affirm the actuality β to be that 
which corresponds to A, when in fact α corresponds to A. The short of this is that at 
the very least one has to be clear how each word is different from another and how 
each corresponding meaning is different from the other respectively corresponding 
meaning.   So Wang explains: 
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if I wrote two similar characters, they are one word.  I put here “word (type)” to make 




If one cannot distinguish among names [ming], it is impossible to discuss 
principles [li] with such a person.  If one cannot determine how names 
apply, it is impossible to discuss actualities with him either. All names 
arise from forms; never has a form arisen from a name.  Therefore if there 
is this name, there must be this form, and if there is this form, there must 
be its separation [fen] [from all other forms].  If “benevolence” [ren] 
cannot be called “sagehood” [sheng] or “intelligence” [zhin] called 
“benevolence,” each must have its own actuality.83
 
But Wang goes further.  Not only is he interested in tracing out accurately the 
meaning or actuality of each or a particular word, he presses further in that same 
direction to seek the ultimate causal source(s) of the reality which the word signifies.  
Or at least this is what he seems to suggest.  Thus rather interestingly he adds, 
 
Discernment of the most minute indicates the ultimate of perspicacity 
[ming].  Discovering what lies completely hidden indicates the ultimate 
power of inference [lu].  Who can extend perspicacity to the ultimate, can 
this be other than the sage?  One who can extend the power of inference to 
the ultimate, can this be other than the wise?84  
 
Parallel passages suggest that for Wang, this “ultimate” is the Dao.  For Wang writes 
again: 
                                                 





…those whose vision is limited to physical manifestations and [do] not 
reach the Dao…[will] feel anger at the words they find in [the Laozi].  If 
one wishes to determine what the original substance [ben ] of things is, 
although they might be near, he must verify where they start far away.  If 
one wishes to cast light on where things come from, although they might 
be perfectly obvious, he must trace the roots where they emerge out of the 
dark.  Thus it is that one takes from what is outside Heaven and Earth [the 
Dao] to cast light on what is within phenomenal appearance [xinghai] and 
to cast light on what it means for lords and princes to be “the orphan” or 
“the widower”.  It is by thus tracing things back to the unity of the Dao 
that one makes clear where they all begin.  Therefore let it be those whose 
scrutiny is limited to the nearby and does not reach the source from which 
all things flow, none will fail to regard its [the Laozi’s] words as absurd 
and think there is nothing in them.”85
 
In other words, what Wang seems to be proposing here is a philosophical enterprise 
that attempts to infer the causes of realities, and not just the reality or forms of names.  
He shifts the whole ming-shi discussion up onto a different level by suggesting that the 
Daoist sage not only get the actualities of words right, but that he seek out the deeper 
causal reality of this actuality.   In this way Wang transforms what started out as a 
semiotic exercise of tracing the realities corresponding to the words into an 
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experiment in ontology: tracing or inferring [lu] the ultimate ontological cause of these 
very realities.  With this emphasis on tracing things to the Dao, which is also called 
the dark or the mysterious or the profound [xuan], Wang had sparked a new 
movement. As Alan Chan points out,  
 
…according to the Wen xin tiao long (The literary mind and the carving of 
dragons), Wang [Bi] and Ho Yen did not only spark new interests in the 
Taoist classics, but had in fact charted a new course in the intellectual 
landscape of third century China.  This is described in terms of a shift 
from the doctrine of “names and principles” (ming-li) to that of “profound 
discourse” (xuan-lun).86
 
From Language to Metaphysics 
 
It is this shift from a discourse on names and forms to a discourse in 
metaphysical profundities that marks Wang off as turning Daoist philosophy profound 
(xuan).  We will examine this shift and the relevant debates that surround this 
metaphysical reading of the Laozi.   
We can start with a problematic.  It is not easy to pin down what accounts for 
the “shift”.  How does the theory that “names arise only from forms” inspire Wang 
with the idea that “one should trace that Dao as the source of all these names”? How is 
it that suddenly an interest in semiotic should spark off an interest in metaphysical 
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speculation?   Indeed, the precise philosophical connection between the correlative 
theory of names and the novel project of inferring the Dao as the ontological source of 
all things is not immediately clear.   The connection does not seem to be that of a 
premise and its conclusion.  The idea that “one can and ought to trace names to their 
forms” does not seem to me as self-evidently implying that “one can and ought to 
trace forms to the Dao”.   And Wang does not seem to have explained why the 
discussion of names and forms points him towards the metaphysical speculation of the 
Dao as the source of all things.  And it would be hard to; nothing controversial in the 
discourse of names and forms seems to have required a resolution through the 
projected ontological speculation.  Whether the Dao is the source of all things is of no 
consequence to the debate on name and forms.   Rather the reverse is true.  The kind 
of semiotic one holds as correct determines the possibility or impossibility of 
ontological speculation.  The discussion between nominalistic post-modernists who 
deny onto-theology and thomist realists who affirm the accessibility of the Being of 
metaphysics is evidence of this.  This means that while a primary interest in ontology 
would lead one to discuss semiotics, a primary interest in semiotics would not 
philosophically lead one to discuss metaphysics. Therefore, there seems to be a 
missing philosophical link between the interest in semiotics and the interest in 
ontology in the evolutionary progression of Wang’s Daoism.    
Perhaps the connection is not to be found in the subject matter, but in the Sage. 
Wang does say that the Sage is he who can trace or infer things and events to their 
ultimate source, the Dao. Still the question remains why suddenly in the history of 
Chinese philosophy the sage who is no doubt competent in such inferential 
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speculations should suddenly want to apply his skills and competencies to ontological 
or metaphysical speculation.   Why is it that suddenly the Sage’s domain of enquiry 
has shifted from semiotics to ontology or metaphysics?   
One may credit this shift of interest to the Daode Jing text.  One may want to 
point out that the Wei Jin intellectuals like Wang found in the Laozi text the reference 
to the Dao as the source of all things, and so was inspired to prove these claims.  
Wagner seems to think this was the case: 
“In Wang Bi’s work…the classics, including the Laozi, have no 
intrinsic authority.  They owe their authority to the fact that they, by 
implication or explicitly, dealt with the only relevant problem—the 
features of the “That-by-which”—and that their insights, whether spelled 
out or implied, could be proved by discursive philosophy in the form of 
commentary or lun to be arguably true.  In this manner, they justified the 
story of these texts having been written by Sages or their close seconds.”87
 I think Wagner is onto something here. However this still begs the question.  
Why is it that the Laozi text was interpreted with this metaphysical slant?  Why was it 
read as suggesting a metaphysical quest for the metaphysical Dao as the source of all 
things?  Why was there this shift in the interpretation?  Why was it that Wang saw 
something new—a metaphysical claim that the Dao is the source of all things—in the 
text?  What accounts for the shift from the interest in language to an investigation in 
metaphysics?   Unless the Laozi text is self-evident, we cannot say that Wang picked 
out the metaphysical interpretation just by staring at the text; more likely than not he 
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would have had some interpretive orientation to start with.  And the text is not self-
evident: “[Wang’s] revolutionary turn to discursive philosophy thus comes as the 
claim to rediscover what was most clearly relevant and most radically forgotten in the 
hallowed texts handed down by tradition.”88
Our questions here parallel some of Chad Hansen’s worries (earlier discussed) 
when he wonders if those who read into the Laozi a metaphysical discourse may have 
misread the text.  At the center of these questions and worries is the abruptness of the 
transition in Chinese philosophical Daoism from some topic of long standing interest 
to a rather novel examination of speculative metaphysics.  For Hansen, it is the 
claimed shift from socio-political theorizing to metaphysics.  For this present study of 
Wang, it is the seeming shift from a discourse of names and forms to the discourse on 
metaphysical origins.  Hansen’s research can compliment our study.  The new 
interpretive veil which reads metaphysical research into the Laozi text stand in stark 
contrast to the traditional political reading of the Daode Jing. The traditional reading 
is centered not on the metaphysical/mystical Dao, but on the performance or pragmatic 
Dao. In his own recent words,    
“I find little motivation in ancient Chinese concepts of background beliefs 
for the kind of universal-particular analysis characteristic of ancient Greek 
(and Indic) thought.  While handy for us today in understanding what a 
Dao is, we are unlikely to find echoes of this metaphysical structure in 
Daoist writing from the classical period of Chinese thought.  Thus, while 
we have no overt reason to reject this metaphysical analysis of the Dao, it 
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departs from the conditions on a solution that we began with.  Arguably, it 
is not what would occur to a Chinese thinker with the conceptual structure 
and philosophical agenda of ancient China.”89  
His warning calls us to re-think Wagner’s suggestion that Wang had read into 
the Laozi a proposal for metaphysical research.  Given that the discourse of names and 
forms has always been tied up with political reflection, we can ask if it is safe to 
assume that Wang would so quickly read into the Laozi text a major research proposal 
in metaphysics rather than language and politics.   So the shift from linguistic and 
political concerns to an interest in metaphysical speculation is still curious. It warrants 
some explanation of how the new interest has any connection with the old concerns, 
and why the old concerns seems to have fallen out of view. 
Indeed, I have never seen any satisfactory explanation of how or why the shift 
occurred in Wang.  No study has well explained how the correlative theory of names 
leads Wang to his idea that one ought to infer the Dao as the ontological source of all 
things.   All scholars so far have done is simply to assert, as a historical fact, that this 
sudden shift occurred.   
 This question is related to another, which is also pertinent and has to be 
addressed here.  One can also ask how philosophically Wang goes about justifying the 
claim that the Dao is the source of all things.   One might imagine that Wang would 
have some form of metaphysical argument in his commentary.  And true enough, 
Wang has these statements to that effect.  For example, in the opening lines of his 
Introduction to the Laozi, Wang writes, “It is generally true with regard to that by 
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which things are created—that things are necessarily created out of the “featureless” / 
[and] that by which achievements are brought about—that achievements are 
necessarily based on the “nameless”.  As Wagner explains, 
“…in the center of Wang Bi’s philosophic inquiry is the relationship 
between the “That-by-which” and the ten thousand kinds of entities.  As 
the features of the latter, namely, “forms” and “names” are accessible to 
immediate cognition, while those of the “That-by-which are not, Wang Bi 
infers from the verifiable structures of the ten thousand kinds of entities 
what the features of their “That-by-which” must be.  His method is thus 
inductive…”90
  
 The problem with some of these “ontological arguments” is that they seem less 
intent on establishing the ontic existence of a Source called the Dao than they are in 
just highlighting some characteristic of the Dao similar to the myriad things or the way 
the Dao orders the world.  That is, Wang does not necessarily seem committed to a 
substantive metaphysical Dao; rather the Dao seems merely posited to analogously 
capture some concrete earthly, social or political structure. The Dao seems less a being 
in reality, and more of an imaginary mind-map.  Alan Chan’s study in Two Visions 
brings this out well.  His insightful studies of the “Dao as non-being (wu)”, which 
develops A C Graham’s analysis, and of the “Dao as principle (li)” are instructive. I 
quote at length: 
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“In Wang [B]i’s commentary on the [Laozi], the term wu is used to 
described the nature of [D]ao…As A C Graham points out, “When yu and 
wu are used as nouns, a serious ambiguity arises; they may mean either 
‘(there-)being’ and ‘(there-)not-being’ or ‘something’ and ‘nothing’.”  The 
question…is whether wu can be taken [to be]…an abstract noun when it is 
applied to the [D]ao…[A]s Graham writes, “Those who identify the [D]ao 
with wu mean primarily that it lacks form and other qualities, and…that it 
is not a things which exists in the world.”  Wang [B]i, according to 
Graham, is precisely one of those who exemplified this interpretation…91
 
…On chapter 40, where the Lao-tzu itself states that “All things in the 
world come from  itself states that “All things in the world come from yu; 
yu comes from wu,” Wang Pi remarks: “The things of this world have life 
by virtue of being; the origin of being is rooted in wu.  If fullness of being 
is to be attained, one must return to wu.” …The claim that wu is the origin 
of being may suggest the idea of an “original substance.”  When viewed 
more closely, however, wu remains a primarily negative concept.92
  
…On the…line of chapter 1, “The nameless is the beginning of heaven 
and earth; the named is the mother of the ten thousand things,” Wang Pi 
writes:   
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“All things originate from wu. Thus before there were form 
and names, (Tao) then is the “beginning of the ten thousand 
things”.  When there are forms and names, (Tao) then 
“brings them up, nourishes them, makes them secure and 
stable”; it is their “mother”.  This means that Tao in its 
formlessness and namelessness originates and completes 
the ten thousand things.  They are thus originated and 
completed, but without knowing why—this is what is 
“more profound than the deepest profundity”.   
 
The  myriad creatures are not only produced by the Tao, but are in 
fact dependent on it in every aspect of their existence.  But Tao is here 
described as wu only in the sense of what is “formless” and “nameless”; 
there is no direct ontological discussion of the nature of wu as [an ontic] 
“Nonbeing”.”93
 
And again, on Wang’s understanding of principle (li), Chan explains: 
 
“The knowledge of the sage…has to do with the inner structure, with the 
“nature” of things.  And what makes this kind of knowledge possible is 
precisely the idea of a “principle” that characterizes the workings of the 
Way.  In itself the Way is indeed beyond description, but its “constancy” 
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reveals a meaningful pattern which can be captured by our “following” 
it…[T]he concept of li serves to describe the ordered and ordering 
manifestation of the Tao in the world…The idea of principles in Wang 
Pi’s commentary on the Lao-tzu, like the notion of wu, lacks the sense of 
ontological independence that is apparent in later development of the 
concept…[I]n Wang Pi’s commentary, li is understood primarily as a 
heuristic concept, which seeks to articulate the way in which Tao is related 
to the world, and its implications for self-cultivation.  In this case, it may 
be permissible to abandon the standard translation of li as “principle,” and 
render it by “pattern” or “paradigm”.94
 
“…chapter 42 of the Tao-te Ching depicts the “Taoist” cosmogony in 
terms of the generation of primary numbers….After indicating the 
“oneness of all creation and the movement from wu to yu, Wang Pi 
continues: “Thus with respect to the production of the ten thousand things, 
I know its master.  Although there are myriad forms, the blending of the 
generative force makes them one.  The people have their own minds and 
different states have different customs; but kings and rules who have 
obtained the “One” become their master.  Since “One” is the master, how 
can it be abandoned?”  …Political parallel suggested in this passage is 
significant, for it shows that Wang Pi’s concern is not an exclusively 
metaphysical one.  The reason why wu may be identified with “One” is 
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quite clearly that they both point to the Way.  Whereas the former 
describes its formlessness and namelessness, the latter explains the 
principle of unity that is inherent in the “Tao-ist” world…Neither wu nor 
“One”…may therefore be elevated to the level of an absolute; they remain 
servants of the mind in its attempt to disclose the wonder of the Way.  
Nowhere in Wang’s commentary are they made into a godlike substance 
which exists independently of the realm of experience.”95
  
 Surely, therefore, there is more than meets the eye.   
 
Equivocating metaphors once more 
 
In the discussion thus far, I have tried to surface the challenges of explaining 
how the shift from a discourse in language and names to a discourse on the Dao as the 
source of all things occurs. It is hard to grasp how there was the sudden and abrupt 
shift of interest and for that matter how the supposed inference towards the Dao could 
be demonstrated. At least it will be hard as long as we are trying to find a strictly 
philosophical (and metaphysical) inference towards the Dao as the source of all 
things.  And we will continue to be puzzled until we realize that Wang’s commentarial 
reading is much more sophisticated than that. What do I mean?  Well, recall how the 
preceding discussions have unveiled Wang’s very clever employment and play of 
equivocal meanings of the same words.  Recall the metaphorical reading of key terms 
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of the Laozi text by Wang.   If we are to make sense of how Wang’s project of 
inferring the Dao is related to his theory of names, I suggest we have to interpret his 
intellectual project in the light of all these. 
My suggestion is that the shift from the correlative theory of names to the task 
of inferentially tracing the Dao as an ontological source is bridged by and only by 
Wang’s metaphorical reading of the correlative semiotics.  Recall that the correlative 
theory of names states that all names arise from forms, and that it is never the case that 
a form should arise from a name.  Metaphorically, this is the equivocal parallel for the 
socio-political or ethical point that authentic moral character or forms can never arise 
from lures of prestige as rewards for good behavior.  In other words what started off as 
a discourse in semiotics suddenly and equivocally becomes a completely different 
discussion on how authentic morality cannot be brought about.   The point can be 
broadened.  Lures of prestige and rewards for good behavior cannot bring about a 
political community of authentically moral citizens; rather the opposite results.  The 
country would be flooded, under these kinds of enticements, with hypocritical people.  
 The natural question that comes to mind would be, “well, what then would 
bring about a political community filled with people of authentic morality?”  The 
effort to seek or infer the cause of authentic morality leads to Wang’s theory of a 
policy of non-interference as the best way to encourage morality.  Here we need to 
recall the discussion in chapter 2. As I have explained, since authentic morality cannot 
be encouraged with enticements of prestige as rewards (and Wang would add) nor the 
implementation of a plenitude of punitive measures or the law to “cut people into 
shape”, nor any attempt to exemplify the moral forms since citizens will adopt these 
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forms for inauthentic reasons,  the best way to encourage the desirable political 
community composed of moral and well behaved citizens is to avoid enticing people 
with prestige or names and to avoid shaping people morally through the use of the law 
or institutions exemplifying any moral form or characteristic.  Hence, the best policy 
to adopt as a political leader is to be nameless and formless, respectively.  In other 
words, the causal source of a desirable political community is a policy of 
namelessness and formlessness.   The nameless and the formless becomes the source 
of the true forms and names.   
 Now, for the last time, make a literary paradigm shift.  The “nameless and 
formless” has for the while referred to the political policy of namelessness and 
formlessness. But it can metaphorically and equivocally refer once more to the 
metaphysical source of all things, the Dao, which is also nameless and formless.  
Therefore, the trail of the source of the names and its form or actuality has ended on 
the nameless and formless Dao.   
 In other words, the “shift” is not strictly a philosophical one.  It is a literary 
shift. By equivocating on the terms “forms” and “names”, the discussion moves over 
from semiotics to politics.  And finally by a further equivocation on the terms 
“namelessness” and “formlessness”, the discussion moves from politics to 
metaphysics. The “inferences” are hence not strictly speaking merely philosophical.     
There is a constant play and exploitation of the terms and their equivocations.   Each 
equivocation facilitates the shifting transition from semiotics to politics to 
metaphysics.  The intellectual journey from names to forms to the Dao is thus paved 
by three different kinds of tiles:  the linguistic names and forms; the moral or political 
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names and forms; and finally the ontologically nameless and formless.  When seen 
like this, the relevance of the correlative theory of names and forms becomes evident: 
it serves to usher in the political discussion of the doctrine of non-interference, which 
in turn will eventually lend itself to the discussion of the Dao as the source of all 
things.  
 Furthermore, the inference in the discovery of the Dao as the source of names 
and forms is thinly metaphysical. At least the central inference that moves from 
“names” and “forms” to the “Dao” is not an investigation in metaphysics. It is in the 
main a study in political governance: the causes and policy-origins of the desired 
society.  It explains and sums up the strategy of namelessness and formlessness that 
effects the good society.  This doctrine needs no metaphysical premise; it stands alone, 
justified by pragmatic political reflection.   So the centre piece of the inference to the 
Dao is really political reflection.   This sits well with Hansen’s study, which argued 
that the major interest in classical Chinese Daoism is political reflection.   So also 
Wang’s interpretation of the text as a research in political theory does not surprise us, 
precisely because Wang does not see the text in large part as a research in ontology.  
Consistent with the Hansenian theory of classical Daoist interpretive orientations, 
Wang’s interpretive glasses sees mostly political concerns.  It is only at the last stage 
where the equivocation on the terms “namelessness” and “formlessness signifying the 
political strategy of non-intervention brings the discussion to a point where there is the 
reference to the Dao, the ontological source of all things, itself structurally formless 
and hence nameless.   
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Still, rather obviously there is a separate discourse on the metaphysical Dao, 
about which the political terms “namelessness” and “formlessness” equivocally 
signify.   It would therefore be wrong to say that there is no metaphysical speculation 
on the Dao in Wang.  While Hansen’s point that in Daoism political reflection remains 
dominant holds true for Wang, Hansen’s playing down of metaphysical speculation of 
the Dao therefore cannot be unreservedly applied here.  The way to see it is to 
recognize that there are two speculative inferences towards the Dao, and unless these 
two are sorted out, Daoist xuan xue scholarship will be plagued with confusion.   
There is firstly the inference that the Dao exists, period. This stands on its own 
and is not clearly related to the discourse on names and forms. Its basic line of thought 
is the naïve ontological claim that there must necessarily be a Source for all the things 
in the world, and since this Source is imperceptible, it is formless and hence nameless. 
Its premises have little to do with the correlative theory that names arise from forms 
and never the other way around, or the political doctrine that character-forms cannot 
be effectively encouraged by promises of names and prestige.  Wagner’s scholarship 
correctly flashed out its presence in Wang’s commentary.  
The second “inference” is the one that moves from the discourse of names and 
forms, shifting from that to political reflection and then finally to the Dao, and 
wherein the shifts are facilitated by equivocating on the terms “names” and “forms”.  
This was explained above.   My sense is that Chan had noticed this second line of 
thought in Wang, and so was unwilling to reduce all of Wang’s ontological 
speculation into a simplistic discourse in ontic-metaphysics, typical of the first form of 
inference.  Therefore he was persuaded to suggest that Wang’s discourse on the Dao 
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as non-being (wu) was merely a heuristic devise to capture its metaphorical parallel, 
political policy of namelessness and formlessness, and added further that the Dao 
though ontological was not ontic.  This latter claim is a rather unstable position, since 
there seemed on the other hand distinct references to speculation on a causal origin.  
While there is nothing in Wang which necessarily implies any ontic Dao, nothing in 
Wang has explicitly excluded it.  I cannot of course argue from ignorance; I cannot 
say the ontic Dao is in the text because I know of nothing that resists it. Just as well, 
Occam’s razor is a double edged sword; to interpret a text most economically need not 
always preserve the truth.  If I must risk to err, I would so by giving Wang more 
credit.  My inclination is to say that for Wang, some of his references of the Dao were 
aimed at articulating some ontically existent origin of the myriad things.  I am also 
inclined to conclude this way because of Wang’s treatment of his correlative theory of 
names.  Even while the theory of names is employed metaphorically to capture his 
political doctrine of non-interference, he does take the correlative theory of names as 
an independently credible semiotic, and employs that in articulating how the formless 
Dao cannot be named.   In other words, while he does read his linguistic speculations 
metaphorically when it comes to politics, he does take them seriously on their own 
account.  Therefore, it would seem consistent that Wang would treat his speculations 
on the Dao likewise.  That is, Wang would read the nameless and formless Dao as a 
metaphor of the political strategy of non-intervention, but would nonetheless treat his 
metaphysical speculations on the nameless and formless Dao seriously and regard 
them as aiming at true ontological claims.   
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Therefore, it seems to me Chan may have erred in the opposite direction, 
which is that he had tried to interpret all of Wang’s metaphysical inferences as non-
ontic ontological speculation and merely heuristic analogues to political doctrine. The 
way to see how both Wagner and Chan are correct in their own way is to realize that 
they had spotted each of the two lines of “metaphysical” thinking in Wang.  For just as 
the first metaphysical and (I dare say) ontic discourse of the Dao exists, so also this 
second line of metaphysical speculation exists. But this second metaphysical 
speculation exists in a way that is not unconnected to the discourse on names and 
politics; it exists in addition to and together with the political reflection.  Its principal 
purpose is not metaphysical enquiry; rather this second line of “metaphysical” 
speculation is an artistic, creative and literary way of metaphorically capturing a 
political doctrine of nameless and formless non-interference.  
 
 
It Goes Both Ways 
 
We can test my interpretation.  We can see how the shifts facilitated by the 
equivocation of terms like “nameless(ness)” or “formless(ness)” creates a coherent 
and literarily beautiful reading of how knowledge of the Dao as the origin can inform 
the Sage’s political decisions.  
After having “inferred” the Dao as the source of all things, Wang then requests 
that we move in the opposite direction.  For: given that we have “traced” the Dao as 
the causal source of things and events, we are now in a position to infer the 
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consequences of this.  In this way, one moves from the Dao back to reality so to judge 
how best to operate in the reality of the myriad things.  In other words, having moved 
from present phenomenal realities (corresponding to names) back to the Dao as the 
primordial source of all things, one can understand how things arise.  But now that one 
knows how things arise by means of the Dao, one can now in turn know how things 
will occur.   This knowledge can guide the political theorist or the Sage ruler.  
Indeed, for him this is the entire message of the Laozi: knowing the Dao as the 
origin and how this information can guide political governance.  In a very important 
passage, Wang sums up the above as the thread that runs through the Daode Jing: 
 
As a book, the Laozi can almost be completely covered by a single phrase:  
Ah!  It does nothing more than encourage growth at the branch tips by 
enhancing the roots.  [In other words,] observe where things come from, 
and follow them to where they inevitably return.  In what one says, do not 
put the progenitor [the Dao] at a distance.  In what one undertakes, do not 
neglect the Sovereign [the Dao].  Although the text consists of five 
thousand words, there is a single unity that runs through all of them.96
 
If we are to read this in an unsophisticated manner, one would think of 
philosophically, perhaps inductively, inferring political precepts from one’s 
knowledge of the Dao.   In the last chapter I argued that this was Wagner’s approach, 
and rejected it as seriously mistaken and impossible.   If however we attend to the 
                                                 
96 Wang Bi, Introduction, 37 
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literary shifts which I have argued Wang constantly makes by exploiting the 
equivocations of the terms “formless(ness)” (wu xing) and “nameless(ness)” (wu 
ming), a picture that is more credible and workable (I think!) emerges. 
 Recall that on my theory of Wang’s reading, one moves from names and forms 
through to a reflection on the causes of some desired social behavior and then to the 
nameless and formless Dao. When one is able to do this, one can arrive at principles 
(li).  For: one can take a desired social behavior, trace its source and, presumably, as 
Wang reads the Daode Jing as saying, end up on the Dao as its source. The desired 
social behavior Wang had in mind was moral and law abiding behavior.  How is the 
Dao the source of this behavior? Not in the sense of a metaphysical cause.  Remember, 
the Dao qua nameless and formless, equivocally signifies the strategy of “nameless” 
and “formless” non-interference.  This latter political strategy is the Source.  But it is 
also equivocally the “Dao”, which is metaphysically nameless and so formless. And 
now that one knows the “Dao” as the source of that social behavior, one what one 
should or should not do, since some things that one does would either assist that cause 
or hinder that cause. What should or should not be done, so to assist and not hinder 
that cause, then is the (ordering) principle [li].   This principle then becomes a useful 
prudential norm for guiding the Sage ruler or political governor, who may be 
interested in promoting the desirable social behavior.   
As was pointed out, some of these prudential norms are analogously similar to 
how the Dao operates, and so the principle gets extended to describe how in fact the 
Dao acts and relates to the myriad or ten thousand things. But more significantly, there 
are also the metaphorical and equivocal parallels. The final result is that we have 
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principles like “namesless”(wu ming), “formlessness” (wu xing), “naturalness” (ziran) 
and “no action” (wu wei) which describe how the Dao operates in relation to the 
myriad things,97 and also how the ruler or governor prudentially ought to deal with his 
myriad subjects.  Hence each principle signifies two related ideas: how the Dao works 
and orders the world, and how the sage governor or ruler ought to prudentially operate 
to benefit society. 98   More poetically, the principles express analogously or 
metaphorically/equivocally the way, both of the Dao and of the Daoist Sage.  In a 
sense then, the principle of the “Dao” is a kind of an exemplar, pattern or paradigm99 
for the Sage’s mode of operation. We saw this, in all its clever complexity and in its 
many different layers within the Wang Bi Laozi in the previous chapter. 
Again, to warn that one not put the Dao at a distance or not neglect the Dao is 
to ask that one constantly remember that the “Dao” is the source of all things, and 
when one keeps this fact in mind, one would be in the better position to know how to 
co-operate with the Dao’s actions and not to hinder its causal activity.   What does this 
mean?  Is this merely saying that one examine how the metaphysical Dao operates and 
mimic its processes?  For the last time, No!  The “Dao” here refers not to the 
metaphysical Dao, but to the “Nameless and Formless”, i.e., the political strategy of 
non-interference.   
At the bottom of it all, Wang’s Daode Jing is a still in main a social science.  It 
is a theory about how to best manage society, attentive to the causal sources of the 
                                                 
97 see Alan Chan, Two Visions, 54 
98 Hence li is a heuristic concept which captures parallel ideas.  It has no ontological or 
cosmological reference to a law of nature, contrast with the Neo-confucian concept of 
li. See Alan Chan’s very good discussion in Two Visions, 53-54 
99 see Alan Chan, Two Visions, 54 
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desired social or political community, which traces causally ultimately to the nameless 
and formless political strategy, equivocally called the nameless and formless “Dao.”  
 
Do It Yourself 
 
However, there is a catch.  As Wang admits, the Daode Jing did not spell 
everything out to him.  It points one in directions and leaves one to do one’s 
homework.  If however one would pursue the causes of things, the Laozi is confident 
that he or she will end up as the text has concluded.   He or she will find corroboration 
in the many insights scattered about the text.  Thus Wang writes, 
 
…the text is composed in such a way that it verifies a beginning by 
fulfilling the conclusion to which it leads and it fulfills a conclusion by 
establishing from where it begins. It offers openings but does not go all the 
way; it leads but does not drag you there.  Only after searching for it can 
you arrive at what it means; only after pursuing inferences can you fully 
understand the principles involved.  It starts its discussion by excellently 
revealing how things begin and concludes its arguments by lucidly 
showing how things converge.  Therefore if those who sympathize with its 
approach are moved to express themselves, none will fail to praise how it 
serves as the starting point that inspires them to speak and, in doing so, 
elaborate on it.  If those who differ with its aims write something original 
of their own, none fail to be pleased at evidence for a congruence of views 
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and, as such, corroborate what they say in it.  Although roads differ, they 
all bring one back to the same place, and, although there might be 
hundreds of ways to deliberate, there is an ultimate congruence in thought.  
Thus it is that it [the Laozi] cites the ultimate nature of such congruence to 
cast light on perfect principle.  Therefore let it be those who think in terms 
of corresponding analogies [chulei], and none will fail to take delight in 
the correspondences [ying] its thought makes and, as such, grasp the 
concepts [yi] they seek in it.100
 
Unlike me, Rudolf Wagner does not see this passage as an invitation to 
philosophize, but as a caution about the difficulty of grasping the meaning of the text.  
He reads this passage as Wang’s warning about the limitations of the philosophical 
language used to express the ideas of the Laozi.  Quoting this very same passage, 
Wagner comments: 
 
“the essential unreliability of philosophical language does not prompt 
Wang Bi to adopt an attitude of negligence with regard to the actual 
rhetorical devises used in the Laozi. The opposite is the case.  Wang Bi 
deals with the text as a model of philosophic rhetoric, stressing again the 
importance of its literary craft and the necessity of understanding it in 
order to grasp the text’s elusive meaning…”101
                                                 
100 ibid, 35 
101  Rudolf Wagner, The Craft of the Chinese Commentator: Wang Bi on the Laozi 




For Wagner, the admonishment to pursue inferences (for oneself) is not a call 
to reason for oneself the philosophical connections of the claims of the Laozi. Instead, 
the pursuit of inferences refers to the inferences about what the text is saying.  Wagner 
sees Wang inviting the reader to trace for himself the meaning of the text, i.e., what 
the text is saying.  I on the other hand read Wang as inviting us to trace for ourselves 
the philosophical reasons or justification for the claims in the text, i.e., why the text 
claims what it claims.   
I would have no objection in principle to the point that it is not easy to grasp 
the meaning of the text of the Laozi, and like Wagner, I think Wang is attentive to 
interpretive difficulties.  However, it seems to me incorrect to think of Wang as 
merely pointing out the elusiveness of the text’s meaning and the need to 
independently decipher its meaning.  The reason is this.  If we examine the context of 
the passage, we will notice that Wang is lamenting how readers of different schools 
wrongly read the text as advocating their own philosophies and approaches to 
philosophizing.   The reason they do this is that they notice philosophical notions 
similar to their own philosophies: 
“…when they observe references to uniformity, the call is “Legalist”; 
when they detect references to defining actuality, they call it “nominalist”; 
when they discover references to complete love, they call it “Confucian”; 
when they find references to frugality, they call it “Mohist”; and when 
they see a lack of affiliation, they call it “Eclectic”.  They adjust the name 
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they apply to it in accordance with what they find and insist on 
interpreting it in terms of what they like…”102
However, Wang’s objection to this error is that these kinds of biased readings 
restrict the text: “although as a place can be the same when roads to it differ, so an 
ultimate congruence [of thought] can be achieved when approaches to it disagree”103  
In other words, Wang’s reply to these biased readings of the text is that each biased 
reading denies and excludes other readings the text, when other readings could equally 
be accommodated.  And after criticizing these restrictive and exclusive readings, then 
Wang continues:  
“…the text is composed in a way that it verifies a beginning by fulfilling 
the conclusion to which it leads, and it fulfills a conclusion by establishing 
where it begins.  It offers openings but does not go all the way; it leads but 
does not drag you there.  Only after searching for it can you arrive at what 
it means; only after pursuing inferences can you fully understand the 
principles involved…”104
The fact that this passage, which is the passage Wagner quotes, comes right 
after the criticism is significant.  It strongly suggests that there is a flow of thought 
between this passage and the criticism that goes before it. Wang’s criticism is that 
exclusive readings of the text are wrong because there can be many approaches to the 
same ideas or truths of the Laozi.  The passage then says that the text offers openings 
but does not go all the way, and that one needs to seek its meaning and pursue 
                                                 





inferences.   If we read the passage as a point about the difficulty of arriving at the 
meaning of the text, then the passage and the criticism seems to me disjointed: why 
would a possible plurality of approaches have anything to do with the difficulty of 
grasping the text’s elusive meaning?  Is Wang suggesting that: because the meaning of 
the text is difficult to grasp, there can be a plurality of approaches to the text? Or vice 
versa?   This seems unreasonable and highly unlikely.  Notice: the warning about the 
text’s elusive meaning is, as Wagner understands it, a warning about the difficulty of 
getting the right meaning of the text.  It is a warning about the need to attend to the 
rhetorical devices in the text and to pursue inferences in order to grasp the correct 
meaning of the text. But if this is what Wang is advocating here, it seems to contradict 
his criticism of exclusive readings—a criticism aimed at endorsing different 
approaches to the text.  After all, if it is already difficult to get the right meaning of the 
text, why then still encourage a plurality of approaches?  Should not the reasonable 
thing be to discourage a plurality of approaches, and to introduce the one best 
approach? 
Therefore, my suggestion is that this is not what Wang was talking about.  
Instead, it seems to me Wang is explaining how the way the text is written supports 
the plurality of approaches or readings. This plurality is not a plurality of conclusions 
but of justifications and arguments.  In other words, after putting down exclusive 
readings of the text with their respective philosophical reasons and maintaining that 
there can be more than one way of understanding how the ideas of the Laozi are true, 
Wang points out how the text exemplifies the latter.  Because the text does not offer 
merely one kind of argument for its claims, it leaves the reader to search for his own 
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philosophical justifications for the claims.  Precisely by not stating the justifications 
for its claims, many different justifications for the claims can be all accommodated (so 
long as they are independently sound).  Naturally then, the passage continues with the 
suggestion that “if those who differ with its aims write something original of their 
own, none will fail to be pleased at evidence for a congruence of view, and, as such, 
corroborate what they say in it. Although roads differ, they all bring one back to the 
same place, and, although there might be hundreds of ways to deliberate, there is an 
ultimate congruence in thought”105
In other words, Wang proposes that the reader be open to many different ways 
of justifying or arriving at the conclusions of the Laozi.  With that also, Wang sees the 
Laozi as inviting these many different justifications of its claims.  This I think is what 
Wang is referring to when he says that one must seek its meaning and pursue 
inferences to understand the Laozi’s principles.   
For the reasons above, I see the commentator not merely as someone seeking 
the meaning of the text of the Laozi, but whose contribution includes, perhaps most 
significantly, the justifications for the claims of the Laozi. Wang Bi here exemplifies 
very well the role of the commentator.  His unique contribution was to demonstrate 
and explain the various claims in the Laozi. He adds to and develops the Daoist (and 
Xuan Xue) tradition with his original justification of the claims of the Laozi.   We have 
examined many of Wang’s own “inferences”—both philosophical and literary—in this 
chapter and the previous chapter.  Starting off with a correlative theory of names and 
forms where forms cannot arise from names, he switches the discussion to a political 




reflection on how names cannot generate forms. As he points out, by implementing 
punitive measures to suppress immorality and using lures of prestige (names) to 
encourage good behavior (form) is ultimately self-defeating.  Suppressing evil with 
more laws and “bright scrutiny” or intensified surveillance only results in more 
sophisticated deviance, whereas honoring good behavior with prestige or “names” 
ironically breeds insincere and thus morally undesirable subjects.  Therefore, the best 
political approach to encourage moral and well behaved compliance would be a policy 
of non-interfering “namelessness” and “formlessness.” Since the nameless and the 
formless is the source of this desirable state of social-political affairs, the Dao which is 
nameless and formless is also the source, albeit metaphorically. Thus he concludes, all 
things trace back to the Dao.  Again, as the policy of non-interfering “namelessness 
and formlessness” is what generates the desired political society, so the Sage should 
always apply the “Dao” qua the “nameless and formless” when deciding how to act. 
The riddle then, I think, is solved.  The right way to understand Wang’s 
commentarial reading of the Laozi is to see that some of Wang’s speculations of the 
Dao as the source of all things do not always proceed philosophically. Wang’s 
commentarial reading of the Laozi sews old interests neatly together with the new.  
The discourse on names and forms and the concern with politics is playfully stringed 
up with the metaphysical discourse on the Dao.  One need not logically imply the 
other; but there exists the literary connection.   Each patchwork is joined together with 
the other with metaphorical bonds to form the picture of a quest that starts from names 
and form ending with the Dao.  
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For the analytically rigorous thinker this patchwork is bound to tear.   Under 
the bar of modern analytic philosophy, some portions of his speculations would be 
severely condemned, such as the “equivocal inferences” explicated above. But 
precisely his employment of equivocation is what gives his own reading of the Laozi 
its original beauty and genius.  To appreciate and acknowledge his brilliance, we have 




In the previous chapter I argued how, like Finnis’ thomistic natural law theory, 
Wang does not derive his political theory from a metaphysics of the Dao. We have 
seen in this chapter how Wang integrates the metaphysics of the Dao with his political 
theory, crafting an “inference” of the Dao as the source of his desired political 
community.  In the next chapter we shall consider how a thomistic natural law 
(jurisprudential-political) theory compares with Wang’s inferences.  Unlike Wang’s 
employment of metaphors and equivocations, Western Thomism regards equivocation 
as a serious flaw.   However, I will argue that there can be a philosophically rigorous 
inference of the cause of a desirable society which terminates in some metaphysical 
Transcendent Being or Warrant, or God as its ultimate cause.  This is similar to Wang 
Bi’s argument that the desirable political community traces itself to the Dao as its 
cause, only that in the case of thomistic natural law theory, the inferential moves are 
not metaphorical and never intend to employ equivocations.   A later chapter will then 
compare how this thomistic Warrant or God compares with the Dao in Wang Bi’s 
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Laozi.  My analysis will suggest that there are strong similarities between the Dao and 
the thomistic God, and that this God can be called “Dao”.   In this way, we might offer 
an alternative vision of how political reality is philosophically connected with that 
metaphysical Transcendent, God or Dao.  To borrow from Wang Bi: “Although roads 
differ, they all bring one back to the same place, and, although there might be 











This chapter is mainly preparatory and outlines the kind of desirable political 
community for promoting the common basic goods which the natural law (and thus 
also, Natural Law Theory) directs us to promote.  Such a society has a certain form of 
Rule of Law, and shares some qualities of Wang’s desired society.  Together with the 
next two chapters (5 and 6), it offers a thomistic natural law argument for the 
existence of metaphysical Transcendent Warrant, Norm or God, through analyzing the 
normative authority of the Rule of Law and practical reasoning.  We will then 
compare how this “God” compares with the metaphysical Dao in Wang.  
 
Tracing the Dao 
Previously we saw how Wang’s ming-shi theory of language yields a social 
science and an inference to the Dao.  Because names have a corresponding form and 
are not the product of random fancy, one could attempt to infer that form which 
corresponds to the name.  (Here an equivocation and literary shift takes place) Again, 
since forms do not arise from names, we cannot try to attempt lure people to behave 
well, hoping to shape them into moral forms with promises of prestige or names.  Just 
as well, if we use any institutional forms, people will obey for inauthentic motives, 
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and thereby not become moral. Generally the policy should be non-interference: 
namelessness and formlessness.  It is the nameless and formless (political policy) that 
generates the good society.  Since the nameless and the formless is the Dao, the good 
society has the “Dao” as its source.   Therefore, the “inference” proceeds from social 
reality all the way to a metaphysical origin as its source, although not always 
philosophically, and some significant places, rather fallaciously, even though these 
moves are intriguingly and delightfully clever. 
 Yet however delightful it may be, without the metaphorical reading of the 
correlative theory of names and forms or of the notion of the Dao as “nameless” and 
“formless”, Wang could not develop a purely philosophical inference of the Dao as the 
source of his desired political society.  Or at least, it seems to me he did not see how 
he could have, given the lack of any such an inference in his commentary. His strictly 
philosophical inference of the Dao was merely a rather naïve106 and general claim that 
for every xing or shape, there were causal processes, and for these in turn there had to 
be, beyond the many mediating causes, an ultimate unifying cause, which is the Dao: 
The Dao gives life to them; virtue nurtures them, matter gives them 
physical form, and characteristic potential completes them. 
Once things achieve life, they are nurtured.  Once nurtured, they acquire 
physical form [xing]…What is the origin from which life comes? It is the 
Dao…From the way all things achieve life to the way the potentiality of 
things reach completion, all these processes have an origin.  Because there 
has to be an origin for them, this origin without exception is the Dao.  
                                                 
106 not meaning stupid, but meaning technically unsophisticated. 
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Thus, if we trace these processes back to their ultimate origin, we arrive 
inevitably at the Dao.  It is when we follow them back to their individual 
causes that we find separate terms for these causes.107
If we recall that according to Wang’s semiotic, for every form there was a word, then 
it becomes clear that Wang’s “inference” amounts to no more than the general claim 
that to every word, there corresponded a form which, in the final analysis, was caused 
by the Dao.  The discussion on politics is completely left out of the picture.  Unless we 
weave in the metaphorical reading of the correlative theory of names and forms that 
captures the politics of non-interference, it seemed unlikely Wang saw how he could 
have integrated the discussion of politics into that inferential speculation of the Dao.   
 
Metaphysics From Natural Law Political Theorizing 
In the thomistic new classical natural law tradition, a parallel analysis like this 
is possible.  The subject of my analysis is law, and a careful and sound analysis of the 
concept of law reveals law’s normative sources to be practical reasoning. Practical 
reasoning in turn points to some transcendent, Normative Warrant.    Since we are 
working from within the western Aristotelian tradition, the premium will be logical 
consistency, and the disease is equivocation.   Hence every move is intended to be 
strictly philosophical, and no literary shifts like those of Wang will be employed.   
In spite of this difference, our thomistic analysis shares many assumptions with 
Wang’s Laozi.  Wang had an idea of an ideal political community and its kind of 
governance. It is this certain kind of society and its political arrangement that Wang 
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had in mind consistently throughout his commentary on the Laozi, and it is this ideal 
society that he thought important and worth defending and securing--i.e., its branch 
tips to be flourished—based on the political strategies he finds in the Laozi.  Thus also 
it is the causes and foundations of such a society that he had in mind when he spoke of 
the roots and the Dao that were to be enhanced. This society is not unlike the kind that 
I, following Finnis (and Aquinas) think ideal and important.  
Wang may at times seem to read as if he recommends doing away with law 
altogether.  But in contemporary society, this will be impossibly utopian. As society 
becomes more complex and human action requires co-ordination and organization, it 
becomes quickly apparent that no society can do without the law. If society cannot do 
without the law, then in choosing an ideal society we will always have to pick one in 
which the rule of law exists.  Nevertheless, we could still choose from amongst the 
different societies according to which there are different forms of the rule of law.  For 
not all societies have the law rule in the same manner.  So the choice of the society 
from many of its analogical instances turns out to be a choice of Law from amongst its 
many analogical instances.   Call this ideal case of law the “focal” or “central” case, 
about which many less ideal and peripheral cases surround. 
Now, Wang’s own commentary reveals his ideal type of political governance 
to be one which draws compliance not from fear of punishment, nor by promises of 
honors and pleasures.  His reasons were that ruling people by fear proves ultimately 
inefficacious and promoted various undesirable effects.  H L A Hart’s own choice of 
the concept of legal governance was based on his own observations of the educated 
Englishman’s internal experience of the law. For sure, Hart was constructing a realist 
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concept of law when he affirmed that law moves after the manner of rules rather than 
as imperatives.  Our purpose is to arrive as natural law theorists at an ideal concept of 
law.108   Yet it would be wrong to think that Hart’s realist concept of law cannot guide 
our choice of an ideal concept.  Although Hart was principally interested in descriptive 
sociology, Hart’s own methodology could not avoid the kind of evaluative choice in 
determining what he would or would not include in his concept of law.   
Because: for a fact, some people do experience law as nothing but the brute 
coercions of a greater power; yet Hart would differentiate and exclude that Austinian 
version of ‘law’ from his concept of ‘law’.  In choosing what are the elements to be 
included in his concept of law, Hart appealed to what he called the internal point of 
view, that is, the view point of certain persons who experienced law as rules rather 
than as coercive imperatives.  Yet his choice of the internal point of view of these 
persons who experienced law as rules as data for the construction of the law over that 
of those other persons who took law as merely a coercive power was unavoidably an 
evaluative choice:  for Hart these former view points were better, to be preferred.   His 
preference was not arbitrary; we could agree with his reasons.  Hart had preferred that 
concept of law because for him it was more efficient.  It worked better to overcome 
the difficulties Hart saw in the “pre-legal” world.  As Finnis points out,  
…with Hart’s ‘unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude…or mere wish 
to do as others do’[, t]hese are attitudes which will, up to a point, tend to 
maintain in existence a legal system (as distinct from, say, a system of 
despotic discretion) if one already exists.  But they will not bring about the 
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concept of law 
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transition from the pre-legal…social order of custom or discretion to a 
legal order, for they do not share the concern, which Hart himself 
recognizes as the explanatory source of legal order, to remedy the defects 
of pre-legal social orders.109  
 
However Hart had aimed to be a realist in his construction of the concept of 
law, he could not avoid the idealism in choosing a concept of law that was to him, the 
theorist, more important than other competing concepts.   As Finnis so insightfully 
noticed, 
 
By a long march through the working or implicit methodology of 
contemporary jurisprudence, we arrive at the conclusion reached more 
rapidly (though on the basis of a much wider social science) by Max 
Weber: namely, that the evaluations of the theorist himself are an 
indispensable and decisive component in the selection or formation of any 
concepts for use in description of such aspects of human affairs as law or 
legal order.110
 
As Finnis explains, a natural law theorist would also have a central paradigm 
instance of that Law and its Rule.  In departing from the gun-man model of legal 
obligation, this paradigm instance shares much of what Hart has pointed out in 
                                                 
109 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (NY: Oxford University Press, 
1980),13-14 
110 ibid., 16 
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opposition to Austin for reasons of law’s efficacy. But the natural law theorist goes 
further:  when it comes to deciding the kind of law that is worth having, one has also 
to decide beforehand what are the things or goods that are worth seeking.  For: any 
social entity or civil institution worth having like (the rule of) law would exist to 
secure such goods.  For just as one who wishes to decide which kind of sport is worth 
picking up would have to know what kinds of muscles are worth his development, or 
one who wishes to choose what to eat would need to know what kinds of food are 
healthy and so worth eating, so also one who wishes to pick out the ideal and worthy 
central case of law would need to know what are the objects that law and its rule 
should promote.  A legal institution which (aims to) effectively promote(s) and 
secure(s) those goods worth securing would be more ideal and desirable than one 
which fails to secure such goods, and so would be a better pick for the paradigm 
instance or a central case of law that is worth having, important or ideal.  The self-
evident principles of natural law direct us to these goods. Such goods worth securing 
include life, friendship, knowledge, practical reasonableness, aesthetic experience, 
play, etc.   Since they are commonly participate-able by all persons, we call them 
common basic goods. 
In other words, this is a good candidate for a thomistic natural law theorist’s 
focal concept of law: Law as a legal system which directs through co-ordination its 
compliant towards the promotion or protection of the basic common goods. However, 
such a Law and its Rule is one which draws compliance not merely out of fear and the 
prediction of punishment; instead it draws compliance through something internal in 
the law, after the fashion of a rule.   
 115
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Wang certainly does not have the list of basic goods which Finnis (and 
Aquinas) has.   He has however, some concept of morality and human benefits which 
he is eager to promote, as his commentary on Section 5 of the Laozi shows:  
“…when institutions are established and behavior influenced, people lose 
their authenticity, and when subject to kindness and conscious effort, they 
no longer preserve their integrity…Heaven and Earth do not make grass 
grow for the sake of beasts, yet beasts eat grass.  They do not produce 
dogs for the sake of men, yet men eat dogs.  Heaven and Earth take no 
conscious effort with respect to the myriad things, yet because each of the 
myriad things has what is appropriate for its use, not one thing is denied 
support…”111
Furthermore, he would also agree that men should not be governed coercively: 
“…as scrutiny is curtailed, attempts to evade it will also be curtailed, but as brightness 
of one’s intelligence dries up [through scrutinizing non-conformity], ways to evade it 
will become ever more perceptive.”112   Were Wang alive today, he might not resist 
our choice of a focal concept of law, or of our ideal of a society ruled by such a 
concept of law.  
In any event, it is this type of Law and its Rule that interests us as social 
theorists, especially natural law theorists stemming from Aquinas.  For the natural law 
theorist such a concept of law and its rule is important and worth having.  Because 
natural law prescribes the seeking and promotion of common goods, then a Rule of 
Law which effectively coordinates human action towards participation of these human 
                                                 
111 Wang Bi, The Classic, Section 5, 60 
112 Wang Bi, Introduction, 38 
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goods is derivatively something that one also ought to seek and promote.  Such a Rule 
of Law becomes an important means for fulfilling the ends of the natural law.  Since 
this is a desirable form of civil governance viz. this Rule of Law, it would therefore be 
worth analyzing and examining its foundations for the purpose of strengthening them.   
With these foundations strengthened or preserved or protected, its effects viz. the Rule 
of law will also be preserved.   As Wang would have said it, the strategy is to enhance 
the roots in order to flourish the branch tips.  
 
Conclusion 
At the end of this chapter, I will say a little about chapters 4 and 5. Having 
arrived at a focal concept of law in this 3rd chapter, the next will seek the foundational 
sources of such a concept of law and its normativity.  It concludes with the first 
principles of practical reasoning or natural law as the only source of law’s normativity.  
For: there are no other sources of normative reasons beside the first practical 
principles. Thus natural law does not merely identify the goods worthy to be sought 
and promoted, but it is itself the very source of the norm that such goods ought to be 
sought.  Identifying the goods to be sought enables us to frame a central case of law 
that is important and desirable, but having the norms is what makes the seeking of 
these goods through the rule of law a seeking that ought to be done.  While both are 
contributions of the natural law, often framed as a proposition of the type “such and 
such a good/value ought to be sought”, they are still logically distinct aspects of 
natural law’s prescriptivity; the one tells what are the values or goods, the other tells 
us that such values or goods ought to be sought and done.   Chapter 5 will point out 
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natural law’s contribution of the latter, viz., practical reasons’s normativity, to account 
for law’s very normative power. Chapter 6 then moves on to ask what practical 
reason’s normativity entails.  And I argue that practical reason’s normativity entails 
nothing less than some form of external normative warrant, some transcendent 
creative power which intended that our epistemic faculties delivered these practical 
reasons. Such an ultimate cause of normativity, the Norm Itself, is what in Christian 
(and Thomistic) Philosophy is called God.   It is similar to what Wang and the Laozi 










In the previous chapter we settled on a central case of law.   Such a concept of 
law obligates after the manner of rules, and directs these rules towards the co-
ordinated pursuit of human welfare or benefits.  In this chapter, we hope to discern the 
sources of law’s obligatory, normative or authoritative powers—i.e., the source of its 
capacity to motivate people just like rules obligate those under the rules, in contrast 
with the imperativity of coercive orders. 
   
The Sources of Rule-Normativity 
 
To go about this we will build on the results of Hart’s analysis but we need to 
go some distance further. This is because Hartian Legal Positivism lacks certain 
anthropological commitments and frames its explanation of legal obligation 
accordingly. In so doing, Legal Positivism does not describe with desirable precision 
the phenomenon of law as a human social institution.  It fails to follow through with 
the implications of social reality constituted by human actors.  While attentive to the 
uttered expressions of the experience of law, it failed to pick out other clues besides 
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those present in the utterance: namely, in the utteror. Insofar as Hart was informed by 
the subtle meanings in the utterance of obligated individuals—meanings which 
indicate that law motivates (or obligates) through (social habits adopted as) evaluative 
reasons (to the extent that they operate as rules), Hart did not see himself committed 
to any particular theory why people chose to be thus (legally) obligated, even though 
his account of law captures the description that they in fact do.   But attention to the 
utteror qua human person qua being with practically reasonable capacities equally 
informs us about the law, and in accommodating that information, we shall argue for 
the place of practical reasons as the source of the normative authority of law. 
 
To see all this we may begin with Hart’s notion of a secondary rule of 
recognition.  For Hart, the (secondary) rule of recognition expresses social habit, but 
not just any kind of social habit but such social habits adopted as rules, as identified 
from an internal point of view, i.e., by examining the internal perspective of the person 
who adopts the social habit.113  When used as rules, it means that those (officials) who 
adopt it use the rules as reasons (whatever they are) for criticizing non-compliance 
and appraising compliance.114   
  Now it follows for Hart that insofar as rules are reasons appealed to for 
criticizing non-compliance and appraising compliance, rules have normative force—
whatever the substantive content of the reasons are. This intrinsic normative capacity 
                                                 
113  H LA Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1961), 
56-57.  Henceforth, Concept. 
114 ibid. This amount to what Hart here (ibid.) calls “a reflective critical attitude”. 
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Hart calls the internal aspect of rules.115  ‘Normativity’ here means that they are 
appealed to as reasons for evaluating behavior, but nothing presupposes that these 
reasons are in any manner morally sound, or that they depend on or trace to or are 
reducible to further such moral premises.  Similarly ‘legal authority’ traces to these 
rules’ being appealed to in justifying behaviour and end there. Just as, if someone 
were to ask for reasons why there is such a ‘law’, the answer would point to the rule of 
recognition as a reason, and it would (quite sufficiently) end there; so also, if we are 
to ask why some precept has ‘legal authority’ and is ‘legally binding’, we would 
appeal to the rule of recognition as a reason for the legality of this particular precept, 
and its authority, and the answer (quite sufficiently) ends there. The answer, in 
offering (good or poor) reasons as justification,  just sufficiently  shows up 
‘normativity’ (or ‘authority’ or ‘obligation’) in law (as well as its existence).116  Hence 
there exists for Hart’s account of law’s normativity an implied indifference to the 
substantive content of the law. But this is not all: for Hart saw himself as also not 
committed to the reasons for adopting the normativity-conferring reasons, i.e., the 
social rules. The distinction between the two non-commitments is this. To say that one 
uses the rule of recognition as a (good or poor) reason for criticizing non-compliance 
or appraising compliance leaves out giving the reasons for using the rule of 
                                                 
115 ibid.  Here also note how Hart speaks of the existence of “binding” rules. 
116 Concept, 102. See also Concept, 90, where Hart, comparing the external from the 
internal point of view, writes, “what the external point of view, which limits itself 
from to the observable regularities of behaviour, cannot reproduce is the way in which 
rules function as rules in the lives of officials, lawyers, or private persons who use 
them, in one situation after another, as guides to conduct of social life, as the basis for 
claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment, viz., in all the familiar 
transactions of life according to rules.  For them the violation of a rule is not merely a 
basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow, but a reason for hostility.” 
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recognition as a reason for criticizing non-compliance and appraising compliance. So 
in Hart’s notion of law, why the rules came to be is an open question; that the rules are 
what laws are composed of is a settled issue. Hart’s reply to Ronald Dworkin in his 
Postscript to the 2nd edition of the The Concept totally bears this out.  He writes, and I 
think it is worth quoting at length: 
 
[Social] rules establish duties and reasons for action to which appeal is 
made when such rules are cited, as they commonly are, in criticism of 
conduct and in support of demands for action.  This reason-giving and 
duty-establishing feature constitutes their distinctive normative 
character and  that their existence cannot consist in a merely factual 
state of affairs as do the practices and attitudes which according to the 
practice theory constitute the existence of a social rule.  According to 
Dworkin, a normative rule with these distinctive features can only exist 
if there is ‘a certain normative state of affairs’. I find these quoted 
words tantalizingly obscure…Dworkin, it appears, means by a 
normative state of affairs the existence of good moral grounds or 
justification for doing what the rule requires…If this is what Dworkin 
means by a normative state of affairs required to warrant the assertion 
of a normative rule his account of the existence conditions of a social 
rule seems to me far too strong.  For it seems to me to require not only 
that participants who appeal to rules as establishing duties or 
providing reasons for action must believe that there are good moral 
 122
 123
grounds or justifications for conforming to the rules, but that there 
must actually be such good grounds.117  Plainly a society may have 
rules accepted by its members which are morally iniquitous, such as 
rules prohibiting persons of certain colour from using public 
facilities…Indeed, even the weaker condition that for the existence of a 
social rule it must only be the case that participants must believe that 
there are good moral grounds for conforming to it as far too strong as 
a general condition for the existence of social rules.118 For some rules 
may be accepted simply out of deference to tradition or the wish to 
identify with others or in the belief that society knows best what is to 
the advantage of individuals.  These attitudes may co-exist with a more 
or less vivid realization that the rules are morally objectionable.  Of 
course a conventional rule may both be and be believed to be morally 
sound and justified.  But when the question arises as to why those who 
have accepted conventional rules as a guide to their behaviour or as 
standards of criticism have done so I see no reason for selecting from 
the many answers to be given…a belief in the moral justification of 
rules as the sole possible or adequate answer.119
  
As the last line indicates, Hart does not intend at all to answer the (very 
different) question: why did the law come to be? This question, explicated in terms of 
                                                 
117 Emphasis mine. 
118 Emphasis mine 
119 H L A Hart, “Postscript” in The Concept of Law, (NY: Oxford University Press, 
1980) 2nd Edition, 256-7. (Final Emphasis also mine) 
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the Hartian notion that a union of rules (being something adopted with an internal 
point of view and hence used as reasons for evaluating compliance or non-
compliance) constitute what we (here still) mean by “law”, asks the question: for what 
reason were these rules (esp. the rule of recognition) so adopted as rules (i.e., as 
behaviour-evaluating reasons)? To this question, whatever the reasons, once these 
rules are adopted as rules, the necessary and sufficient conditions of law obtain for 
Hart.  
 
Some Wrong Paths 
 
So rules are normative just when appealed to as evaluative reasons.  For Hart legal 
normativity or obligation means that law motivates as reasons for evaluating 
behavior.  But Hart also avoids pinning down the particular reason for the adoption of 
the social habits as evaluative reason(s), i.e., as rules. Indeed there seem to be many 
possible reasons for adopting the social habits as evaluative reasons. Does this mean 
therefore, that one can say that any reasons (or even non-reasons) for adopting the 
rules go?  I think not.  Consider Jules Coleman's offer. 
 
The internal point of view should be understood…as the exercise of the 
basic and psychological capacity of human beings to adopt a practice or 
pattern of behavior as a norm.  This capacity can be given a 
philosophical analysis in terms of behavioral and psychological 
dispositions—among them, the disposition to conform to the norm or 
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rule, to evaluate oneself and others on its basis, and to form certain 
beliefs and other intentional states associated with such a commitment.  
However, there may be no further philosophical explanation of the 
ground or source of this capacity.  Its existence is to be explained in 
some other way—causally, sociologically, biologically, or more 
broadly, by invoking an evolutionary argument that identifies that 
adaptive value of such a capacity (for example, its usefulness to 
individuals in enabling them to undertake projects and to secure the 
gains of coordinative activity).  Understood in this more sophisticated 
sense…as the exercise of a basic capacity to adopt a pattern of behavior 
as a norm—the internal point of view is essential to the explanation of 
the Rule of Recognition’s normativity.120
 
But that sophisticated account is a misleading, as well as an illuminating one. 
Coleman, I grant, is careful not to characterize the internal point of view and its 
normativity as some kind of evolutionary or anthropological dispositional tendency or 
capacity to adopt a social habit as a norm (as it surely is not). Instead he says it is the 
exercise of that dispositional tendency to adopt a social habit as a norm. Hence 
according to Coleman, given this tendency to adopt a social habit as a norm, once in 
fact the tendency is exercised (or acted upon), i.e., once the norm is actually adopted 
as a norm (by giving reasons for compliance and criticizing non-compliance), we have 
                                                 
120 Jules Coleman, “The Conventionality Thesis” in Social, Political and Legal 
Philosophy (Philosophical Issues Vol. 11). Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva, (ed.), 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 354-387 at 369 
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the internal point of view and normativity. In short, normativity exists with the 
exercising of such capacities.  
But as Hart points out, normativity is in the reasons and legal obligation is 
found there: in the essentially normative reasons, and not anything beyond that. 
Normativity is not something incidental to (evaluative) reasons, as if a property added 
to it. Quite the contrary: once there are (evaluative) reasons, there is normativity. How 
then does “the exercise of psychological tendencies to apply a social habit as a norm” 
in fact help explain normativity in the (rules of) law? If this ‘explanation’ intends to 
offer any elucidation on how in fact the adoption of rules gives rise to normativity, 
then surely the “insight” (if any) is that it is (by elimination) thanks primarily to these 
psychological tendencies (to adopt social habits as norms) that we are motivated adopt 
the norms—and  hence there exists the normativity of rules. And this is not because 
there are evaluative reasons, but because such tendencies are exercised or acted on.   
But then the puzzle still remains unsolved: how, one may ask, does being 
motivated by psychological capacities to adopt a social habit as a norm in fact grant 
normativity? Not only is this explanation simply unhelpful, but it seems to me that 
Coleman here sets the positivist tradition back into the primitive by going against the 
evolutionary grain of its intellectual trajectory:  Hart’s motivation to resist John 
Austin’s theory of law was  to include the user’s appeal to reasons in accounting for 
law’s obligatory powers (even if these reasons were not necessarily moral), in 
opposition to the Austinian account which failed to capture that inner life of the law-
obligated person. This  inner life (or what Hart called the ‘internal point of view’) is 
marked by appeals to evaluative reasons, as signaled by expressions such as “I have an 
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obligation [should, ought] to…”121  Hence on Hart’s account evaluative reasons are 
necessary and sufficient to explain law’s normativity or legal obligation for its human 
(i.e, rational) users. Yet Coleman’s account, per our analysis, really attributes the 
principal agency of legal motivation to unreasonable tendencies which are later 
camouflaged by rationalizations122 (which are of themselves not central in accounting 
for normativity in the law).  On this account of legal obligation, evaluative reasons are 
absolutely redundant, and take on the quality of an epi-phenomenon.  Here master and 
commentator are headed in opposite directions. 
 
No More Excuses 
 
Let me elaborate on this last point. The unwitting opposition between Coleman 
and Hart helps to bring out the very subtle difference between (a) someone who uses 
the rule as rationalization for his behavior (and hence not qua rules!), and (b) someone 
who properly uses the rules qua rules qua evaluative reasons to guide his behavior. 
Only (b) expresses the Hartian account of legal obligation from the internal point of 
view.  In the former (a), while the rules (i.e., evaluative reasons) may be used to 
explain his behaviour in the sense that he appeals to them to explain his own 
                                                 
121 Hart, Concept, 90 
122 see also John Finnis, Aquinas:  Moral Political and Legal Theory (NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 74: “Reason in passion’s service does its master’s bidding by 
inventing intelligent and attractive but, in the last analysis, specious and imperfectly 
intelligent rationalizations for doing what one (emotionally) wants, against some 
reason or reasons for not so acting.  By ‘rationalization’…I mean reasons which one 
recounts to oneself or to others, for doing an action that one in fact is undertaking for 
emotional satisfaction, for emotional ‘reasons’ that are not the reasons which 
intelligence understands and reason affirms and develops.”  This expresses very well 
what I mean here and in the immediate following as (legal) rationalization.  
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conformity to the social rules, they do not motivate him.  Meaning: he is first 
motivated by other (irrational) causes, and then uses the rules to justify his behaviour.  
This does not correctly express the internal point of view of the legally obligated 
person.123  Indeed while the two instances (a) and (b) are indistinguishable insofar as 
both appeal to social rules as reasons in order to explain their behavior, (a) is not 
motivated by the reasons which he uses as an explanation to justify his action. For 
Hart, when appealing to rules as evaluative reasons, the obligated person is not merely 
justifying his legal compliance with these rules. Rather, he is describing the historical 
cause of his obedience. Thus, Hart intends therefore not merely explanatory power for 
these reasons, but motive power. Thus normativity exists when social habits are 
appealed to as reasons for evaluating behaviour—wherein to “appeal to” reasons is not 
merely to call up those reasons to rationalize one's act (however otherwise motivated), 
but to give an account of that which in fact so moved me to act.  In which case, the 
adoption of the social habits as rules cannot be motivated by reasons extrinsic to the 
rules (qua evaluative reasons) themselves.  Meaning to say, it cannot be the case that 
the social rules were adopted for causes totally unrelated to the rules, such as 
psychological tendencies, for if that were the case, then the reason why one adopts the 
social habits as guiding principles of behavior is some motive different from the rules 
itself--and hence the person is not so much obligated by the social rule (as is the case 
                                                 
123 Again, Concept, 102. See also Concept, 90, where Hart, comparing the external 
from the internal point of view, writes, “what the external point of view, which limits 
itself to the observable regularities of behaviour, cannot reproduce is the way in which 
rules function as rules in the lives of officials, lawyers, or private persons who use 
them, in one situation after another, as guides to conduct of social life, as the basis for 
claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment, viz., in all the familiar 
transactions of life according to rules.  For them the violation of a rule is not merely a 
basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow, but a reason for hostility.” 
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with law), but rather motivated by something else apart from the social rules.  He is, if 
he did this, rationalizing his (otherwise motivated) law abiding behaviour, but not at 
all being obligated by the law. Therefore we might even say that ‘to adopt a social 
habit as a rule (or norm in the Hartian, stronger sense) for non-reasonable motives 
(such as psychological tendencies)’ is an internally  contradictory statement:  to adopt 
a social habit as a rule is to have the rule  motivate my compliance to  the social habit, 
but now here I am further saying that I am adopting or complying with the social habit 
for some other reason (that does not involve the rule), and hence not motivated to 




In other words, if we are to progress in our analysis of law’s authority, then we 
must press on with the Hartian insight that it is legal rules operating as evaluative 
reasons that best describes the internal view-point of law’s obligatoriness. Its 
normative force is what Hart means by the internal aspect of legal rules.  He had in 
mind this aspect of rules that was not externally visible.  Meaning, these evaluative 
                                                 
124 This account does not imply that ordinary law-abiding citizens who go about their 
daily business without breaching the law are therefore rationalizing with the law.  
Rationalization can occur only when persons use the legal rules to justify their 
obedience, i.e., they claim they are being guided by the legal rules (when in fact not 
so).  Hence persons who appeal to the law and use it are really only officials. Ordinary 
citizens who do not violate the law do not ordinarily appeal to it nor use the law in any 
strong sense, and hence do not engage in legal rationalizations when motivated to 
comply without concern for the legal rules. My case then, is that law can only be 
present where there are at least officials who are properly under law’s obligations and 
not using the legal rules to rationalize their otherwise motivated compliance.  I am 
grateful to Joseph Raz for alerting me to this point. 
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reasons (i.e., legal rules) legally obligate by being: (1) contra Austin: not merely data 
for predicting behavior; (2) contra Coleman: even less, excuses for rationalizing 
behavior otherwise motivated, but rather the very reasons for the behavior, i.e., 
sources of intelligent motivation for one's law abiding acts.  In relation to (2), which is 
what my analysis above concerns, this excludes the possibility that the social rules 
which constitute the law were so adopted for non-reasonable motives.   
 
But the question still remains: how it is that these rules, operating as evaluative 
reasons, have such evaluative, normative and hence internal motive force?  Where do 
they get their normative authority from?   Aquinas’ natural law model of determinatio, 
which explains how legal rules are derived from and hence related to the natural law, 
is helpful here.  John Finnis explains determinatio very nicely: 
 
Determinatio is best clarified by Aquinas’ own analogy with architecture.  
The general idea or form of a dwelling-house (or a hospital), and the 
general ideas of a door and a doorknob (or a labour ward), must be made 
determinate as this particular design and house (or hospital), door, 
doorknob, etc.; otherwise nothing will be built.  The specifications which 
the architecture or designer decides upon are certainly derived from and 
shaped by the primary general idea, e.g. the commission to design a 
dwelling-house (or maternity hospital).  But the specifications decided 
upon reasonably have been different in many (even in many) dimension 
and aspect, and require of the designer a multitude of decisions which 
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could reasonably have been more or less different.  Stressing the 
designer’s wide freedom within the ambit of the commission or other 
general idea, Aquinas says that laws whose derivation from natural law is 
of this second type have their force ‘from human law alone’ (ex sola lege 
humana vigorem habet).125
  
It is important to understand the claim that positive law derived from natural law have 
their force from human law alone with delicacy, so as not to obscure positive law’s 
dependency on the moral content of natural law.  Finnis’ critical commentary 
highlights the latter relation.  Thus: 
 
This last statement really goes further than the analysis itself warrants. 
(More accurate is another of Aquinas’ descriptions: such laws have their 
binding force not only from reason, but [also] from their have been laid 
down.)  The precise requirements imposed in laws made by determinatio 
would have no moral force but for law’s enactment, and the lawmaker had 
no moral duty to make precisely those laws. But once such a law has been 
made, its directiveness derives not only from the fact of its creation by 
some recognized source of law (legislation, judicial decision, custom, etc), 
but also from its rational connection with some principle or precept of 
morality.  
 
                                                 
125 John Finnis, Aquinas, op. cit., 267 
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His very important analysis continues: 
 
…this connection is not simply with the general moral norm…that lawful 
and just authority should be respected.  It is the connection of a law’s 
content with morality’s permanent principles and precepts as they bear on 
that law’s subject matter.  There is a sense in which the rule of the road—
keep to the left/keep to the right—gets all its force from the authoritative 
custom, enactment, or other determination laying it down.  But there is 
another and equally important sense in which such a rule of the road gets 
‘all its normative force’ from the principles of practical reason which 
require us to respect (and our legislative representatives to promote) 
safety on the road, taking those principles in combination with non-posited 
facts about communication difficulties, traffic flows, braking distances, 
human reaction times and so forth.  Though the law’s determination is in a 
sense free, it must be made with due consideration for the circumstances 
which bear on the appropriateness of alternative eligible laws.126
 
Let us schematize the relations between the positive legal rule and its sources of 
authority as spelt out in the above analysis.  Suppose we represent a positive legal rule 
with “R”.  Such a legal rule is a properly posited law, enacted by the competent 
authorities.  From this enactment it derives in large part its authority or force.  But not 
entirely.  Their rational connection with the principles of practical reason also 
                                                 
126 ibid., 267-268 
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contributes to the normative authority of these laws.  In determinatio the determined 
legal rule R gets its authority from the principles of practical reason.  
Suppose we represent the principles of practical reason with “P”. The posited 
law R gets its normative authority from these practical reasons P, and to the extent that 
the derivation from the practical reason fails, the normative authority of the posited 
precept is diminished.   So to have a normatively authoritative legal rule R, it must be 
successfully derived from P. Let us represent this successful derivation or 
determinatio with the “Æ” sign. A successful derivation, or a determinatio, resulting 
in an authoritative legal rule would be this: 
“P Æ R” 
As can be gathered from Finnis’s analysis above, the derivation of the legal 
rule from the practical reason by determinatio can fail in two ways.  And the first way 
derivation can fail is in the derived legal rule R. While determination is free in the 
sense that there are many eligible possibilities for the choice of a law, there are limits.  
Driving on the left or driving on the right are both possibilities for a law aimed at 
promoting road safety, just as speed limits of 60, 70, or 90 km/h are eligible 
possibilities.  Some other candidates, however, are not eligible.   
Some ineligible candidates are the impossible: driving on the left and right at 
the same time, or driving less than 60km/h but more than 70km/h.  These are clearly 
ineligible because they cannot be realized in any possible world.  A law requiring the 
impossible would be absurd. Other candidates could be realized in some possible 
worlds, but not in our world. So a law requiring we drive our cars 5 meters above the 
ground may be logically possible in a possible world where earth existed without 
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gravity, but this remains impossible or at least very difficult given the conditions in 
our world. These proposed laws would be ineligible because we are positing laws in 
our present world, and so long as in our world these proposed laws cannot be realized 
to enact them would be absurd. Still other ineligible candidates would simply be those 
which are not effective in bringing about the goal aimed at by the practical reason. So 
a law permitting a driver to choose at his or her own whim and fancy which side of the 
road at any time, and setting speed limits of up to 200 km/h just are not effective 
means for achieving road safety, so would be ineligible for enactment as law.  In other 
words, for a successful determinatio, the legal rule R must require actions which are 
possible to perform (in our world), and such actions must be effective means for 
securing the goals sought after by the practical reason (in our world). Suppose we call 
our world “O”. So: 
(PÆ R) implies that (in O, R is neither impossible nor ineffective) 
From this it follows modus tollens that where R is either impossible or 
ineffective for securing the aims of P, then there cannot have been a successful 
determinatio resulting in a normatively authoritative legal rule R.  Thus, 
 ~(in O, R is neither impossible nor ineffective) implies ~(PÆ R)  
Now, there is furthermore a second way determinatio resulting in an 
authoritative legal rule can fail.  This failure is traced not to the derived legal rule R, 
but to the practical reason P itself.  An implied assumption thus far has been that 
practical reasons are themselves normatively authoritative.  It is because they are that 
a successful determination yields a normatively authoritative legal rule.  But if a 
“practical reason” P turns out to be normatively dubious, then it has no normative 
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authority.  A legal rule R derived from such a “practical reason” will carry no 
normative weight.  When this happens, determinatio fails.  The fault of this failure lies 
in P, and not in R.  In other words, even if R is an effective means for securing the 
goals in P, if P is not normatively authoritative, R lacks any normative authority.  So: 
(PÆR) implies that (P is normatively authoritative) 
Again, where P is not normatively authoritative, it implies modus tollens that 
there cannot have been a successful case of determination, and hence no authoritative 
legal rule has been obtained. Thus: 
~(P is normatively authoritative) implies that ~(PÆR)  
The role of P’s normative authority in securing a normatively authoritative 
legal rule R can easily be overlooked, as does Matthew Kramer.  In his In Defense of 
Legal Positivism, he proposes the possibility that certain very evil and monstrously 
oppressive regimes can still properly, for normative prudential reasons, be guided by 
the Rule of Law to achieve their evil aims. Hence such an evil regime is motivated by 
evil ends, but see the Rule of Law as effective means of achieving these ends. Thus in 
opposition to the natural law position, and his foil being Finnis, amongst several 
others, Kramer writes: 
 
The very point at issue here is whether the aforementioned function of 
law, [being the function to provide human beings with security and 
autonomy and social co-ordination] is indeed invariably the principle 
function of full-fledged legal systems. To be sure, no one should doubt 
that benevolent legal regimes are characterized by the primacy of such 
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a function.  But in certain other full-fledged legal systems, the 
paramount function resides in the sustainment of the officials’ 
oppressive dominance and the pursuit for their sundry flagitious 
objectives. Though virtually every regime will probably provide most 
people with greater security than would exist in anarchic chaos, the 
provision of the security is derivative of the regime’s primary purpose 
and is therefore carried on only inasmuch as it deserves that purpose. 
Both in fact and in the eyes of the wicked officials who run such a 
regime, its overriding function is to reinforce their potent sway.  The 
internal perspective of the officials is orientated toward the 
accomplishment of that function and is thus entirely prudential in its 
tenor.  Yet in connection with that very function, there will be strong 
reasons for those officials to endow their regime with the essential 
characteristics of law…to just as great an extent as would be 
undertaken by the officials in a benevolent legal system.  When the evil 
officials act on those reasons, their regime in all its monstrousness is a 
straightforward instance (a central case) of legal governance.127
 
The officials of such a regime, no doubt, will see that the Rule of Law is a 
plausible means to effect their own evil ends. We must not put the cart before the 
horse by saying that evil officials use the Rule of Law, as if to say that already there is 
the Rule of Law so to be used; the existence of the Rule of Law is itself the matter of 
                                                 
127 Matthew Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law Without Trimmings, (NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 237-8 
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controversy here. Now, to speak of the Rule of Law is to say that there is a legal 
system in place. This means that there are normatively authoritative legal rules.  But 
this begs the question: are there really normatively authoritative legal rules?   
 We know that authoritative legal rules are authoritative insofar as they are 
derived via determinatio from practical reasons P.  And there is a first way that 
determinatio can fail, resulting in rules which are not authoritative.  This has to do 
with the legal rule R, wherein R is either impossible or ineffective for securing the 
goals of P.  
 No doubt as Kramer would point out the evil officials see their legal rule(s) R 
as effective means for securing P, and these evil officials are probably correct.  But we 
know that this does not quite settle the question whether the legal rules R turn out to 
be normatively authoritative.  It is important to recall that the second way determinatio 
can fail.  This occurs when the practical reasons P from which R is derived are 
normatively dubious.   If the practical reasons P are normatively dubious, then 
whatever if derived from them is also normatively dubious.   
And this is the case with an evil regime.  Such an evil regime has evil goals.  
Their legal rules are obtained by determination from their (pseudo) “practical reasons” 
directing them to fulfill these evil aims. But such evil “practical reasons” are 
normatively dubious.  Hence the determination is not successful, and no normatively 
authoritative legal rules are obtained. The upshot of this is that there is no Rule of 
Law.  
It is this concern that Kramer's rejoinder fails to address, and which seems to 
have escaped his reading of Finnis.  Let us look again at Finnis' comment on Rolf 
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Sartorius' paper, a comment to which Kramer thought he had offered an adequate 
reply.  Finnis writes, 
 
One sign of Hart's openness to reality has gone unnoticed by Sartorius.  
In The Concept of Law, the end or 'aim' which is the basis for the 
'natural' or, better, 'rational necessity' of the central features of law is 
said to be 'survival'.  Sartorius rightly suggests that 'surely room must 
be made for loftier human pursuits than mere survival...'  But Hart got 
there before him; in his 1967 essay 'Problems of the Philosophy of 
Law', Hart proposes as the final point of law not mere survival, but 
rather that 'whatever other purposes law may serve, they must, to be 
acceptable to any rational person, enable men to live and organize their 
lives for the more efficient pursuit of their aims...certain rules [are] 
necessary if fundamental human needs are to be satisfied...'  No doubt 
the faithful and cautious interpreter of Hart's works might see in this 
shift no more than a new stratagem in the unaltered grand strategy of 
declining to participate (or at least to involve jurisprudence) in the great 
'dispute' about the point of human existence, the basic forms of human 
flourishing and the basic requirements of practical reasonableness; the 
new stratagem is...of saying (no more than): if anything is wanted, these 
[primary goods] will be needed. But one who speaks at all of human 
needs and human rationality cannot prevent his hearers reflecting that 
human intelligence can also understand some “ultimate” wants as really 
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no more than worthless means of self-gratification while other objects 
of desire are really desirable or worthwhile.  Human rationality can also 
reflect that the arbitrariness in unrestricted self-preference is itself a 
deviation from 'rationality' and something one needs to avoid whatever 
else one wants...(my emphasis)” 128
 
Attention to the last few lines alerts us that Finnis' primary concern is not (yet) 
the plausibility that evil officials might think of the rule of law as required or 
necessary (whether on a long or short term) for effecting their evil aims.  While Finnis 
thinks they cannot and do not,129 even if on this point the empirical evidence suggests 
the contrary, the main and prior concern remains unaddressed.  
 This concern is that the evil motives are not normatively authoritative practical 
reasons.  The charge then is that evil officials who are thus motivated by these pseudo 
“practical reasons” really have no reason from which to derive their legal rules.  Their 
derivation does not yield normative legal rules.  The legal rules R may truly 
effectively secure the aims of the “practical reasons” P.  But the goals which P directs 
us to seek are not what one ought to seek in the first place. Hence P is a normatively 
unsound principle or precept. A legal rule R directing us to effectively fulfill a 
normatively unsound precept cannot be normatively authoritative.  It cannot be 
normatively authoritative because its source has no normative authority.  
                                                 
128John Finnis, "Comment" in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The 
Influence of HLA Hart, Ruth Gavison (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 62-75, 
@ 63. Italics original, underline mine. 
129 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., 273-4. Also see Matthew 




 Let us take stock.  Thus far we have been discussing how legal rules get their 
normative authority.  We have offered Aquinas’ model of determinatio as an 
explanation.  By analyzing the determinatio model the derivation of legal rules from 
practical reasons, we exposed ways which determination can fail to give us normative 
legal rules.  The first way is what the legal rules are impossible or ineffective means to 
secure the goals of the practical reason.  The second way is where the “practical 
reason” is itself not normatively sound or authoritative.   
 This second way that determinatio can fail is a reflection of the fact that the 
normative authority of the legal rules comes from the normative authority inherent in 
the sound practical reasons.  Absent these sound practical norms which are truly 
normative and authoritative, legal rules have no normative authority. This is important 
and we can pursue this. We can ask: what are these sound practical reasons? 
  
John Finnis' Natural Law and Natural Rights was an effort to reveal some of 
these sound, truly normative practical reasons. There Finnis ask that we consider the 
points of our action, asking oneself “why did I do this for?” Having arrived at an 
answer, if one presses on with asking “why did I do that in turn for?”, one arrives 
ultimately at some several basic, irreducible intelligible goods.  It is an effort that can 
be embarrassingly difficult, not least because trying to describe one's own intentional 
states and sort out the intelligibility or absurdity of one’s practical proposals can be 
typically challenging, let alone infer those of others, which seems to me impossible.  
Still, in doing so one recognizes one's own responsiveness to practical reasons which 
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identify basic intelligible goods as worth seeking: “such and such a good ought to be 
sought”.  These goods include life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, 
practical reasonableness and religion.130
Reasons, being intelligible and having data, are not feelings. 131   Nor are the 
points of our seeking mere good feelings.  Were the ultimate points of our seeking 
mere pleasure, one would have no qualms about plugging oneself once and for all into 
an experience machine offering a lifetime of every possible pleasurable feelings.  But 
we would hesitate at such an offer, because we recognize that some non-feeling goods 
are at stake, and will be sacrificed at taking up such an offer.  Indeed we would even 
resist it, recognizing that many such non-feeling goods that would be sacrificed are 
true objects of human fulfilment, in comparison with pleasure.132
 It is these practical reasons, identifying the basic goods worth seeking, that 
gives normative force to all other intelligent seekings (whether as rules, counsels, 
instruction, or other prescriptive propositions). For: other seekings are sought worthily 
insofar as they lead to the attainment of that basic good that is worth seeking: “I ought 
to seek x  because getting x helps me get the basic good y, which I ought to seek for 
itself; and where it the case that I ought not seek y, then neither ought I seek x.”   
These practical reasons identifying basic goods as worth seeking, as ought to be 
sought, are thus the only sources of norms.  Because they begin and ground all other 
seeking, they are the first principles of practical reasons, the starting norms of all other 
                                                 
130 see Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 59-99 
131 Even Hart recognized the difference between feelings and normative principles. 




subsequent norms which are normative on their account.  The first principles of 
practical reason are what Aquinas calls the natural law.    
 
Conclusion 
Let us summarize our finding thus far in this chapter. We have argued that Law 
and its normative Rule is inevitably traced to the natural law as an important source.  
If the law moves, it is because the legal precepts derive their normativity from some 
first principle of practical reason.  Thinking through the implications of practical 
reasons as the true source of normativity and defining an appropriate political strategy 
for preventing its normativity from being suppressed or deflected is the task of the 
following chapters 8 and 9. Attentiveness to this source therefore enables us to figure 
how best to strengthen it. But before that we must press on one last leg, inferring 









In this chapter we continue with the task of inferring the causes of the Rule of Law.  
Having established practical reasons as the source of law’s normative power, we will 
argue that the normative authority of practical reasons in turn implies some form of 
Metaphysical, Transcendent Warrant, or God.   In this way I argue that natural law 
ethics leads us to affirm a metaphysics of God, and, consistent with the position in 
chapter 1, I criticize any attempts to argue in the opposite direction. 
 
Proper Functionalism 
In the second volume Warrant and Proper Function of his highly appraised 
trilogy, Alvin Plantinga reminds us of what he calls the "sober truth".  This last is the 
epistemic virtue (the normatively desireable factor) in human thought processing 
which he hopes we will consider: proper function.  I quote, 
 
As a first step to developing a satisfying account of warrant, I should like 
to call attention to still another epistemic value:  having epistemic faculties 
functioning properly...133  
                                                 




The basic idea is this.  An account of human knowing has to include in that 
account the supposition that the warranted intentional data is the deliverance of 
properly functioning faculties.  In other words, minimally, if the data is to be 
warranted, it cannot be said to be the product of malfunctioning epistemic processes.  
The breakthrough, I think, is his next step in that subtle line of reasoning: that to speak 
of "proper" function seems to lead us in the direction of a creationist, metaphysical 
supernaturalism. An apologetic vindication for the theist.  Crudely put, the strategy is 
to press for the implications of the assertion that there is a notion of proper function.  
If there is such a thing as "proper function", then there seems to follow the implicit 
presupposition that somehow our epistemic faculties were designed, whether in 
ourselves or in our genetic ancestors.  A claim of design in turn suggests a designer, 
whom we may call God. 
 
You might arrest me here. Is this question begging from the start? After all, is it 
not true that we are sneaking in a normative concept of "proper" functioning? What is 
the basis of this "proper"? Should we not more accurately just say "functioning" 
faculties, neither proper nor improper.  This seems enough--enough to garuantee 
certain results, that is, whether normatively intended by design or not. Ernest Sosa 
recently made this point when commenting on Plantinga's Proper Functionalism. He 
writes, 
 




...in seeking an alternative to proper functionalism, let us try to understand 
"working properly" without appealing to notions like "design" or "design 
plan" or "Divine design" or even "evolutionary design."  What then might 
it mean to say that something is "working properly"?  According to a very 
weak and basic notion of "working properly," all that is required for 
something to work properly relative to goal G in environment E  is that it 
be ø'ing where ø'ing in E has a sufficient propensity to lead to G."134   
 
An example could illustrate this. Suppose I were an abstract performance artist 
meddling with a new art form integrating electronic media and other bizarre electronic 
gadgets.  I am interested in capturing on the electronic monitor patterns which register 
brainwaves, and I have here an electronic probe to attach to the temple of my subject.  
As he begins to have mental movements, patterns are registered in various colors and 
shapes in the monitor, which are for me an art form. Unfortunately, when I put a 
philosopher on the stand, his rigor and systematic thought, though by all academic 
standards most proper and sane, registers a dull blue line on the monitor.  For the artist 
this mind is not working properly with respect to producing the desired patterns.  
Instead, he manages to get a man from the funny farm, strapped in a straight jacket as 
subject, and in spite of his psychological absurdities, produces on the monitor various 
interesting moving patterns of many exotic colors when his temple is attached to the 
probe. For the purposes of art, one might in fact say that the subject's mind is working 
properly only if it is working improperly with respect to say logic.  In either situation, 
                                                 
134Ernest Sosa, "Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology", NOUS, 27:1 (1993), 
51-65 at 57-58 
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to say further that the mind was or was not "designed to function in this manner" 
seems somewhat out of place.  All one can say is that the mind's workings were 
useful--whether by design or not. 
  
But sometimes, it is not just a matter of leaving out the word “proper” or 
“improper”. In fact, even if we leave out the "proper" or "improper" predication, just 
the use of very notion of "function" can already be design-normative.  For something 
can be said to function, and also not function, i.e., break down.  There can already be a 
kind of "ought" there: there is a certain way a thing ought to work, and when it 
actually does work in that particular way, it is functioning.  Otherwise, i.e., when it is 
not operating as it ought, it is not functioning.  Plantinga, I think, was attentive to this 
when his reply to Sosa points out that Sosa’ talk of faculty and such related notions 
already presuppose some kind of normativity that is design-laden: 
 
…the problem for Sosa, I think, is that the notion of a faculty involves the 
notion of proper function. A faculty or power—perception, or memory, or 
reason in the narrow sense, or digestion, or one’s ability to walk—is 
precisely the kind of thing that can function properly or improperly.  So we 
don’t really avoid that notion [of proper function]; we smuggle it in in the 
very notion of a faculty135  
 
Indeed common parlance blurs these two equivocal senses of the term 
                                                 




"function":  a stronger and a weaker one.  Let us start with the latter.  A weaker sense 
of function means merely that something is occurring, that something is happening.  
There is no additional clause, "as it ought to be".   
So suppose we see for the first time a small UFO landing in the garden of one's 
backyard, and lying still there for several hours.  We wonder if anything will happen, 
and we do not know what will happen.  In a sudden it starts to jiggle.  We exclaim to 
each other, "look! It's working! It's functioning!"  In this weak sense then, there is no 
place for the normativity that leads to the supposition of a design plan. There is no 
concept that it "ought to work in this and that way".  Suppose on the other hand that 
after some jiggles the UFO gives a puff of smoke accompanied by a moderate bang of 
an explosion.  One might then be tempted to say, "Oh dear, it's not functioning."  Here 
the notion of function is stronger than the one above.  Here we mean not that it is not 
working, or that nothing is happening, but rather that it is not working or happening as 
it ought to—because we know, from cartoons perhaps, that things are not supposed to 
work—i.e., not designed by intelligent minds to work—with a loud bang and a huge 
puff of smoke.  Some kind of normative judgment is present here.  Implicitly there is a 
sense that the UFO ought have worked in a certain way, and it failed to.  This sense of 
(non) function, when asserted, includes the implicit judgment that there is a kind of 
intended operation, presumably intended by intelligent design.  Here too, to function is 
to function properly.  Conversely, to not function is to function badly or improperly.  
It is to malfunction.  So if one starts off which the second stronger claim of function, 
one can easily shift into speaking of proper function.  However, if one starts off with 
the weaker meaning of function, viz. just mere operation, period or activity, period, 
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then one needs additional premises to show that there is a sense in which some 
occurrences are "proper" and others therefore improper". Otherwise, there will be no 
basis for that distinction, because to happen one way is as equally to "happen, to 
function" as another way--neither more properly nor improperly than the other.  So we 
must be careful, and note this possible equivocation. To my mind, in speaking of a 
faculty as a functioning capacity, Plantinga’s “faculty” has the stronger and more 
robust sense of function; whereas Sosa uses “faculty” in the weak sense of function.  
Both equivocate on the same word, so start off with distinct referents.  
Still, claims of operational normativity beg for proof.  If Occam is to be 
believed,136 then Plantinga has the burden of proof; he cannot simply rest asserting 
(not that he does) that there are these design-normative notions implicit in our 
articulations; for all purposes we could simply be careless in our linguistic 
articulations, so that we have slipped in these notions without prejudice.  What needs 
to be done is to discuss, more further, whether to speak of faculties or functions or 
such like cognate terms in their design normative sense, we are justified in so doing.  
Or, if not, then we should seek more neutral expressions, so to be honest as well as 
meaningfully economical. Hence the task before us is to further consider if our use of 
the term "function" itself is question begging.   
Similarly, as pointed out above, the move from the weaker sense of function to 
proper function requires the additional premise that there is a way the said faculty was 
intended to function.  This additional premise is something which needs to be 
established independently prior to the claim of proper function, and not something that 
                                                 
136 Not that he should be, and even less for a thomist, I suspect. 
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follows from it.  Plantinga's claim, in contrast, is not that one needs an additional and 
separate argument which concludes that things were designed, and therefore we can 
speak of proper function, but rather, that we do in fact understand or have a notion of 
proper function, and this in turn leads to or implies a kind of design plan and thus a 
metaphysical supernaturalism which admits some kind of transcendent designer. In 
other words, the claim of proper function is prior, and proves the designed universe--at 
least, the designed human mind.  That is to say, Plantinga started off with the premise 
that independently of any claims that the world was designed, there is a notion of 
proper function.  His "function" is the stronger one: already, there is an implicit 
normativity in the operation or function. There is an implicit normative judgment that 
certain things are to operate in this way and not in another.  This is not because we 
think there is a design plan--rather we think there is a design plan because of this.  So 
the more-than-putative success of his anti-naturalism campaign stands or falls on the 
quest for the normative. Like Plantinga, this too is my quest.  But my realm is not that 
of the speculative, but in the practical.   
  
Natural Law, Proper Function and God 
 
Now, my thesis. Concurring with John Finnis I think it futile and vain to think 
natural law theory can benefit from a derivation from metaphysics, because no 
“ought” from an “is”.  But the reverse, I argue, could be fruitful.  Natural law theory, 
rather than presupposing a knowledge of God, can actually lead us to an account of a 
creator.   To this effect, it can be fruitful for the natural law theorist to adopt 
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Plantinga's strategy.  In a way akin to what Plantinga has done for the domain of the 
speculative,  I hope to show that the natural law theorist can in fact develop a powerful 
argument against metaphysical naturalism, moving from natural law qua practical 
reasons to metaphysics.   
 
Let us see what are practical reasons. Here I am (developing my theory of 
natural law by) building on the work of John Finnis, Germain Grisez and Joseph 
Boyle, which elaborates on Aquinas' own account of natural law qua the first 
principles of practical reason.137 Attention to the data of intentional action reveals a 
field of experience quite distinct in their character from what are brute emotions. The 
phenomena of these experiences consists in their peculiar ability to motivate in an 
intelligible manner; to persons thinking about what is to be done, they appeal as 
meaningful points worth promoting or acting for.  Because intelligent and distinct 
from the propulsion of emotions, we call them reasons; and because reasons in 
response to practical question of what is to be done, we call them practical reasons.  
Thus also, in proposing themselves as worth promotion for their own sakes, i.e, as 
what ought to be done or sought, they express a normativity, captured by the term 
"ought" which is not reducible to an imperativity of passionate compulsion.  Nor is 
this ought merely instrumental or prudential, for its normativity hinges not on the 
value of some further value, as it were, that such and such ought to be sought for some 
other good.  Rather: such and such a good ought to be sought for its own sake--thus 
                                                 
137see their “Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends”, American Journal 
of Jurisprudence, 32 (1987), 99-151.  Also see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, (Oxford: OUP, 1980), and his Aquinas: Moral Political and Legal Theory 
(NY: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
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the ought, as it were, is not reducible to the useful.  So there is a real normativity here 
that is closer to the right:138 its normative authority or obligatoriness is not reducible to 
the impetus of force, nor the contingency of benefits.   
 
Let us consider one of these principles, adequately expressed by a proposition 
such as  
 
"knowledge ought to be sought" 
 
Phenomenologically, this precept has within its intentional structure an 
“ought”.  Substantively therefore it has normativity. By “substantively” I mean that 
the content of the directive precept includes in it the normativity which is signified by 
the “ought (to be sought)” 
 
                                                 
138but not yet 'morally right', where moral rightness requires not merely the use of this 
precept but further than it be followed through consistently without deviation. But this 
is not to say that therefore it is morally irrelevant, as Steven Long (“St Thomas 
Through the Analytic Looking-Glass”, The Thomist, 65 (2001: 259-300 at 268-272) 
rightly worries about.  Indeed it is a source of morality, wherein whatever follows 
validly from this would be moral, but still, standing alone, we could not say without 
qualification that morality is already present; one has to add that whatever follows 
does indeed follow consistently--and then, in this consistent relation to the first 
principles, we have morality.  So Finnis' various works (Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, Aquinas) downplays the moral character of the first principles by saying that 
they are non-moral to highlight this existential contingency of morality.  But the point 
is however, clear: as fully normative precepts they are morally relevant, i.e., that 
whatever follows validly from them are themselves moral, but apart from these, we 
could not yet say that there is morality until we can be sure that what follows from 
these does so coherently without deviation.  For the essence of morality is right 
reason, and not just muddled practical deliberation, which even heretics and vicious 
men do, as Aquinas teaches. 
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But if we look more closely at this precept with its substantive “ought” viz the 
normativity that is within its intentional structure, we see that this alone is not all that 
there is to be said.  For when we say or grasp that: 
 
“knowledge ought to be sought”, 
 
we mean not merely that there is this intentional data “knowledge ought to be sought” 
but that this intentional data should not be otherwise.  For if this were not the case then 
the substantive “ought” would be severely undermined.  Consider, that if it were 
merely, 
 
I grasp that: “knowledge ought to be sought” 
 
To merely say that I grasp that knowledge is to be sought is not to exclude the 
possibility that I could well have grasped that knowledge ought not be sought. If so, 
then I could have just so happened to have grasped this norm instead of the contrary.  
Hence it could well be that 
 
I grasp that: “knowledge ought to be sought” but if I grasped that 
 “knowledge ought not be sought”, that would do as well. 
 
If this above were possible, then the normativity of “knowledge ought to be sought” 
must be severely undermined.  For this norm could in fact have had an arbitrary 
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genesis.  In that case, to say that such a “norm” (whose genesis is arbitrary) is a norm 
qua something normatively authoritative is something of a contradiction.  This is 
because it could equally have been the exact opposite of what it is, and that would 
neither be better or worse off; why then, should such a precept be of any determining 
authority by determining that things should go one way rather than another, since its 
opposite could just equally be? Indeed, it would be nonsensical to claim something 
arbitrary as a normative rule. Yet if we are to maintain that the normativity is present 
to be followed through, then something else is necessarily included over and above the 
substantive ought.  I need not merely that I have indeed grasped that “knowledge 
ought to be sought”, but further, to think that: 
 
I ought to grasp that: “knowledge ought to be sought” 
 
In other words, I have to think that my grasping this precept is not arbitrary, 
even if there be a general consensus on its assent. It ought to be this way and no other 
contrary. And I ought to have grasped this, and no other contrary. Let us call this 
“ought” which is outside the substantive intentional structure of the normative data the 
epistemic ought, or the epistemic normativity, because it has to do with the right way 
about one’s epistemology, or theory of knowing.  But to return to the immediate 
above: why do I need to have had this epistemic “ought”?   Well, the reason is this.  
Only with this epistemic “ought” was the arbitrariness that will necessarily arise 
without it excluded. Only with this epistemic “ought” could it be that the particular 
norm was not replaceable by the opposite of what I have grasped.    So if my precept 
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and its substantive normativity is present, then implicitly its presence presupposes that 
this is the way it is supposed to be, and that it should not be otherwise; in other words, 
what I grasp is what I ought to have grasped.    
 
Now there can be a misunderstanding here.  I am not saying that one ought to 
grasp that “knowledge ought to be sought”.  I am not making a normative claim here.  
Rather it is the reverse:  saying (meaningfully) that knowledge ought to be sought 
entails that one ought to so grasp it. Nor am I saying that as a matter of objective fact, 
I am not mistaken or that I indeed have grasped in a manner that I ought to. Indeed, it 
is not just about being “mistaken” for to speak of “mistakes” or “errors” suggests that 
there is still an objective, non-arbitrary standard.  But the point is that without the 
epistemic normativity, one cannot even coherently worry of “errors” or “mistakes” or 
such likes, because there just are not any of these: one thing is just as good as another.  
Deviations are guiltless. Rather: I am saying that the person who experiences the 
practical reason as normative must believe that such a precept was grasped in a way it 
ought to be have been grasped. I am describing what phenomenologically is included 
in the eidetic essence of any normative practical precept. What I am saying is that if 
the normative precept is substantively normative, then the epistemic normativity is 
included.  This means, that given the fact that we do indeed experience such normative 
orientations, then necessarily associated with these normative orientations are beliefs 
about epistemic normativities without which the substantive norm itself cannot be.   
For: if we took the epistemic normativity and separated it from the substantive norm, 
the substantive norm loses its robust normativity.  Unless we include the assumption 
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that the way we grasp that which we grasp is indeed the way we ought to grasp, then 
whatever it is that we have grasp would in fact be arbitrary, and hence would not be 
normative.139  Hence to say that have grasped that I ought to do such and such, at the 
same time includes the claim that I ought to have so grasped it.  Aquinas, it seems to 
me, had this in mind in the corpus of question 16, article 2 of his De Veritate.140 After 
explaining in the previous article that we know the first principles of practical reason 
without inference, just as angels intellect knowledge, he poses the question: “whether 
there can be error in synderesis, which is the habit (permanent faculty) for delivering 
first principles of practical reason?”  Note the context of the question. This question 
follows nicely from the previous because precisely as asserted in the previous 
question, the first principles are not inferred, so the issue of their truth becomes 
especially pertinent.  If the precepts were derived, then to ask if they could err would 
just be foolish--of course they could err, as all inferences can be fallacious.  And the 
way to know if they are mistaken or erroneous is simply to examine their logical 
connection to the premises they were derived from, since their truth or falsehood 
stems from evidence of the previous premises.  But now, precisely because they are 
not inferred and hence no inferential mistakes are possible, so equally also there is no 
way to establish their truth as one would be able to if they were inferred.  Hence the 
question, "can it be mistaken?" is very fitting, because it seems that we cannot know, 
                                                 
139 In the same way St Thomas aims to discern the essence of any being (say a 
phoenix, Aquinas’ own example), and when abstracted from existence, the essence 
remains as it is, so the essence of a being does not include in it the concept of 
existence. See Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence). Armand 
Maurer CSB (trans.), (Toronto: PIMS, 1968), Chapter 4, 55.   
140St. Thomas Aquinas, On Truth (De Veritate), q. 16, art. 2, corpus, James McGlynn 
SJ (trans.), (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), Vol. 2., 304 
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as contrasted with how we would be able to know if it were inferred.  What then is 
Aquinas' answer?  Or what should we expect his answer to be? What ever it is, we can 
be sure what it is not: he is not going to infer the truth of the precepts--indeed he 
cannot; the question of the truth of the precepts is relevant precisely on account of 
their non-derived nature.   
  
Indeed, his answer is that there cannot be any because then there would be no 
probity or normative authority in whatever follows from it.  So he does not appeal to 
some other premise to (inferentially) establish their normativity. Instead he takes for 
granted (and therefore affirms) that the normative authority is already present, which 
traverses into the other precepts inferred from them, and this supposedly present 
normative authority (from the inferred secondary precepts all the way to the first 
principles) would be incompatible with the claim that they were mistaken.  The point 
being, that if we think as we do that (first principles of) practical reasoning are truly 
normative, then we have to grant that the first principles are supposed to be what they 
are--which is logically distinct from merely saying that they are such and such (which 
is not necessarily yet what it should be), for to say that this is what it is supposed to be 
adds :that this which is what-it-is is precisely what-it-ought-to-be and none other).  
Hence it is to say that whatever which synderesis grasps as the first principles of 
practical reason, then I ought to grasp it.  
 
Effectively then, a fully flashed out experience of the normative (first 




[1]  The substantive norm: “such and such a good/value (e.g., life, knowledge, 
friendship) ought to be sought” 
 
[2]  The epistemic norm:  “I ought to grasp that: [1]”,  
i.e., “I ought to grasp that:  such and such a good/value ought to be 
sought” 
 
But to say that I ought to grasp this and that is really to suggest, if anything at 
all, that this was the way my mind was intended to grasp it: that if my mind was 
functioning this way, it was functioning as it was intended to, as it ought.  I.e., it 
means that my mind was functioning properly.  And not just "properly" with respect to 
the principles which would well be one way or another, as perhaps Sosa would insist, 
but properly with respect to the principles which are normatively authoritative and so 
cannot be other than what they are.  In sum, it means that implicit in the normative 
authority of practical reasoning is the assumption that my mind is working properly, 
that my epistemic faculties are sound.   
 
Hence--capturing the above point--Aquinas' next article probes how, if ever, 
can practical reason's first principles be other than what it is, and his answer is that 
when and only when one's epistemic faculties are damaged, or malfunctioning, in 
which case the first principles will be destroyed.  Put another way, if they are not 
destroyed, then one's faculties are operating properly, soundly.  They are working the 
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way that they should or ought to work. 
 
From this we may reach other implications.  For when we say that my epistemic 
faculties were working the way they ought to work, and thus I ought to grasp whatever 
substantive norms that I have grasped, implicitly I mean to say that it is in accord with 
some kind of external normative standard—i.e., such a normative standard itself 
external to the epistemic normativity and yet consistent with the epistemic normativity 
that we have so far revealed in our analysis.  What are these?  Well perhaps we should 
start with what are those which are not consistent with the normativities fleshed out in 
our analysis.  Evolutionary naturalism is one of these.  In a very fine piece Thomas 
Nagel most insightfully asks, 
 
What does it mean to say that my practical reasons are efforts to get the 
objectively right answer about what I should do, rather than manifestations 
of biologically selected dispositions that have no more objective reality 
than a taste for sugar?  The idea of a harmony between thought and reality 
is no help here, because realism about practical reasons and ethics is not a 
thesis about the natural order at all, but a purely normative claim.  It seems 
that the response to evolutionary naturalism in this domain must be purely 
negative.  All one can say is that justification for actions is to be sought in 
the content of practical reasoning, and that evolutionary explanation of our 
dispositions to accept such arguments may undermine our confidence in 
them but cannot provide a justification for accepting them.  So if 
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evolutionary naturalism is the whole story about what we take to be 
practical reasoning, then there really is no such thing."141
 
We may recast the point positively this way. Evolutionary naturalism, which says that 
the way we are is the result of blind chance devoid of any creative Theistic intentions 
or design, cannot cohere with the epistemic normativity implicit in the first principles 
of practical reasoning, themselves substantive norms which respond to the question, 
“what ought to be done?”.  We have seen that the answers to that question are the 
substantive norms which include epistemically normative assumptions. Meaning, that 
the mind ought to work in a particular fashion, in a certain way, or that it function 
properly.  If we believe that the mind ought to work this way rather than that, but we 
have come to be by forces without conscious, intentional design, then it would seem 
that this “ought to work this way” is really a vacuous claim.  For things could well 
have turned out in another way, and that way (being that way different from the way 
that the mind does indeed now work) could equally be as good.    In fact to speak of 
“equally as good” is not quite right—to be more accurate, we should say that the other 
way things might turn out is neither better nor worse in itself.  One way things turn out 
cannot be fittingly said to be more or less (im)proper than the other.  For unless there 
is some transcendent Author or Ought-er, that Standard which sets the stage for saying 
that there is an Intended End (so that something which is more efficient to that end is 
better) or that there is a blue-print with which to compare our mind’s epistemic 
processes (so that what matches better that blue print is better), there is just no basis 
                                                 
141Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (NY:Oxford University Press, 1997), 141-2 
 159
 160
for comparison, no basis for judgment.  In his very fine Real Ethics: Rethinking the 
Foundations of Morality, John Rist displays a firm grasp of this very problem.  He 
writes,  
 
In the world of realist morality, the 'determination' that this ought to be 
done is not something secured by a human will reacting to inclinations, but 
something to be first recognized by the human mind de facto, simply 
because the world is as it is.  Though human reason may give the command 
that X should be done (in the belief that X 'morally' ought to be done), that 
'ought to be done' ...implies further authorization--and that not merely 
because of the inability of the human mind to determine correctly even 
when it determines sincerely.  In justifying itself as moral rather than 
prudential or at best constructively rational in the Kantian sense, fallible 
human reason requires...some sort of external warranting.  In default of the 
Platonic Form (which does not give commands) that external warrant can 
only be God, whose 'nature'...is communicated by way of non-arbitrary 
commands.  Insofar as practical morality provides us with obligations 
rather than simple appeals to our (limited) reason, it requires the 
justification not of an impersonal and inactive Form but of an omniscient, 
providential and perceptive deity.142    
 
The principles of practical reason must therefore, in the final analysis, be thought 
                                                 
142John M Rist, Real Ethics: Reconsidering the Foundations of Morality. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p 259 
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of not merely as prescribing normativities, period, but: prescribing normativities which 
are intended (by design) by a transcendent source (outside of the structures of the 
human epistemic processes). Otherwise what we hold as normatively credible will be 
but an incoherently vacuous fiction.   
 
Let us take stock.  At this point, we have defended the thesis that naturalism and 
practical norms are incompatible.  Thus, the following conditional and its corollary: 
 
“If naturalism is true then practical norms do not exist”  
and modus tollens: “if practical norms indeed exist then naturalism is false” 
 
We could go further: since naturalism is false precisely because of the problem 
of arbitrariness, then whatever is entailed by the epistemic normativity as the source of 
this normativity must itself not be arbitrary.  So the external Warrant, as something 
which must itself not be arbitrary, must itself be normative—there must in it be some 
Intention, or Design, some ultimate Normativity—call this the ‘metaphysical Norm’. 
But we have no understanding of what all these norms (ought to be’s) are except 
through our grasp of the content of the first principles.  Meaning, we have no idea of 
how our mind ought to work (i.e., this way rather than that way), or further, how the 
external Warrant should design our minds (i.e., this design rather than another), except 
through the substantive norms.  For if the substantive norms were one way (say, x: one 
ought to seek ψ) rather than another (say, y: one ought not seek ψ), so also the 
epistemic norms are one way (e.g., that properly function faculties are faculties F(x) 
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that ought to function to generate x) rather than another (e.g., that properly functioning 
faculties are those faculties F(y) that ought to function to generate y), and also the 
metaphysical Norm would be one way rather than another (e.g., that It intended or 
designed F(x) rather than F(y)).   
From this we see how we might get a glimpse of what the nature of the 
metaphysical Norm is—namely, that it is one such Ontological Principle, that intends 
F(x) and therefore x.  Suppose we call this Ontological Principle God. We have no 
grasp of its nature in itself, and certainly nothing of the sort of the things that revealed 
Faith teaches us about God (e.g.,God is an uncreated  Trinity of Persons, at once 
omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient and omni-benevolent) could be approached here. 
But in terms of His normative effects—i.e., its intending or designing things to be one 
way rather than another—we may perchance be able to say something about it.  God is 
that which intended and designed F(x) and hence x.  But normativities like intentions 
and designs are not random acts; in choosing things to be one way rather than another 
God shows Himself to be someone who chooses F(x) rather than F(y).  Here we 
approach a very poor grasp of the kind of Being God is: that he is One who would 
sanction through his choice x rather than y.   Now a Being that would sanction x rather 
than y seems not just any Being but an intelligent being, with a Mind that would judge 
x in favour of y.  Yet also our mind and our grasp of the first principles of practical 
reasoning would also have judged x in favour of y. Have we not here, in the human 
practical intellect, then, a certain sharing and con-geniality with the Mind of God?  
Therefore my last suggestion: even if one as a moral philosopher, stripped of 
the premises of revelation, might not call practical reasoning or natural law a certain 
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participation of the eternal law, co-extensive with the Divine Substance,143 as St. 
Thomas did, one can certainly approximate this definition.  The principles of practical 
reason hence are always grasped as principles sanctioned and determined by a 
Transcendent Warrant, a Normativity, a Mind that shapes the normativity which 
human beings experience.  If we call this Transcendent Source of Norm or Warrant 
God, or a Mind, then our normativities and mental proclivities qua product of Its 
determination, would be some kind of a sharing of that Normativity or (God’s) Mind.  
(Be it noted, however that this sharing need not necessarily come through by way of 
the precepts themselves, as would be for example when God infusing the precepts 
themselves directly to us.  Rather, this sharing could be simply by way of the 
secondary causes of the precepts, such as the designed shaping of our faculties, which 
then, operating of themselves, delivers the normative precepts.)  
 
 
Can’t Do Without Metaphysics? 
 
Still I would mention some reservations I have of Rists’ account of natural law 
or practical reason’s normativity.  He concludes therefore that natural law theorists 
such as Grisez and Finnis cannot avoid a Theistic metaphysical context.  Indeed Rist 
picks on Finnis and Grisez for precisely this.  Thus Rist continues, 
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We are forced to concede that moral obligation--only obligation clearly 
separable from prudence or enlightened self-interest--remains a utopian 
dream in a non-theistic (and therefore...non realist) universe, and vain are 
attempts of theists to deny this in hope of persuading secular moralists that 
the debate between them is resolved in purely this-worldly terms.  As they 
should have forseen, philosophers who, like Grisez and Finnis, attempt to 
argue that God need not be invoked in such debates are no more able to 
avoid him than was Kant, who, attempting to show that morality needs no 
metaphysical foundations (in his understanding of metaphysics), had to 
allow that without the ultimate sanction of God, his moral universe would 
collapse: a side of Kant...well appreciated by Nietzsche, who held that after 
the ‘death’ of God there could be no foundation for morality.144
 
As I pointed out, Rist thinks an account of ethical normativity “cannot avoid” a 
theistic metaphysics.   Nonetheless I think one has to be careful about overstating this.  
Instead of understanding “cannot avoid” as meaning that natural law requires such a 
metaphysical context as a philosophical premise to establish reason’s normativity, it 
would be more accurate to say (which is what I have been saying) that natural law 
theory “cannot avoid” such a theistic metaphysics in the sense that only such an 
account is consistent with practical reason’s admissible self evident normativity.  The 
possible inconsistency between a robust account of practical reasoning and certain 
naturalistic metaphysical assumptions was not blind to Finnis (even if not elaborated 
                                                 
144Rist, Real Ethics, 259-260 
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at great length), nor certainly to Aquinas.  In the final chapter of his Aquinas, Finnis 
writes: 
 
[the] reflective account of Aquinas' social, political and legal theory has 
mostly been within moralis philosophia.  That is to say, it has been 
concerned with the (third) order that practical reasons can bring into one's 
deliberations and free choices, rather than with the (first) order of realities 
which are what they are quite independently of our reasoning about them.  
But no course of reflections could reasonably remain confined to the 
practical, to third-order considerations.   For the very fact that there is a 
third type of order--that rational order can indeed be brought into one's 
choices, that there are first principles of practical reason--is a first order 
reality, a kind of given, something remarkable that is somehow 
independent of and prior to one's practical thinking.  The projects or 
options which we conceive and deliberate upon--like the logic by which we 
guide our thought, and like our products and techniques--have their 
immediate explanation, their cause, in human thinking.  But our capacities 
to make and carry out a choice--like our capacity to think logically, and the 
availability and malleability of the materials out of which we make our 
products--are factors in the first order: they are what they are, 
independently of our thinking and willing...All these realities, like 
everything else in the first order, provoke the question: Why?  What is their 
explanation? What other factors contribute to their being as they are and 
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working out as they do? What must the world be like for such thing to be 
the case?  It would be very good to know!...In tracing some of Aquinas' 
fundamental reflections on first order realities, we will not be straying from 
the subject of this book…For everyone is aware how close is the fit 
between first-order and third order positions--how smoothly, for example, 
the thought that everything is no more than material particles evolving by 
blind chance towards eventual motionlessness fits with the thought that 
nothing really matters save getting pleasures while we may.  And though 
the natural sciences themselves have a self-correcting, critical method and 
integrity, it would be rash to assume that the tendency to rationalize one's 
wrongful choices plays no part in the genesis, defence and successful 
diffusion of wider 'scientific world-views'. (not to mention loquaciously 
irrational "post-modernisms').145  
 
The point being, (especially in that last part of the quotation) that a mechanistic 
world view coheres with and leads to an account of “morality” which condones 
rationalization.  And by “rationalization” Finnis means here and elsewhere “reasons 
which one recounts to oneself or to others, for doing an action that one in fact is doing 
for emotional satisfaction, for emotional ‘reasons’ that are not reasons which 
intelligence understands and reason affirms and developes.”146  In other words, in 
keeping with such a mechanistic world-view, only such non-reasons or pseudo reasons 
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will have any credible appeal because practical reasons, which are the only real 
reasons (prescriptions with normativity), would in fact be reduced to nonsense.  This 
point we saw Nagel and Rist were perceptive to, as explained above.  From the 
perspective of those who do affirm the reality of practical reasons qua reasons qua 
authentic normative directions, rationalization will be the order of the day.  Simply 
put, such a world view reduces a reasonable normative morality to an absurdity.   
 But modus tollens, if it is true that there are practical reasons qua prescriptive 
norms, then equally and in the opposite direction, such a world view is false.  This last 
is what we are arguing for, and which Finnis (and Grisez) do not develop but are 
attentive to and thus are certainly not opposed to, as we saw in the above.  What they 
deny, however, is simply that an account of the content of the principles of practical 
reasoning or natural law requires a metaphysical knowledge about God, or for that 
matter, premises about human nature.  Not only does it not require, it cannot use that 
knowledge, because of the logical gap between the descriptive and the normative.147
Indeed the extended debate between the traditional readers of St. Thomas and 
the New Natural Law theorists concerning the disassociation of human nature and 
natural law fleshes out the possible confusion between the priority of the ontological 
and the priority of the epistemological which Finnis et al are insistent on clarifying.  
What is epistemologically first is not human nature, and we might add, as is relevant 
here, any metaphysical account of reality.  What is epistemologically first are the 
experiences of practical reasoning: the experience of the intelligible goods and their 
prescriptivity.  What is ontologically first, however, would indeed be human nature 
                                                 




and the larger metaphysical reality--for unless these first existed, there could be no 
cosmological reality of which beings are a part, nor human beings with their particular 
human natures with a capacity to think and know. But insofar as knowing is 
concerned, the relationship is reversed: for we know we are beings with a nature to 
know thanks only to the fact that we do experience objects of knowledge, from which 
we infer that there are knowing faculties, and then that we are such beings which can 
know.  We need not over-labour this point, already well clarified by Robert P. 
George.148 (see chapter 1).  Similarly, we can also infer that we exist, and as we have 
pointed out, that we exist in an anti-naturalistic universe.  But this final inference is 
not a claim that such a universe is not first required—indeed it is very necessarily first 
and very much first needed—ontologically, that is. The whole notion of practical 
reasoning would be quite vain were it not for the ontological reality that there is some 
kind of External, non-Arbitrary Intelligent Author or Creative Designer, whom we 
might call God.  So practical reasoning, as a coherent concept and reality, leads to this 
metaphysical truth, which is ontologically prior.  That is to say, the reality of practical 
reasons entails that  that I agree that God exists, and that He exists prior in being (and 
time) compared to my knowing here and now (that there are practical reasons or that 
he does indeed exist in being and time prior to my so knowing that he does or indeed, 
any truth at all).  But that being said, knowing what these practical reasons are by no 
means presupposes that I first believe there is such a God, or know anything about 
Him.  Discovering the what of the precepts is achieved by reflecting on the choices 
one makes when one asks oneself the question, “what am I to do?” Once more, 
                                                 
148see Robert P George, "Natural Law and Human Nature", In Defense of Natural Law 
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believing that God exists, forced by the reality of practical reasons which are not 
categorical fictions, tells us nothing about what these practical reasons qua normative 
prescriptions are, which are known without prior hint of God.  
 
But Rist is aware of this.  Thus my sense is that his charge goes deeper.  His 
complaint is that without us already having established and therefore knowing that 
God is there to guarantee their normativity, even the substance or content of the 
precepts would be called into question from the very beginning.  So granted one could 
know these precepts, what normative authority they would have is at most tentative or 
dubious.  Because: if their normative truth or credibility is vulnerable to a radical 
skepticism to begin with, nothing else follows.  Finnis might indeed have given us the 
right methodology for knowing the precepts of the natural law, but until God is there 
to guarantee that such ends are indeed worth seeking as we seem to have grasped 
(presumably through guaranteeing the credibility of our epistemic faculties) why 
should we even obey these natural laws qua reason's practical prescriptions?  So Rist 
is really asking the “Cartesian” question: without the guarantee of a benevolent God, 
how are our epistemic deliverances guaranteed to be free from skepticism from the 
very start?  Just as Descartes invited us to question the normative authority qua 
veritability of the first logical (speculative) principles in the  Meditations, so Rist 
invites us to question the normativity of the first practical principles.  As Descartes 
asked, “how can we be sure that our logical principles are really true, until we have 
established that they are not the conniving of an evil genius but the products insured 
by a non-deceiving good God?”, so Rist asks the same of the practical domain: How 
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can we be sure, save by some theistic guarantee, thanks to a loving God, that these 
precepts are objectively, really true qua credibly normative? In this way Rist takes to 
task not only Finnis, but Anthony Lisska, who, contra Finnis, thinks one can indeed 
derive the precepts of the natural law from an account of human nature.  Thus,   
 
Even supposing that we could come up with our rationally derived list, we 
would have shown no more than that if we want to flourish, as we have 
defined flourishing, we would do well to live in a certain way...If we are a 
substantial set of dispositional properties tending to a certain end or good, 
there seem in a non-theistic naturalism to be no more than prudential 
arguments as to why the human race should accept that good.  We 
incidentally may not want to be 'human' or 'fully human'...so why should 
we not decline any 'obligation' to be moral, that is choose to make 
ourselves something else, something 'non-human'?  Of course, if we are 
designed by God to go in a certain direction as towards our ultimate and 
individual end, and if that directedness is the plan of an ultimate goodness, 
the situation is quite other.  In that case, and in that case alone, a choice of 
immorality is stupid pride.149
 
Basically Rist is eager to ground the normativity of practical reasoning, and that 
on a metaphysical premise of a loving and commanding God.  Introducing the 
possibility of deriving the precepts complicates matters somewhat—partly because it 
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is I think fallacious from the start, and also partly because as Rist rightly points out, 
such derivations capture only a prudential norm—but the bottom line is, no matter 
derived or self-evident, supposing we have here what are norms which are normative 
in the fully robust sense, Rist is still not going to be satisfied.  Because until he knows 
that God is there to guarantee that these “norms” are indeed, in a supra-phenomenally 
objective sense, truly normative, they are for him weak foundations to proceed with.  
So his quest, if I may, is to build an ethics on a good God. 
 
Unfortunately his quest seems to me to be wrong-headed, and this for three 
reasons. Firsly, the project is meaningfully problematic.  Secondly, the project 
involves some kind of performative self-contradiction, or self-referential 
inconsistency, if you will; for: the very posing of the question—i.e., its very 
problematizing—can only be thanks to the very principles the question seeks to 
undermine.  Thirdly, his arguments are fallacious. To best see all these we could 
examine Rists' proposal.  He suggests that unless we first know there is a loving God, 
we would not yet find the precepts of practical reason to be normative in their fully 
robust sense. Distinguishing his theory from a brutish divine command theory, He 
writes, 
 
If...God's love is an attribute inseparable from his power, we can be certain 
that what he commands will not be right merely because he commands it 
(even though he will and 'must' command it if it is right), but right because 
it is good as God is good...Granted the truly divine commands of a God 
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whose nature is love, we can assume that actions are wrong because alien 
and hostile to that divine nature, and against his will because God does not 
command what is contrary to his excellence.  Thus a viable 'realist' 
morality --the alternative to the ethics, or better 'moralities', of choice, 
rational calculation or obligation for obligation's sake -- involves 
obedience to divine commands not because they are commands, but, as the 
Platonists always put it, because what is good is in itself inspiring to us, 
just as, analogously, a loving being will not use power unjustly, even 
though he or she may have the physical capability of doing so...150
 
This looks right, but is in fact a wild goose chase.  I raised three objections; I 
will now elaborate on them in turn. Firstly, in line with St. Thomas, I say that Rist too 
casually overlooks the difficulties in employing moral predicates to God, as he so 
freely does.  For a fact, we have no idea what God's nature is.  All we know is—to the 
extent that we would be successful deducing from the fact that we are essentially 
(quidditatively) limited instances of really distinct151 existence {esse}—that God is 
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how “real” the distinction is.  While I am more sympathetic to Wippel’s exposition on 
this matter, the reader should be attentive to other competing accounts. On one end of 
the spectrum which argues that the distinction is not real to the point where essence is 
ontologically other than existence, we have William E Carlo’s Ultimate Reducibility of 
Essence into Existence (The Hague: Martinus Hijhoff, 1966), 103-104 and Rudi Te 
Velde’s very fine study,  Paricipation and Substantiality in St. Thomas Aquinas 
(Leiden, Netherlands: E J Brill, 1995), 151-152;  On the other end where the real 
distinction is claimed (I think, erroneously) to be not merely a distinction of two 
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pure Unlimited Existence {Esse}.152 We may indeed predicate Goodness of God, and 
God may indeed be morally good but philosophically the transcendental Good is not a 
moral predicate; it is a metaphysical (or ontic) predicate. At least, it is not a “moral” 
predicate in the sense that Rist can find useful. For ‘good’ adds nothing except a 
concept of a relation to ‘being’; good is that being which is related to another being by 
perfecting the other being existentially. But for all we know, that ‘good’ being might 
be perfecting another being for malicious intentions, though God himself forbid.  
Because God's Essence is Existence {Esse}, and existence {esse} perfects everything 
that exists by bringing it into being and sustaining it in being,153 therefore God is most 
fittingly said to be good—not morally good, but good qua that which perfects 
(existentially) another (as an end).154 Existence {Esse} perfects every existent {ens} 
as an end by bringing it into existence and hence no matter with reference to 
whichever being {ens}, God is focally and fittingly predicated good qua existential 
perfector with reference to every being, to the extent that it exists. For this reason, St. 
Thomas following Augustine says that everything is good insofar as it exists, not 
however by an exemplary form (in which case divinity would be in the essence of the 
creature) but by participation,155 thus outside of the really distinct essence of the 
creature but nevertheless so intimate with it as to form a unity {unum per se} 
                                                                                                                                            
ontologically distinct principles, but rather two things (res), we have Giles of Rome 
and to a controverted extent according to some scholars, Cajetan’s commentary on 
Aquinas’s On Being and Essence, his In De Ente et Essentia, who speaks of the 
distinction of essence and existence “as if two things”.  
152 De Ente et Essentia, 60-61 
153 ibid. 
154 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, op. cit.,  Vol 3, Q. 21, art. 1, 6-7 
155 St. Thomas Aquinas, Qq., 2, q 2., a. 1 in Quodlibetal Questions 1 and 2, Sandra 
Edwards (trans.), (Toronto: PIMS, 1983); De Ente et Essentia, 55-56.  
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composite from which no third thing emerges. This much we know philosophically of 
God’s nature: that he IS, as the IS which, through his generous free gift of this IS is 
the metaphysical perfectant of everything else that has156 is-ness and therefore also is,  
he is called Good from every point of view, because he perfects everything, every 
being {ens}. But outside of scripture and revelation, God’s nature is hidden.  This 
revelation also testifies, as St. Thomas notes well, since when in the Exodus 3:14 God 
revealed his Name, he told Moses that he was “He Who IS”, that he was “I am who 
AM” {Ego sum qui SUM}, period, not he who is such and such. He IS, not is what.157  
For this reason, while we can be philosophically sure that God Exists, and as Pure 
Existence lacking absolutely nothing is Perfect, he is therefore good, we need faith to 
trust in his infinite (moral) goodness.  So strictly speaking, philosophically to say that 
God is good and loving are just not morally meaningful—unless, in a very limited 
manner as I pointed out earlier near the end of the first section, by way of the 
normativities which we already experience158; but Rist would not yet endorse these 
norms.  So crippled without the premises of revelation, a philosophical ethicist who 
doubts the normativities of practical reasoning cannot, even if he appeals to 
metaphysics, find in ‘a morally good God’ a meaningful referent, let alone a ground or 
basis for obligations.   
Now do not misunderstand: surely as Aquinas would say, God is good in a 
                                                 
156 Habens esse 
157 St. Thomas Aquinas,  Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk 1., Anton Pegis (trans.), (NY: 
Hanover, 1955), Chapter 14, 2; Chapter 22, 9-10 
158 and that only if we further suppose that ‘moral goodness’ is defined in terms of 
some kind of agreement with these norms, because all I claimed back then was that 
there was some correspondence between God’s Mind and ours, but that does not seem 
to rule out the possibility that He is Evil and I’m a demon.   
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moral sense, where specifically to be ‘moral’ is to be perfectly rational, and God is 
perfectly rational. But, this morality is a claim about God’s not lacking in anything 
whatsoever as pertains to right reason and this “not lacking anything whatsoever as 
pertains to right reason” tells us nothing about these “whatsoever” in themselves.  It 
just tells us that whatever ought to be there—and God knows what it is that ought to 
be there—if it is there, then God is moral.  Now these whatever-that-ought-to-be-there 
as pertains to rationality (and God knows what they are!) must indeed be there since 
God is perfect as Infinite Being lacking nothing, and so he is moral.  But notice how 
there is no illumination regarding the content of God’s moral goodness; rather, there is 
only the claim that whatever these contents are that ought to be there, there they are.  
To borrow a Heideggerian distinction, to say that God is morally good is an ontic 
statement, rather than an ontological one.  It is to say that God is morally good qua 
perfect Being (and hence also fully existing) lacking nothing, but tells us nothing 
about what that Infinite Being which exists is.159 But in that case, this claim that God 
is morally good is of no use to Rist. Remember, Rist wants to say that God is good, 
                                                 
159 Also see Qq. 2, q. 2. a 1, op. cit., where Aquinas most explicitly explains how he 
means God is good.  God’s goodness is always ontically defined, i.e., in terms of his 
infinite plenitude of being. Something is good insofar as it is. God is goodness itself 
because he is essentially existence, IS. We in turn share that goodness—because 
ontically we also are but participate in being: “we must say that ‘being’ (ens) is 
predicated in the manner of an essence of God alone, inasmuch as divine being (esse) 
is subsistent and absolute being.  However it is predicated of any creature in the 
manner of participation, for no creature is its being but rather is something which has 
being.  So also we call God ‘good’ in the manner of an essence because he is goodness 
itself, we call creatures ‘good’ in the manner of participation because they have 
goodness.  For anything is good inasmuch as it is, according to what Augustine says in 
De Doctrina Christiana 1, that inasmuch as we are, we are good.”  So to say that God 
is good is to say that he is Infinite Being, but does not explain anything about his 
moral character or behavior.  Unfortunately it is the latter sense of “good” that Rist 
requires in saying that God is good for his purpose of grounding ethics in the divine 
commands of such a good God. 
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and therefore whatever he commands will be good.  But in this very conjunction “God 
is good and therefore whatever he commands will be good”, Rist wants the latter 
‘good’ to say something ontologically substantive (as opposed to merely ontically 
substantive) about the commands, i.e., that they are good qua morally agreeable 
precepts, because commanded by a morally agreeable God, rather than merely 
commanded by God, period.  So for Rist it is important that somehow the moral 
goodness of the commands derive their moral goodness from the moral goodness of 
God.  Because God is good, somehow that goodness translates into the goodness of 
the commands. But just at this point the ontic goodness of God cannot deliver: because 
this says no more than that God IS he who lacks nothing, and whatever it is that he 
does not lack, they are there, and on the basis of that whatever that the lacks not, he 
commands.  Now this seems to me no different from the brutish divine command 
theory Rist was trying to escape from.  In this case, whatever he is, that whatever gets 
translated or transits into the character of his commands.  Wherein these commands, 
being whatever they are, would come from a God who IS perfectly Whatever he is. If 
we are going to call this “whatever” under descriptive terms such as loving, morally 
good, etc., then what we really have before us is indeed is a divine command theory 
that equates moral goodness and lovingness with whatever God commands.   
Further, even if God revealed himself to be morally good, it would seem 
difficult for us to have any grasp of that moral notion of God unless we first had some 
kind of earthly grasp of what moral goodness consists in.  Morally descriptive terms 
like a good and loving God are at best empty signs, unless we can make an analogical 
induction by magnifying to infinity the moral goodness and the lovingness that we 
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already grasp here, even if vaguely.  The kind of proper and fitting sense in which 
God is good and loving—i.e., his nature—is something quite beyond the grasp of the 
human intellect; it is something that is given and known only in the beautific vision 
when the intellect is supported by the power of grace.  Telling someone that God is 
infinitely good is just vacuous nonsense because we simply to have no access to the 
referent of the phrase ‘infinitely good’.  If however it is to mean anything, it has to be 
none other than some kind of analogy of what we already think good qua morally 
agreeable or some other this-worldly notion.  And even that would be hard to endorse, 
as St. Thomas and the Pseudo Denis would warn. So eventually that moral “goodness” 
of God still leads us back down here first. Prior to all that goody talk of a moral God, 
we must first have some stable notion of what objectively moral goodness is.  But if 
we need to have some kind of this-worldly account of moral goodness before we can 
even make the meaningful claim that such a morally good God is giving commands, 
then it seems to me that the metaphysics of a morally good God cannot be a ground for 
ethics.  Rather, in reverse: ethics becomes the basis for any possibly meaningful 
metaphysical articulation about the moral God which Rist hopes to appeal to to 
guarantee his ethics.  Nor would it help for Rist to say that whatever God reveals 
himself to be, that we call ‘morally good’—because in that case what is morally good 
is what God commands as proceeding from his ‘morally good nature’, and we are back 
to the raw divine command theory that Rist was eager to dissociate himself from.   
 
But secondly, and more importantly, suppose I do know what it means for God 
to be morally loving and good, still: why ought I obey God, who loves and commands 
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what is good?  Given that I am dissatisfied with obeying God simply because he 
commands it, then unless I already think that I ought to obey what is good, it matters 
not a dint that God commands what is good. For it is not itself evident that I should 
blindly obey the good that God commands, even if I should be so sure that he cannot 
but command goodness—unless I already first agree that I ought to obey the good.  
And Rist himself confesses this; as Rist himself says, if we obey the good that God 
commands, it is because “what is good is in itself inspiring to us”—but what does that 
mean?  I suggest: nothing more than whatever it is we think is good qua worth doing, 
seeking or promoting, that "whatever" ought to be so done, sought and promoted.  I.e., 
until it matches up to the very self-evident principle, what is good ought to be sought 
and done, and what is contrary to that good ought to be avoided, Rist would not 
sanction it.  So Rist is muddled: while he is so adamant about God’s commands, his 
analysis betrays its irrelevance.160 For ultimately, whether God commands or not, the 
crux of the matter is that I, independently of God and his commands, understand that 
good ought to be done. But to agree—as Rist must now agree—that “good ought to be 
done, never mind the fact that a good God commands the good”, is to admit that the 
“ought” is already fully normative sans God’s commanding the precept.  In other 
words, Rist's project to ground the normative credibility of (the deliverances of) 
                                                 
160Also see Michael S. Moore's (I might add, absolutely brilliant) "Good Without 
God" in Natural Law, Liberalism and Morality, Robert P George (ed.), (NY: 
Clarendon/ Oxford University Press, 1996).  221-271.  Moore thinks Finnis' final 
appeal to God in the last chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights to mitigate the 
subjectivity qua "merely relative to us" does not succeed.  For Moore, God on close 
inspection does no work.  I am inclined to agree with Moore.  Still, bear in mind that 
the subjectivity in question is not that of arbitrary opining, which there is not.  But I do 
not do justice to Moore with these superficial comments; I earnestly ask our reader to 
inspect the exceptional paper for himself.  
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practical reasons from the start itself in the commands of a loving God cannot be 
meaningful except by presupposing the normative credibility of the very practical 
principles he hopes to justify.  Unless we are motivated by these first principles, we 
would not even be concerned to seek out a schema or account like the kind which Rist 
proposes.  Rists' whole quest for the ground of morality is not because he believes in a 
Good God, much as he may.  It is motivated--insofar as his analysis of obligations 
display--by a concern to match up to certain insights about what really constitute 
meaningful norms, viz. self- evident insights which are intelligently satisfying answers 
to the question “what ought I do?”  And such a norm is: “I ought to do what is good--
no matter Who or What commands me to do them.”  Indeed, Rist aside, any attempt to 
ground ethics in a theory of divine commands of a loving God (and not just in a God 
who commands) paradoxically demonstrates the inherent, fully robust normativity 
present in practical reasoning apart from God’s commanding them.  
 
Thirdly, and following somewhat from the second, even if we grant that the 
normativity which we claim is self-evident and which Rist himself appealed to as self-
evidently normative is not really normative, and that he does not self-referentially 
appeal to them, Rists’ project to ground ethical obligation on the divine command of a 
loving God still fails.  Simply put, his argument is fallacious.  For a fact, Rist cannot 
reconstruct or re-establish the normativity that he doubted. Recall that Rist is indeed, 
as we have argued, entitled to affirm the inconsistency between naturalism and the 
existence of practical normativity:  if (p) naturalism is true, then  (q) practical reason’s 
normativity cannot exist. But while to affirm (not q) the existence of practical norms 
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entails (not p) the falsehood of naturalism, affirming that there is a loving God giving 
commands, i.e., that there is a Theistic universe and thereby (not p) denying the truth 
of naturalism proves nothing. To think that it warrants the conclusion that therefore 
(not q) there are practical norms by merely affirming that there is a theistic universe 
would be faulty reasoning on account of denying the antecedent.  Of course, if there is 
a loving God giving good commands, then there are loving and good commands being 
given, and so there are loving and good commands to be obeyed.  But this will not do 
for a satisfactory account of obligation, as we saw in the second objection, since either 
the loving commands will be obeyed because they are commanded, or obeyed despite 
being commanded.  Now he cannot here admit the latter, since there are no 
trustworthy norms to oblige apart from God’s commands. So he is left with the first.  
Yet as we saw, Rist would disassociate his account of ethical obligation from the first.  
So he is left with nothing.  So if Rist starts off without admitting any self-evident 
norms, not even calling out to God would help him.  
 
Conclusion 
Thus far, I have tried to demonstrate how an account of practical reasoning 
which takes seriously the normativity of reasons leads us to a supernaturalistic 
metaphysics. Further, I argued that such an account of ethical obligation cannot be 
grounded in such a metaphysics, and any effort to ground ethics in metaphysics is 
either linguistically meaningless, self-referentially inconsistent or just plain false.  
Such a metaphysics includes at the very least some external Creative principle, itself a 
Norm and not arbitrary.   Working from the thomistic tradition, one would call this 
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principle God.  
 
In Wang’s Laozi, Wang comments on a passage in a manner which gives us a 
rather naïve, ontological argument, a via to the Dao, if I may borrow from St. Thomas: 
 
You might wish to say that it does not exist, but everything achieves 
existence because of it…161   
 
How does this Dao that Wang’s Laozi refers to compare with the God in 
Aquinas’ metaphysics?   Some scholarship has suggested that Daoist ontology and 
Christian ontology are incompatible162 and to a great extent scholarly interpretations of 
the Dao as intrinsically incomprehensible reinforce that impression.163 In the following 
I offer an alternative reading of the namelessness of the Dao in accordance with the 
interpretation of Wang Bi which preserves the Dao from an intrinsic absurdity, and 
with this I demonstrate the comparative similarities between the Thomistic 
metaphysics of Unlimited Being and the Namelessness of the Dao. Aquinas’ 
discussion of God—explained as the Being which is itself unlimited being—is 
complex, and is built on the tradition of the Neo-platonic Fathers and developed over 
                                                 
161 Wang, The Classic 73 
162 R. P. Peerenboom, "Cosmogony, the Taoist Way", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 
17 (1990), 157-174. 
163 A. T. Nuyen, "Naming the Unnameable: The Being of the Tao", Journal of Chinese 
Philosophy, 22, (1995) 488 
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time with the philosophical apparatus of Aristotle.   There can be no question of 
claiming that the Daode Jing has a conception of a being called God as sophisticated 





Nameless Dao and Unlimited Being 
 
Introduction 
Having examined in previous chapters how political reflection integrates metaphysical 
reflection of the Dao and of God in the Daoist and Natural Law tradition respectively, 
it is fitting in our thesis to compare these two metaphysical conceptions of the 
ontological origin of all things. So this chapter compares the Thomistic metaphysic of 
God as Unlimited Being with Wang’s conception of the Dao as Nameless and 
Formless.   I will argue for parallels in both conceptions of that Origin, and conclude 
with the suggestion that the Thomistic God can be named “Dao” also. 
 
Nameless Dao 
The Daode Jing begins with the lines insisting on the namelessness of the 
Dao: 
The Dao that can be described in language is not the constant Dao; the 
name that can be given it is not the constant name164  
                                                 
164 Wang, The Classic, 51 
 183
 184
What is clear from the above text is that language somehow fails to capture 
fully the Dao.165 According to one presentation of the precise meaning of this text, the 
reason for this failure, however, can fall either on the side of language itself, or on the 
nature of the Dao itself. Meaning, is to say that the Dao is unnameable to point out the 
limits of language itself, or the inexpressible nature of the Dao itself? Criticizing the 
first opinion, which is D. C. Lau's, A.T. Nuyen writes,  
It is clear that for Lau the Dao is in principle characterizable. He goes 
on to say that the only problem we have with characterizing it is in the 
inadequacy of language: "There is no name that is applicable to the 
Dao because language is totally inadequate for such a purpose". Lau's 
view is misleading to say the least. Surely the first two lines convey 
much more than a sense of linguistic inadequacy. They point out the 
source of inadequacy lies in the paradoxical nature of the Dao. The 
truth of the matter is that there is no name that is applicable to the Dao 
because it is unnameable. Indeed the Dao is uncharacterizable.166   
I am sympathetic to Nuyen's criticism. But only because “a Dao that is in principle 
characterizable but cannot be characterized due to the inadequacy of language” makes 
                                                 
165 In a recent paper Bo Mou points out that this does not mean that the Dao cannot be 
spoken of--notice that after this line the Laozi spends the rest of the chapters precisely 
talking about the Dao--but rather that language cannot fully exhaust--i.e., characterise-
-the Dao, so that the first line is a conjunction of two claims: that the (genuine) Dao 
can be spoken of, but cannot be characterised in language. See "Ultimate Concern and 
Language Engagement: A Re-examination of the Opening Message of the Dao-De-
Jing", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 27, (2000) 429-439.  
166 A. T. Nuyen, "Naming the Unnameable: The Being of the Tao", op. cit. 
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no sense. If language is inadequate for naming or characterizing the Dao, it will be 
difficult to see how in any sense the Dao can still be “in principle characterizable”. It 
would seem that something which language is inadequate to characterize is a fortiori 
in principle uncharacterizable. Logically, to be characterized is to be characterized by 
a language. There seems to be no sense in speaking of something that is in principle 
characterizable and at the same time to declare that no language is adequate to the task. 
It would be like speaking of something that in principle can be heard when there are 
no ears in the world that can hear it. Just as sound as 'something heard' can logically 
exist only when it is heard, so also logically the Dao can be characterizable (i.e., can 
be characterized by a language) only when there is a language that can characterize it. 
But we have already admitted that no language can do this, and hence we run into an 
absurdity.167  Hence it seems that we cannot say with Lau that there is a sense in which 
the Dao is still in principle characterizeable, when we admit that no language is up to 
the task. 
 
                                                 
167 Note here that the discussion is about characterizability, i.e., an attempt to fully 
articulate it, and not about epistemic entrances into the Dao. There is nothing to imply 
that what is not characterizable is not knowable. Yet the point remains, even granted 
that we can know the Dao, that when we say that language is inadequate for 
characterizing the Dao, it is not consistent logically for us to admit that it is still 
characterizable in principle.  
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Nonetheless, the distinction that Nuyen wants to make between (1) the nature 
of Dao as the source of its own namelessness and (2) the inadequacy of language as 
the reason for the namelessness of the Dao must be specified carefully, and here I 
think Nuyen has made too much of it. Nuyen of course accents the former as the real 
reason for the Dao's namelessness. More specifically, Nuyen points out that the Dao is 
not merely nameless but unnameable in the following manner. The unnameable is 
unnameable not merely because of the inadequacy of language but also because of its 
peculiar ontological structure: that it intrinsically defies any possibility of being 
named—by no means the fault of language. It is in this ontological sense that the Dao 
is not only nameless but also unnameable. Thus: 
In the standard view, the Dao is to be named "the nameless," is to be 
characterized as "non-being." This is to miss the fundamental point that 
the Dao is nameless because it is unnameable, not even as "the 
nameless."168  
This assumes that there is something deeper than the inadequacy of language 
in naming the Dao: that somehow per se it is due to the Dao's nature that it cannot be 
named, that is to say, that language is not up to the task only per accidens.  
                                                 
168 A. T. Nuyen., op. cit., 487-497 
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In contrasting the Dao with absolute non-being or privation, Nuyen points out 
that the Dao is not negative non-being in the simple sense of the opposite of positive 
being. Neither is it a negativity nor a simple non-being. It is not nothingness.169   
However, in line with his emphasis on crediting the unnameableness of the 
Dao to the intrinsic nature of the Dao itself, Nuyen further adds:  
Rather, it is a positive negativity; it is a non-being with a being, or a 
reality. Thus its nature is paradoxical. The standard view does not 
come to terms with the paradox of the Dao that is clearly announced in 
the first two lines…This nothing-which-is-something, this non-being-
that-has-being, is nameless because it is truly unnameable; it is 
characterless because it is truly uncharacterizable.170  
This leaves the Dao not merely uncharacterizable, but also quite unintelligible. 
In trying to “prevent a premature assessment of the Daode Jing, as merely a series of 
murky rumblings, and from being rejected as mystical”,171 I am concerned that Nuyen 
has ironically led us to a Dao which is altogether absurd. While it is to be conceded 
that the paradoxical unnameableness of the Dao is to be traced to the nature of the 
Dao itself, this is not to say that the Dao is of its nature altogether paradoxical. It is 
one thing to say that the Dao is unnameable, and quite another to say that the Dao is a 
unity of mutually contradictory principles.  Nuyen it seems to me has overstepped 
                                                 
169 ibid. 
170 ibid. 
171 ibid., 498 
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reason.  He moves illicitly from the suggestion that the Dao is ontologically 
unnameable to saying further that the Dao is ontologically absurd. 
 
Rather, the Dao as unnameable (given the inadequacy of language) could well 
be due to the nature of the Dao (not as intrinsically paradoxical) but as having a 
nature which is unnamable because it is without any principle of formality, and as 
such cannot be named. To put it simply, the Dao cannot be named because names 
designates a form which the Dao lacks. The Dao's nature is such that it is without any 
formal principle by which names as linguistic signs can necessarily designate. Let me 
propose this as an alternative reading that dispenses with having to admit an intrinsic 
absurdity on the part of the constant Dao.  
 
Wang Bi explains the first two lines like this: 
The Dao that can be rendered in language and the name [ming] that can 
be given it point to a thing / matter or reproduce a form [xing], neither 
of which is it in its constancy [chang]. This is why it cannot be 
rendered in language nor given a name.172  
                                                 
172 Wang, The Classic. 
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Wang Bi understands the name as a linguistic sign that picks out a form. 
Writing about the Dao again in section 25 of his commentary, Wang says: 
Names [ming] are used to determine forms [xing]…173  
The commentary explains that insofar as constancy is incompatible with the 
having of forms, then the Dao as constant cannot have form. It follows then that the 
Dao cannot be named. What according to Wang Bi is the reason for the 
unnameableness of the Dao is its constancy, rather than it being paradoxical, as Nuyen 
supposed.  
 
According to this reading then, the Dao's constancy is inconsistent with its 
being represented by a form-representing name. This helps to illuminate one important 
sense by which the Dao is constant and nameless: Tao is not constituted by a formal 
principle. Exegetically the metaphysical implication seems to be that that which is of 
constancy (or invariability) excludes formality, and hence is nameless. It follows then 
that to speak of the unnameableness of the (constant) Dao can be to point out its 
lacking any principle of formality, rather than its intrinsic absurdity.  
 
Again, since constancy is opposed to formality, and is also opposed to being a 
thing that can be pointed to, Wang Bi seems to suggest that things have form in them. 
                                                 
173 ibid., 95 
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And so we read in the next part of his comments on the 3rd and 4th lines of the Daode 
Jing:  
Nameless, it is the origin of the myriad of things; named it is the 
mother of the myriad things. 
Anything that exists originates in nothingness [wu], thus, before it has 
forms and when it is still nameless, it serves as the origin of the myriad 
things, and, once it has forms and is named, it grows them, rears them, 
ensures them in their proper shapes, and matures them as their mother. 
In other words, the Dao, by being itself formless and nameless, 
originates and brings the myriad things to completion. They are 
originated and completed in this way yet do not know how it happens. 
This is the mystery beyond mystery.174  
Thus, the commentator points out clearly that in saying that it is nameless, we 
refer to the time when it does not yet have forms. Again, when it has forms, then it is 
named. Hence the namelessness refers precisely to the formlessness of the Dao. In the 
parallel commentary Wang Bi writes in referring to in Section 25 to the Dao: 
                                                 
174 ibid., 51 
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Names [ming] are used to designate forms [xing], but, amorphous and 
complete, it has no form, so we cannot make any such determination. 
Thus the text says "we do not know its name."175  
Yet what is also interesting is that already in the second line of the Laozi, the 
Dao is named and is said to be the mother of the myriad things. We know that Wang 
Bi attributes the namelessness of the Dao to its being formless. How then does he 
explicate the Dao as named? In line with the interpretation that relates namelessness 
with formlessness, when the Dao is named, it must then already have some kind of 
formal principle--yet not in itself, but as “the myriad things”. That is, once the Dao 
causes these myraid things, “it has forms and is named”. Therefore the Dao “by itself 
formless and nameless”, can be named not qua Dao, but as the myriad things that 
come from it, and also which have forms and hence can have names.  
 
Immediately a problem arises, which will press our specification of the relation 
between the nameless Dao in itself and the named Dao qua the formed myriad things. 
If the nameless Dao is now the named Dao qua the myriad things, can it still be said to 
be Dao or is there a contradiction? That is to say, these myriad things with formal 
principles in them and hence nameable--can they still be called the (constant) Dao? 
The first sentence has been ruled this. The Dao that has form and which can then be 
named is not the (constant) Dao. But as Wang Bi's commentary has it, as named the 
Dao is the various things with forms. It would seem that this is not possible: if the Dao 
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properly refers to the formless, then once anything has formality, it cannot be the Dao. 
Hence is Wang Bi's reading mistaken in suggesting that qua these formed myriad 
things, it is still the Dao? If not, then one has to account for the tension between the 
nameless Dao and the naming of the myriad things as Dao. In order to understand this 
seeming tension, I propose an interpretation that suggests that Wang Bi is arguing that 
although the Dao is nameless and hence not any of the myriad things with form, it is 
also in some sense within these myriad things. Thus in calling the myriad things Dao, 
Wang Bi is trying to communicate the presence of the Dao in the myriad things.  
 
To get a better sense of the problematic here, let us consider the Dao as 
absolutely transcendent. If the Dao is absolutely transcendent and is therefore totally 
apart from the myriad things within which it dwells, then this accords with it being 
formless and nameless, as contradistinct from the myriad things which are formed and 
named. This nameless and formless origin we call Dao. What is named, is therefore 
not the Dao. If I should then say that the myriad things, which are named, are Dao, 
this would be a blatant contradiction. Therefore Wang Bi is trying to communicate the 
ontological presence of the Dao in the myriad things when he says that the Dao "has 
forms and is named" as the myriad things. The nameless Dao is not the formed and 
myriad things, but in a sense (to be discussed later) is within the myriad things. Since 
it is not totally apart from the myriad things, a way to communicate this presence of 
the Dao is to say when the Dao dwells in things, it can be. But this is simply an effort 
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to communicate the abiding presence of the Dao and at the same separate the Dao 
from these things.  
 
Hence I would paraphrase Wang Bi's phrase “once it [Dao] has forms and is 
named” as “when the Dao is present in the myriad things which have forms and hence 
named”. This reading of the naming of the Dao understood as the presence of the Dao 
in the myriad things is reflected in the fact that the Dao is then immediately named the 
mother of all the myriad things. The image of a mother Wang Bi explains refers to the 
Dao as maintaining them: “grows them, rears them and ensures them in their proper 
shapes.” The Dao is somehow in the world maintaining it. 
 
In a recent paper R. P. Peerenboom gives support to my interpretation. He writes: 
Part of the confusion regarding the status of Dao emerges from the use 
of the term "transcendence." [D]ao is not transcendent in the sense of 
existence entirely apart from the world…as Izutsu points out, this is a 
"very peculiar kind of transcendence" in that Dao is also immanent.176  
Nevertheless granted some form of immanence, the exact specification of the 
way in which the Dao is immanent needs to be laid out. Because the Dao as origin of 
                                                 
176 R. P. Peerenboom, op. cit. 
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the myriad things is a major theme, the Judeo-Christian metaphysics of creation ex 
nihilo can be a helpful model for articulating the Dao's origination and relation with 
the myriad things. It must be stated that Peerenboom rejects such a comparison. His 
reason is that the Judeo-Christian metaphysics of creation ex nihilo hinges upon a 
conception of transcendence that leaves no room for immanence because for him this 
model understands the creator and creation as absolutely apart. Thus: 
Dao is immanent in that the world is Dao differentiated into form. Dao 
as wu gives rise to Dao as yu which will return to wu in a continuous 
cycle of transformation. Moreover, not only is Dao immanent in the 
world, but because the world as wu and yu are both aspects of Dao, one 
is really talking about the ontological precedence of one of the two 
aspects of Dao and not transcendence of a separately existing entity. 
Daoist cosmogony, then, does entail not creatio ex nihilo as in the 
Judeo-Christian version.177  
While he rightly points out that a main emphasis of the text is the ontological 
precedence of the Dao, his rejection of the Judeo-Christian metaphysics of creation 
qua a metaphysics of absolute transcendence of creator and creation as a model for 
articulating Daoist cosmogony betrays a serious misunderstanding of the Judeo-
Christian conception of the creator-creation relation. This is most evident in his 
caricature of the Christian model as presupposing a transcendence that leaves no place 
for immanence.  
                                                 




I regard this as a gross misrepresentation. For the rest of this section, I will 
attempt to offer a true picture of the Judeo-Christian metaphysics of the relation 
between creator and creature. This will show that the creator both transcends creation, 
and at the same time is intimately bound up with creation. Here transcendence and 
immanence can be affirmed together. This analysis involves the metaphysics of the 
participation of being in Thomas Aquinas, or what has been traditionally called in 
scholastic terminology as the doctrine of limitation of act by potency. It will 
demonstrate not only the mutuality of transcendence and immanence of the Dao, but 
also explicate the namelessness of the Dao qua its lack of formality and the nameable 
dimension of the myriad things due to their formed nature.  
 
Unlimited Being 
St. Thomas' metaphysics of participation brings together both transcendence 
and immanence. That is to say, in specifying the relationship between creator and 
creature, the Thomistic account leaves room for affirming the presence of the creator 
in creation, just as it affirms its independence over and above creation. A 
representative text is to be found in St. Thomas' De Ente et Essentia. In this early text 
he writes, 
There are in fact three ways in which substances have essence. There is 
a reality, God, whose essence is his very being. This is why we find 
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some philosophers who claim that God does not have a quiddity or 
essence, because his essence is not other than his being…178   
Essence is found in a second way in created intellectual substances. 
Their being is other than their essence, though their essence is without 
matter. Hence their being is not separate but received, and therefore it 
is limited and restricted to the capacity of the recipient nature….179  
In a third way essence is found in substances composed of matter and 
form. In these too, being is received and limited, because they have 
being from another…180  
As Etienne Gilson remarks Thomas' doctrine of being (esse) which 
distinguishes a principle of existence separate from essences radically differentiates 
him from other metaphysicians. Against those who focus merely on the essential or 
formal sources of beings, St. Thomas articulates a principle which he calls esse, 
translated as “being”, which is an act or rather an active source of the existence of 
beings (ens). That is to say, central to St. Thomas' vision of reality is this principle he 
calls esse or being, which is responsible for the fact that being (ens) are rather than not. 
In the classic study, Being and Some Philosophers Gilson writes:  
                                                 
178 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia (On Being and Essence), Armand Maurer 
CSB (trans.), 2nd Edition (Toronto: Pontifical Institute Of Medieval Studies, 1968), 61 
179 ibid., 62 
180 ibid., 65 
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…..Thomas Aquinas could not posit existence [or being] (esse) as the 
act of a substance actualized by its form, without making a decision 
which, with respect to the metaphysics of Aristotle, was nothing less 
than a revolution. He had precisely to achieve the dissociation of the 
two notions of form and act. This is precisely what he has done and 
what probably remains, even today, the greatest contribution ever made 
by any single man to the science of being. Supreme in their own order, 
substantial forms remain the prime acts of their substances, but, though 
there be no form of the form, there is an act of the form. In other words, 
the form is such an act as still remains in potency to another act, 
namely existence [or being]. This notion of an act which is itself in 
potency was very difficult to express in the language of Aristotle. Yet, 
it had to be expressed, since even "those subsisting forms which, 
because they themselves are forms, do not require a formal cause for 
being one and being, do nevertheless require an external acting cause, 
which gives them to be." In other to receive its to be, a form must needs 
be in potency to it. "To be," then, is the act of the form, not qua form, 
but qua being.181  
 
                                                 




In the De Ente's concept of the way being (esse) and essence are related in the 
different orders of beings, St. Thomas concludes that there are three kinds of beings, 
whose metaphysical constitutions differ. There is first God, and then separate 
substances, which are the angels and the separated souls, and finally there are the 
composite substances, which refer to man and every other being that has a material 
principle. The important point in saying that God's essence is being itself is to assert 
the fact that nature of God is unlimited by any essential principle. This doctrine aligns 
itself with the theme of the namelessness of the Dao as owing to the lack of any 
formal principle. 
 
For those unfamiliar with Aquinas' metaphysical categories, to say that God is 
not constituted by a limiting essence and then to assert that he has an essence which is 
his being can sound like a contradiction. It seems like we are insisting that he both has 
and has not an essence. But we must distinguish essence as a logical principle and 
essence as a metaphysical principle. To say that God's essence is his being is to use 
“essence” as the logical place-holder when it comes to the variable “what”. To put it in 
another way, to say God's essence is his being is to answer the question, “what is 
God?”. In answering this question, we say that God's essence is his being in the sense 
that God is simply being, without referring to a metaphysical essence that would limit 
him. To ask for the “what” or “quiddity”) of something is to ask for the essence qua a 
logical place-holder or variable x. This x in its turn is a variable which will be an 
ontological principle that metaphysically limits being. One may ask, for example, 
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about the essence of nothing. The answer would be that the essence of nothing is 
complete privation. But this response in turn asserts that there is no presence of an 
ontological essence. This is because nothingness excludes the existence of everything 
including any ontological principles including that of an essence. One may logically 
assume that everything has an essence and therefore pose the question "what is it?" 
But this is not the same as saying that therefore everything has an ontological principle 
called an essence. Again, God's essence is pure being; his essence (logically) is 
essence-less (ontologically).  
 
If God is without a metaphysical essence, creatures, on the other hand are 
constituted by reception in such a metaphysical essence. Therefore in speaking of the 
second and third ways essences are found, he speaks of essences--whether simple or 
composite--which receive being and limit them. Because "everything that receives 
something from another is potential with regard to what it receives, and what is 
received in it is its actuality"182, hence the essence is also called the principle of 
potentiality, or simply potency, whereas being is called the principle of actuality, or 
simply, act. In this way pure being is called pure act, unlimited by any potency qua 
(metaphysical) essence, whereas creatures are constituted as composites of act and 
potency. Hence the scholastic principle, "act is limited by potency, without which act 
would altogether be unlimited" captures the grade of beings from God to rocks.  
                                                 




As I remarked a moment ago, the doctrine of the namelessness qua 
formlessness of the Dao in the Laozi, as read by Wang Bi, aligns itself very well with 
the Thomistic doctrine concerning the formal unlimitedness of the highest Being, who 
is God. This Being is not received in a formal principle, and hence is infinite. But 
more than that, it is precisely also because it is not received in a formal principle that it 
has no proper name, or rather it has a proper name which has no formal predicate. In 
the Contra Gentiles, St. Thomas writes,  
Everything, furthermore, exists because it has being. A thing whose 
essence is not its being, consequently, is not through its essence but by 
participation in something, namely, being itself. But that which is 
through participation in something cannot be the first being, because 
prior to it is the being in which it participates in order to be. But God is 
the first being, with nothing prior to Him. His essence, is therefore, His 
being.183  
To say that God's essence is His being is not to imply that essence as a formal 
ontological principle limits God in constituting Him. Rather, what St. Thomas means 
here is that all that God is—his quiddity, whatness—is simply being. Given that God 
does not participate--i.e., have a share of something from another—in being, there can 
be nothing ontologically prior to Him, in the sense of Him depending on it for being. 
                                                 
183 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 1, 22, 9-10, Anton Pegis, (trans.) 
(USA: UNDP, 1975), 120-1 
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Hence God must be the ontological source of his being, and therefore, his essence 
must be his being, since there is nothing else to confer being on Him. He, in his 
quiddity, must have being already, without having to obtain it from another. The point 
is that God is his own source of his existence or being (esse). His essence is his being. 
This means that his essence has no metaphysical essence which as a formal 
ontological principle limits him: his essence or quiddity is being rather than an essence, 
if the latter were the case, then his being would received as something extrinsic to his 
quiddity. Finally, if this were the case, then something is prior to God which is absurd, 
since God is first being. From this St. Thomas draws the following conclusion.  
This sublime truth Moses was taught by our Lord. When Moses asked 
our Lord: "If the children of Israel say to me: what is His name? What 
shall I say to them?" The Lord replied: "I AM WHO AM…Thou shalt 
say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" (Exod. 
3:13, 14). By this our Lord showed that His own proper name is HE 
WHO IS. Now names have been devised to signify the natures or 
essences of things. It remains, that the divine being is God's essence or 
nature."184  
Alternative interpretations of the Exodus text are not an issue here. What is 
central is the Thomistic teaching on the predication of God. Therefore, one could say 
that God, strictly speaking, is without a proper predicate. As St. Thomas explains, 
names are used to "signify the …essences of things". Here "essence" refers to the 
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logical place-holder called quiddity and not an ontological formal principle which 
receives being, which God does not have or need. God has no essence qua a receptive 
formal ontological principle. Therefore, God, HE WHO IS, is not HE WHO IS SUCH-
AND-SUCH, since "such-and-such" as a name signifies a metaphysical essence 
distinct from being (esse) which actualizes it. In other words, though God has a name, 
he does not have a name that signifies a metaphysical essence as a limiting principle, 
but merely being. This is the heart of the similarity between Thomas and Wang Bi's 
treatment of the namelessness of the Dao. 
  
One might think that for Aquinas, God has a name, whereas for Wang Bi, Dao 
is nameless, and therefore conclude that there is no fundamental agreement. But this 
would be a premature analysis. Though God has a name, this "name" as St. Thomas 
uses the term signifies God's logical essence. Strictly speaking, to the extent that if a 
name only signifies a formal principle such as a metaphysical essence, then God has 
no such name, and hence if we sought such a name for God, we could not find one. He 
has no formal ontological principle like a metaphysical essence. We can only find a 
name for him if we admit to the class of names such names which signify being (esse) 
apart from metaphysical essences. Similarly, Wang Bi, who restricts names (ming) to 
designating forms (xing) qua metaphysical principles, calls the Dao nameless, because 




And again, just as for Aquinas the essentially or formally unlimited being is 
the source of existence or being (esse) for all things other than itself, so also the Dao 
for Wang Bi. Hence again, 
That which is free from form and nameless is the progenitor of the 
myriad things.185  
Even though all things are completed by it [Dao], we do not see its 
form, for this is the most perfect thing…Do you wish to say that it does 
exist? Well, we do not see its form. Do you wish to say that it does not 
exist? Well, the myriad things are produced by it…Not one single thing 
fails to be completed, yet it never tires.186  
The second quotation returns us to the other theme of comparison, i.e., the 
immanence of the Dao and its parallel model in the Thomistic schema. As I pointed 
out the Thomistic model addresses well the immanence of the Dao analyzed in the 
beginning of this essay, as well as its transcendence. To understand this requires a 
return to doctrine of the participation of being in Aquinas' metaphysics, which is 
expressed in the language of Aristotle as the scholastic axiom, “act is limited by 
potency”.  
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St. Thomas Aquinas' vision of the dependency of creation upon the creator is 
fleshed out in terms of the sharing of being (esse) by creatures of the Being who is 
God, Being itself, Esse ipse. Though often framed in the Aristotelian schema of act 
and potency, as in "act is limited by potency", this doctrine seems also to have had a 
definitive antecedent in the Neoplatonic works after Aristotle. Norris-Clarke, for 
example, suggests that this original Neoplatonic doctrine of participation was 
expressed in the Aristotelian schema of act and potency when St. Thomas realized that 
the articulation of the participation motif in terms of act and potency preserved the 
unity of beings. 187  One source of this doctrine seems to have been the pseudo-
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic work, the Liber de Causis (Book of Causes), which is a 
summary of Proclus' theology. A critical analysis of chapter 5 of the De Ente reveals 
this to be the case. It is here that Thomas for the first time in the De Ente speaks of 
being (esse) as undergoing limitation by reason of the essence or nature that receives 
it.  
Essence is found in a second way in created intellectual substances. 
Their being is other than their essence, though their essence is without 
matter. Hence their being is not separate but received, and therefore it 
is limited and restricted to the capacity of the recipient nature.188  
                                                 
187 See W. Norris Clarke SJ, "The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or 
Neoplatonism?" in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being-God-Person. (USA: UNDP, 
1994) 65-88  
188 St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, op cit., 62 
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In analyzing the third line of the argument, we observe that there is a suppressed 
premise [#2]: 
 
1. Their being is…received… 
2. [what is received is received according to the mode of the receiver] 
3. …therefore it is limited and restricted to the capacity of the recipient nature  
What is instructive about this suppressed premise, which we may call the 
reception principle, is that it makes possible the reception of being limited by the 
nature of its recipient. Unless we suppose this principle, there is nothing to bring 
together limitation and the reception of being. There is nothing that requires reception 
to imply any kind of limitation. Therefore, central to St. Thomas' vision of the 
limitation of being is the endorsement of some form metaphysical limitation of being 
based on the mode of the receiver's being.  
 
This principle is found in the Book of Causes, which St. Thomas constantly 
cites as an authority for his concluded limitation of being. For example, under 
proposition 10 we read,  
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…anything receives what is above it only through the mode according 
to which it can receive it, not through the mode according to which the 
received thing [itself] is.189  
Again, under proposition 20, we also read, 
For the first goodness infuses all things with goodness in one infusion. 
But each thing receives that infusion according to the mode of its 
power and its being.190  
And still, under proposition 22:  
Therefore, the first goodness fills all the world with goodness. But 
every world receives that goodness only according to the mode of its 
potency.191  
St. Thomas' understanding of how this reception according to the mode of the 
recipient occurs specifies in detail how being is received “according to the mode of the 
receiver.” We know that the principle of essence cannot exist apart from the principle 
of being for it is the principle of being that grants the essence to be, i.e., to exist.  
                                                 
189 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes (Super Librum De Causis 
Expositio), (USA: CUA Press, 1996), 75. Here I am quoting not St. Thomas' 
commentary, but the texts of the De Causis itself. 
190 ibid., 120 
191 ibid., 128 
 206
 207
Hence being is very intimate to the structure of all creatures, since their essences are 
only thanks to the being which is composed with it. But there is something more.  
Thomas's writes in his commentary on the fourth proposition:  
if something were to have infinite power of being such that it does not 
participate in the being of another, then it alone would be infinite. Such 
is God…But, if there be something that has infinite power of being 
according to being that is participated from another, insofar as it 
participates [in that being] it is finite, because what is participated in is 
not received in the one according to its entire infinity but in the manner 
of a particular. Therefore an intelligence is composed of the finite and 
the infinite. [. . . ] to the extent that the nature of an intelligence is said 
to be infinite in its power of being, [it also must be said] that the being 
it receives is finite.192  
Here Aquinas mentions an infinity in its power of being that the intelligence or 
immaterial substance enjoys. What then is this “power of being” which is retained as 
infinite in the intelligence? Earlier Thomas quotes Proclus in his explanation thus:  
“All beingly being is infinite, not according to multitude or magnitude, 
but according to power alone,” namely, [the power] of existing.193  
                                                 
192 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, op. cit., 33 
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This argues that being qua power is received as infinite, but qua being it is received in 
proportion to a creature's finite essence. The fact that Aquinas speaks of “all beingly 
being”—i.e., all the being (esse) of beings (or creatures)—suggests that for him the 
infinity of power of existing is not enjoyed exclusively by intelligences alone but all 
creation. Thus creatures are sustained in existence with an infinity of power to be what 
they are within the limits of their essence.  The fact that there is an infinity of a power 
of being which creatures share from God shows that God, as it were, spares nothing in 
sharing his being—and therefore his own presence—with creatures.  He is as intimate 
as possibly can be to creatures, and any failure is on the side of creation as limiting 
essences.  
 
At this juncture we recall our argument with Peerenboom's thesis that the 
Judeo-Christian model is incompatible with a model of transcendent and immanent 
Dao. Being (in the sense of infinite being) is in principle both distinct from and at the 
same time intimate to all creation as the existential constituent in the realm of 
creatures. Being is in the world holding and sustaining its creatures in existence. That 
is to say, while being is transcendent to creatures, it is evermore so intimate to 
creatures that without being, no creature could in fact exist.  And we appreciate this 
even more when we consider that there is an infinity of the power of being which all 





To sum up: I have tried to offer an alternative reading of the namelessness of the 
Dao in accordance with the interpretation of Wang Bi which defends the Dao against 
the charge of absurdity. I have also tried to demonstrate the Dao's comparative 
similarities with the Thomistic metaphysics of the Unlimited Being, the “He who IS 
What”. My argument rests on Aquinas’ understanding of the dynamic power of esse 
(to be). I have argued that this whole idea of creation being sustained by this 
nonetheless radically other dynamic power of being is comparable to the Daoist 
emphasis on the transcendence and immanence of the source of things.   Flashing out 
this comparables does not of course erase the differences between these two 
ontologies.  For Aquinas, Being is always something ontically positive.  While not 
substantial in the sense that it is limited by a substantive form, it is that which stands 
out of nothingness, and is responsible for creation’s standing out of nothingness. It is 
not always definitively clear that Wang’s Laozi makes any positive ontic claim of the 
Dao.  Even though I have argued that there are some interpretive reasons for thinking 
that Wang may have taken his ontological arguments for a “Dao” as serious proposals 
for the existence of an ontic reality, we must bear in mind that there is no conclusive 
evidence for that. In Wang the Dao has often been described in terms which logically 
do not entail any positive claim of an ontic existent. We need not overlabor this point; 
it is well documented and clarified in Chan’s fine analysis.194  The Dao is often 
described with the concept of wu, which has been translated nothingness, as we read in 
Wang’s commentary to the opening lines: “anything that exists originates in 
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nothingness [wu]”.195   Wu for Wang signifies an absence rather than a presence. As 
Alan Chan points out, 
[D]ao is described essentially in terms of its namelessness and its 
generative force.  There is no clear ground to extend the concept of wu to 
mean “Nonbeing” in the sense of substance.  Although the concept of wu 
is central, for Wang [B]i the important point is precisely to eliminate any 
idea of “thingness” or “substance” from one’s contemplation of the 
meaning of the Way.196
 
God as “Dao” 
Still, we are now almost ready to resolve the issue we were left with in the last 
chapter.  For Wang the Dao is called the “Dao” because “it is that on which myriad 
things makes their”197.  Can the thomistic God also be called Dao?  We have argued 
that ontologically there are strong similarities between God and the Dao of Wang’s 
Laozi.  Both are nameless and formless. We might be tempted to quickly conclude 
based on these similarites that these titles “God” and “Dao” can be swapped.    But it 
is of course not as simple as that.  I will argue that the word Dao can be applied to 
Aquinas’ God, but the justification will require more than mere ontological similarities. 
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The difficulty is not the issue of applying a name to ontologically similar 
entities that might possibly turn out to be distinct.  The problem is not so much that 
they might not be the same things, even if they are similar.  In any case our claim is 
not so bold as to say that these ontologically similar “beings” or principles viz. God 
and the Dao are one and the same thing.  The problem has more to do with the method 
of applying a descriptive term like “Dao” to something formless and hence 
unnameable like the Dao.  
 Remember that for Wang, a name arises from the form of the object.  The form 
(xing) decides in great part what the name is. But when it comes to a designation, 
which is what we are dealing with, that which in great part decides on the designation 
is the subject or the designator.  That designator is you and me as we attempt to sign 
this nameless Dao, albeit clumsily: “To name is to determine objects. To designate is 
to follow what things are conventionally called. A name arises from the object, but a 
designation issues from the subjective.”198  Hence one same being may be designated 
in many ways: it depends not so much on the thing in itself, which for Wang would be 
the shape or form or appearance in itself. Rather, it depends on what that thing means 
to me, or what particular aspect of the thing I am trying to capture, deprived of any 
hint of its objective form.  It depends, as it were, on which of its many properties or 
qualities I am trying to capture.    
 Hence I can name a bull from its shape, and it has only one shape, hence it will 
have but one name. But I could designate the same bull in a variety of ways: I could 
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designate it as stomper, given its tendency to stomp the ground before it charges, or I 
could designate it as destroyer, given its tendency to ruin anything in its charging path.  
Thus it is the same with designating the Dao.  Deprived of any hint of the form for 
naming it, we can best designate the Dao.  But our designation will be determined by 
which aspect of the Dao we are trying to capture, given some particular quality we 
observed.   This is the issue here: what about that Dao that leads us to designate it as 
Dao?  If we want to see if the thomistic God can be called the Dao, then we need to 
see if it shares those qualities which the designation “Dao” were seeking to capture.  
And the question of whether the Dao and God are one and the same thing is not 
immediately relevant here because even if they were the same thing, they might still 
not be entitled to the same designation. If the qualities we use to designate the Dao in 
Chinese philosophy are not what are descriptively captured in Thomism, then, to 
designate the thomist God “Dao” would still be incorrect, even if objectively they are 
the same thing.  And the converse would equally be true: two distinct things can share 
the same designation, to the extent that they share the qualities that the designation 
refers to.  It is not so much what they are in themselves, but what we mean by these 
designations, such as “Dao”.  What qualities do the designating word “Dao” capture, 
and are these same qualities found in the thomistic account of God? That is the 
question. 
In order to answer this question, we need to get a better grip of what Wang really 
means when he says that “the term “Dao” is derived from the fact that it is that on 
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which the myriad things make their way”199  Parallel passages in the text are in 
Section 25:200   
We do not know its name 
Names are used to determine forms, but amorphous and complete, it has 
no form, so we cannot make any such determination.  Thus the text says 
that “we do not know its name.” 
So style it “Dao” 
Names are used to determine forms, and style names are used to designate 
attributes.  To speak of “Dao” is derived from that fact that absolutely 
nothing fails to follow it and because, of all the terms that might be used to 
address the “amorphous and complete,” this one has the broadest meaning. 
We are already familiar with the reason why the Dao is designated and not named.  
But what needs to be grasped now is why the Dao is designated as “Dao”, and Wang’s 
explanation is that it is that upon which all things necessarily follow and that Dao has 
the broadest meaning.  These two reasons are connected, as Wang’s commentary 
explains.  The reason why a term with the broadest meaning is needed seems to be the 
desire to avoid some restricted physicalist or materialist representation of the Dao.  
My conjecture is that this is motivated by the already clearly made point that the Dao 
has no physical form. Dao for Wang escapes this restricted physicalist meaning 
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because the notion of the “greatness” it is connected to has not such a restricted 
physicalist meaning.  Wang explains: 
Forced to give it a name, we call it “great.” 
“The reason we style it “Dao” is that, of all the terms that might be used to 
address it, this one has the broadest meaning.  Seeking the reason why this 
style name is assigned to it, we find that it is connected to the notion of 
“greatness”… 
“Great” refers to the way it goes forth.  
“Goes forth” means “operates,” so the meaning here is not restricted just to 
the single sense of great as in “great body.”  As it operates everywhere, 
there is no place it does not reach. Thus the text says: “goes forth” 
In other words, Wang is eager to adopt the word “Dao” because of its association with 
the notion of greatness.  This “greatness” does not mean spacial and physical vastness, 
like the case of a huge balloon. Rather it refers to the complete operative presence of 
the Dao.  This explains also why Wang says that the word “Dao” is derived from that 
fact that it is that on which all things necessarily follow: as designated by the word 
“great”, the Dao is all and everywhere operative.  
Thus far, the meanings attached to the designation “Dao” seem much in line 
with thomistic description of God as sustaining Being of all creation, thus present in 
all finite beings.  The unlimited Being is infinitely present in all beings, operatively 
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keeping them in existence. This seems to warrant applying the designation “Dao” to 
thomism’s God.  However, the commentary goes on to elaborate further on this far-
reaching operative presence of the Dao.   It makes the point that this Dao favors no 
particular direction of operation.  I bring this up because this seems inconsistent with 
what we said about God when we analyzed it from the point of view of the 
implications of normative precepts.   In chapter 4 we concluded that the God or 
Transcendent Warrant of the natural law theorist was a Transcendent Norm.  Meaning: 
this God must have intentionally willed our epistemic faculties to work this way rather 
than that, so that they would deliver these precepts rather than others.  This implies 
that this Norm or God favors things to be this way rather than another, and seriously 
chose to have created this kind of thing and not another.  Its choice to create and 
sustain this rather than that is not willy-nilly, but normatively made. To It, it is right, 
good, or correct for things to be this way rather than that.  If that is the case, we need 
to see if there is any real inconsistency between Wang’s Dao for which there is “no 
particular direction of operation that it favors over any other”201 and such the thomistic 
Norm, God.  Let us look at the stanza: 
“Goes forth” describes how it is far-reaching, and “far-reaching” 
describes its reflexivity. 
“Far reaching” means “to reach the ultimate.”  As it operates everywhere, 
there is both nothing that lies beyond its infinite reach and no particular 
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direction of operation that it favors over any other.  Thus the text says: “far 
reaching”.202   
We need to get a better sense of what exactly Wang means by saying that the Dao 
favors no particular direction of operation.   A passage further down in the same 
section offers some clues.  There the text gives the order of the modeling of the 
Natural, with Dao modeling after the Natural followed by the Heaven and Earth 
modeling the Dao, followed in turn by the modeling of Earth by Man.  The 
commentary runs like this: 
“To take models from” means “to follow the example of”.  It is by taking 
his models from Earth that Man avoids acting contrary to Earth and so 
obtains perfect safety.  It is by taking its models from Heaven that Earth 
avoids acting contrary to Heaven and so achieves its capacity to uphold 
everything.  It is by taking its models from the Natural that the Dao avoids 
acting contrary to the Dao and so achieves its capacity to cover everything.  
It is by taking Its models from the Natural that the Dao avoids acting 
contrary to the Natural and so realizes its own nature.  To take models 
from the Natural means that when it exists as a square, it takes squareness 
as its model, and when it exists in a circle, it takes circularity as its model: 
it does nothing that is contrary to the Natural.203  
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Wang’s commentary makes one major point which runs across his explanation.  What 
Wang understands the text as prescribing is: that one must avoid acting in a way that 
violates the original structure of things.  Instead, one should act by following the 
original structure of things.  As the text says, one should model, via Earth, Heaven and 
then the Dao, ultimately the Natural, which in turn means modeling oneself after the 
natural structure of things.  Focusing on the Dao, it says that it models itself after the 
Natural, which is to model the natural structure of things. This seems immensely 
vague still.  Nevertheless, this much may be gathered.  The Dao ultimately models 
itself after the natural structure of things.  That is, it does not impose anything 
different from the original structure of things; quite the contrary, it takes after that 
original structure.  This seems to fit in nicely with the earlier claim that the Dao 
operates without favoring any particular direction of operation: because the Dao 
models after the original structure of things, clearly it has no particular preference for 
a certain structure. Therefore the Dao can be said to operate without favoring any 
particular direction of operation.  No one operation is preferred: rather it simply takes 
on the mode of operation of whichever being it finds itself in.  It models itself after the 
natural structure of things, and does not impose a preferred structure on things.   This 
seems to me the general line of thought.  
 If that is the case, then the basic idea is not at all that the Dao bring things into 
being and sustains them towards completion after the manner of an accidental, willy-
nilly big bang.  Rather it means simply that it does not attempt to impose a foreign 
structure on things; instead it moves in the very direction of the thing, or it models 
itself after the thing.  This does not mean that as it models the thing it does not favor 
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this very thing being what it is.  Quite the contrary; if the Dao models the Natural by 
modeling after the structure of each thing then it seems to me it prefers that things be 
what they are, rather than that they be re-constructed into something else.  Hence to 
say that there is no particular direction of operation that it favors over any other is 
precisely that: it does not favor one particular direction of operation over any other.  
But it does favor each thing fulfilling each its original line of operation.  From this it 
seems to me fair to conclude that nothing implied in the designation of the Dao would 
be inconsistent with the notion of a Transcendent Norm, as is the God of the thomist 
or natural law theorist.  Hence, there need not be too much of an obstacle to 
designating the thomist God “Dao”. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have compared the Thomistic concept of God and Wang Bi’s 
Laozi’s Nameless and Formless Dao.  Rather interestingly, both share the idea that the 
Ontological Origin of things is metaphysically unlimited. By examining Wang’s 
theory of language,  I also argued that there is no difficulty in applying “Dao” to the 
Thomistic God.  It seems then that natural law theory too, like Wang’s Laozi, has its 
own philosophical analysis of the “Dao” as the source of the desired political 
community. Thus we end this chapter.  And we move on to the next, which examines 
how Wang’s non-interventionist politics of the Dao finds correspondences in the 










What Not To Do: Against Moral Legalism and Religious Coercion 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will argue for parallels in Wang’s Daoist/Nameless/Formless 
politics of non-intervention and what I would defend as a Natural Law political theory 
that resists religious and moral legalism. Both traditions (in their own way) grasp the 
importance of a metaphysics of Dao/God, although neither of these political theories 
are grounded in a metaphysics of the Dao/God.  Although Wang’s Laozi speaks of 
honoring the Dao in politics, the “Dao” refers not to the metaphysical ontic Dao so 
much as the non-interventionist politics of namelessness and formlessness.  This 
politics of non-intervention is recommended on the basis of projected human behavior.  
Similarly, natural law political theorizing recognizes the importance of the recognition 
of God for practical reason’s and Law’s normative credibility, but would resist using 
the law to coerce religious adherence and compliance with practical reasonableness for 
the sake of strengthening the Rule of law.  These strategies are recommended not on 
account of a metaphysics of God, but based on the structures of practical reason and 




Honoring the Dao 
Wang’s Laozi writes: 
… the myriad things without exception must honor the Dao and esteem 
virtue. 
The Dao is the origin of all things, and virtue is the power behind their 
potential. It is only after they originate that they have a potential, so this is 
why they must honor the Dao.  Any neglect of virtue will result in harm, 
so this is why they must esteem it. 204
Few contemporary commentaries of Daoist scholarship examine this passage, except 
Alan Chan’s Two Visions, from which I draw instruction.205    Indeed this passage is 
very fascinating. This passage points out that the myriad creatures must honor the Dao, 
which is the source of their being. The Laozi text points out that this honoring is 
spontaneous: “This honoring of the Dao and this esteeming of virtue, none are ordered 
to do so, yet it always happens spontaneously”206.  Wang’s commentary however does 
not make clear why the myriad things honor the Dao.  What he does add is that they 
“must” honor the Dao because the Dao is their origin.   
A few questions are relevant here.  Does Wang read the Laozi as endorsing 
some kind of natural theism here, when it says that the myriad things spontaneously 
honor the Dao?  That is, is Wang saying as a matter of fact that they do, whether they 
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ought to or not? This may be the case, but certainly there is a further normative claim.  
The further claim is not only that they do, but that they “must”. Hence Wang seems to 
suggest that their honoring is somehow required, obligatory, something that should or 
ought to be done.  And he gives the reason for this. For Wang the myriad things must 
honor the Dao because the Dao is their origin: “the Dao is the origin of all things…it is 
only after they originate that they have potential, so this is why they must honor the 
Dao”207  Still this is vague. Why is it the case that one should honor one’s origins?  Is 
it a matter of gratitude?  This seems to me the most immediate explanation and a 
natural reading.     If this is what Wang means, then when insisting that the myriad 
things must honor the Dao, Wang is simply insisting on something like a courteous 
response on the part of the myriad things.  They must honor their origin because it is a 
requirement of courtesy and of gratitude.  If however we do not, we are merely being 
ingrate or rude.   
However, a more sophisticated reading of why the myriad things must honor 
the Dao may be possible. The sophisticated reading suggests that the honoring of the 
Dao has more at stake than courtesy.  Intermittent the discussion of honoring the Dao 
is Wang’s explanation of why we must esteem virtue.  And his explanation is not 
because it would be rude or ingrate.  His reason is that there might be ill consequences.  
His concern is about the harms that will ensue absent this esteem: “Any neglect of 
virtue will result in harm, so this is why they must esteem it.”  Hence as I see it, Wang 
may be thinking generally about the bad consequences in this part of the commentary, 
and not merely about etiquette. So, as in the case of the esteeming virtue, the 




requirement that the myriad things honor of the Dao need not just be merely an 
insistence that the myriad things express gratitude for their existence.   
It may be difficult to see how failing to honor the Dao can lead to ill effects, 
until we import into our interpretation the idea that Dao is often metaphorically read as 
the doctrine of non-intervention.   As pointed out in the early chapters of our thesis, 
Wang Bi’s Laozi plays on the equivocations of the terms “names/nameless” and 
“forms/formless”.  By equivocating on these terms, the discourse subtly shifts from 
one subject matter to another: from semiotics to politics, and then to metaphysics.   It 
is likely that the same kind of literary shift is operating here.   When Wang is talking 
of the Dao as worthy of honor, he may be referring to the Dao qua the Nameless and 
the Formless.   But the “Nameless and Formless” also refers, in another sense, to the 
political strategy of non-intervention (wuwei).  For Wang, this political strategy of 
non-intervention is what best promotes the beneficial and moral society, because 
interventionist efforts to cultivate morality in people through threats of punishments or 
promises of rewards only encourage inauthentic moral action or more devious evasion 
of the law.  (See Chapter 1 and 2)  In other words, “we must honor the Dao” means 
that we must respectfully apply the political strategy of non-intervention, or else ill 
social effects will result.    
My reading finds corroboration in Alan Chan’s analysis.  He quotes Wang Bi’s 
commentary on chapter 57 of the Laozi and explains: 
[Laozi] Text  Wang Bi’s Commentary 
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Thus the sage says: I take no 
action and the people are 
transformed.  I love 
tranquility and the people are 
of themselves rectified.  I do 
not engage in affairs and the 
people of themselves become 
rich. I have no desire and the 
people of themselves become 
simple.  
What the ruler above desires 
the people will follow 
quickly.  If what I desire is 
only to have no desires, then 
the people will have no 
desires and become simple of 
their own accord.  These four 
[nonaction, tranquility, 
nonactivity, no desire] 
indicate honoring the root so 
as to put to rest the branches. 
 
These comments describe well the ideal state of the [Laozi], as represented 
by Wang [Bi].  By [wuwei], “honoring the root”, the sage will lead the 
people away from falsehood and return to the true.  The assumption is that 
people will follow the sage as a matter of course.  They will have few 
desires; they will not “avoid” the ruler, as Wang [Bi] puts it in a number of 
places.  At the same time however, they will hardly know the sage is 
governing at all.  Specific policies or techniques of government are not the 
issue here.  The political vision of Wang [Bi] is centered on the claim that 
the transforming power of [Dao], exemplified by the ideal ruler, would 
permeate “naturally” the minds and hearts of the people.  When Wang [Bi] 
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went to see the prime minister Tsao Shuang, he probably talked about this, 
as opposed to the abstract meaning of [Dao] in itself.  This, I suspect, is 
also why Tsao Shuang laughed at him.”208
Paradoxically then, when Wang is speaking of honoring the Dao, he was not engaging 
in metaphysical discourse.  Rather, he was simply saying that one should not engage 
in the policy of interventionist politics.  And the philosophical justification for this is 
again not Daoist metaphysics; his non-interventionist politics is grounded in the way 
he thinks human nature will respond to social intervention. 
In this way also, the talk of “virtue” (de) as if it results from (honoring) the 
Dao becomes understandable. Because the political social policy of Nameless and 
Formless non-intervention (i.e., the Dao qua wu ming and wu xing ) gets the desired 
result, it is that very virtue or efficacy (de) that obtains or gets (de) the good effects 
and avoids the ill consequences.  Failure to honor the Dao then becomes the neglect of 
virtue or efficacy (de), since it is the failure to do what gets (de) the desired 
consequences.   Again, we agree with Alan Chan, who writes: 
“Chapter 38 of the [Laozi] is especially concerned with the idea of virtue 
(de).  According to Wang [Bi], virtue means to “obtain” or “attain” (de), 
playing on the homonymic relation of the two words.   How can one 
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“obtain virtue”?  Through [Dao], and more specifically by taking wu as 
“function”, which is to say to follow the Way.”209
Finally my interpretation also makes sensible the notion of the Sage Ruler as 
embodying the Dao, or being one in body with the Dao (yu Dao tong ti).   This does 
not mean metaphysically one’s body is substantially united or indistinguishable with 
the Dao.  Rather, as in the case with “honoring the Dao”, the “Dao” here refers to the 
Nameless and Formless, which is the metaphor for the Nameless and Formless politics 
of non-intervention.  Hence “being one in body with the Dao” refers not to any kind of 
substantial unity between the Sage, but rather refers to the idea that the Sage is one 
who adopts the policy of (the Dao qua nameless and formless) non-interventionist 
politics.  Alan Chan’s analysis gels well with our interpretation: 
“In Chapter 23 Wang Bi describes the follower of the Way as “one ti with 
[Dao]” (yu Dao tong ti).  This may indeed seem to justify the use of 
“substance” in redering ti in this context.  But Wang [Bi] goes on to say, 
one who seeks to “attain” (de) virtue is also “one ti with attainment,” and 
one who “loses” it is one ti with loss.”  If one does not wish to extend the 
same metaphysical meaning of “substance” to “attainment” and “loss”, 
which I do not, it is better to render the literary expression of the type yu x 
tong ti in a verbal sense as “embodying x” or metaphorically as “one body 
with x,” or simply “one with x.”  The word “literary” is emphasized here 
because of Wang [Bi’s] fine skill as a writer, though generally recognized, 
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does not appear to have been taken much into account in current 
interpretations of his work.”210
 
Natural Law Theory and God 
Natural Law Theory would also have compelling reasons to require that God 
or the Dao be “honored”; Natural Law theorists recognize that there is a sense in 
which the recognition of the existence of the Transcendent warrant, God, is important.  
Further, like Wang, Natural Law theory would also have reservations about 
intervening with the law to promote practical reasonableness for strengthening the 
Rule of Law.  
The requirement to honor or acknowledge the existence of God follows 
philosophically from the Rule of Law. This is quite unlike the clever and literary 
construction of Wang’s argument, where “Dao” signifies not the metaphysical source 
of all beings but the politics of non-intervention. Here “God” has a metaphysical 
referent. Recall the following. A careful study of the sources of legal obligation and 
the rule of law reveals practical reasoning’s normativity at its heart (Chapter 5).  
Law’s normativity derives from the normativity inherent in practical reasons, for there 
is no other source of normativity.  Further, we have also seen (in Chapter 6) that the 
denial of any Transcendent Warrant for our practical reasons ultimately undermines 
the very credibility of these reasons.   For: the affirmation that there is no Normative 
Intention in the origin of our epistemic capacities and ipso facto the epistemic 
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deliverances of these capacities calls into question the normativities contained in these 
deliverances.  After all, if things came to be by mere chance, then reason’s practical 
norms—which counsels that such and such ought to be this way rather than any 
other—are at best an illusion.   Finnis’ recent analysis of secularism’s explicit denial 
of God potently makes our point.  He writes: 
 
…denials that there is any transcendent source of meaning and value in 
human existence and opportunity tend to unravel the structure of practical 
reason and corrode its efficacy.  For practical reason directs us towards 
states of affairs which should, according to practical reason, be made to 
obtain, but do not obtain.  Imagination, memory, desire, aversion, and 
inertia all direct us towards other attractive states of affairs, alternative to 
those picked out by reasons considered fully reasonably.  If practical 
reason considered fully reasonably has no transcendent ratification – no 
further intelligibility than that it is what we inexplicably find as one aspect 
of our psychic structure – its place in deliberation is understandably 
subject to usurpation, displacement, by alternative sources of 
directiveness: the passions in all their raw, spiritual, rationalized, and 
conventionalised forms.  Their constitutional ruler loses one of its titles to 
legitimacy and allegiance.  The pungent Nietzschean apothegm asserts that 
if God is dead everything is permitted, and though it is psychologistic, not 
logical (as is signaled by the logical absurdity of “God is dead”), the 
apothegm on that plane makes a fair diagnosis of practical reason’s loss of 
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intelligibility and desirability if a secularist denial or discounting of divine 
wisdom and providence becomes one’s working presupposition. 211
  
Given the tight philosophical relation between the secularist denial of any 
Transcendent Warrant (such as God or Dao) and the weakening of reason’s 
attractiveness and credibility, it would also seem fair to suggest that a statesman eager 
to enhance the rule of law would do what lies in his power to erase such denials.   A 
society where people practice religions implicitly recognizing such a Warrant like God 
would be most congenial with the acceptance of practical reason’s normativity.  At 
least, such a society would be least threatening to the credibility of practical reason’s 
normativity.212 A statesman may be eager to create this state of affairs.  Here again, a 
historically favored way to do this had been to suggest that one legally coerce the 
recognition (both performative and verbal) of such a God or a Dao.213  Such coercion 
is usually manifested as punitive pressures to participate in public expressions of this 
recognition.   Here the law enters into the spiritual domain by coercing religious 
worship.  
                                                 
211 John Finnis, “Secularlism, Law and Public Policy”, forthcoming in Robert P 
George, (ed.), Faith, Secularism and Public Policy.  I am thankful to Professor Finnis 
for making his splendid paper available to me before its publication.      
212 This is philosophically true, even if historically false. Many religions commend 
that their adherents abandon natural reason’s guidance.  But the kind of religion I am 
thinking of here as worth enforcing will not commend the abandonment of reason. It is 
this kind of religion with its implicit acknowledgement of a Warrant or God that I am 
proposing may have been thought of as worth enforcing, although I eventually argue 
against this. 
213 Besides the rather obvious program of preaching the reality of the existence of such 
a God.  
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Again, one may wish to use the law to enforce punitive measures against those 
who dismiss practical reasoning’s direction.   A policy of applying punitive measures 
to try to coerce a people’s acknowledgement of the normativity of practical principles 
in the form of the first principles and in the form of its derivations will not be too 
different.  Both will be concerned with punishing immorality, since immorality 
includes deviations from either the first principles or its later derivations.  An 
examination of attempts to use punishment and rewards to reinforce practical 
reasoning therefore includes a study of punishment’s effects on not merely our grasp 
of the first principles, but also of the principles that follow from these.  That is, a study 
of the efficacy of punishing immorality can at once examine the effects of punishment 
on our grasp of the natural law, or of morality.    
 
An internal examination of the data of practical reasons gives rise to an 
account of human nature214, and also an account of metaphysical reality.215  My task in 
the following is to use that information to explain why religious and moral legalism is 
counter-productive.  As Finnis would have put it: “there is thus a movement to and 
from between, on the one hand, assessment of human good and of its practical 
requirements, and on the other hand, explanatory descriptions (using all appropriate 
historical, experimental, and statistical techniques to trace all relevant causal 
interrelationships) of the human context in which human well-being is variously 
                                                 
214 See John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (NY: OUP, 1998). 
90-94.  
215 see ibid., 294-298. Also John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980), 371-410.  Also see previous chapter. 
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realized and variously ruined.” 216    Attentiveness to the structure of practical 
reasoning’s modus operandi reveals that practical reasoning, both in form of the first 
principles (i.e., as natural law) and in its later derivations (i.e., as moral norms) cannot 
be enhanced by punishment or rewards. Religious coercion (call this ‘Religious 
legalism’) is futile because what is begotten is not authentic religion; the socially 
destructive denials of God persist despite the coerced pretenses. Also, policies of 
punishing immorality through the law, commonly called moral legalism, lead instead 
to counter-productive and frustrating effects, contrary to the hoped for ideal of a 
people with a strong grasp of practical reasoning and its normative implications.    As 
natural law theorists seeking to promote the Rule of Law which coordinates the pursuit 
of common goods (because practical reason directs that: these common basic goods 
ought to be sought and promoted), we may conclude that these policies should not be 
adopted. 
 
Rejoining The Hart-Devlin Debate 
In a recent work, the natural law theorist Robert P George rejoins the Hart-
Devlin debate.  Devlin had argued that not enforcing shared morality leads to the 
disintegration of society, whereas Hart had replied that this would not occur. In his 
Making Men Moral, George asks whether morals laws should be legally enforced, and 
surveying the arguments in the debate between Devlin and Hart, he gives an 
affirmative answer.  George’s discussion is relevant for our purpose, because like him 
we are interested in the legal enforcement of morality for the purpose of making men 
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moral, although this will not be our final end.  We are interested in making men moral 
for the sake of strengthening the rule of law.  As was pointed out, the recognition of 
the normativity of legal rules derives in great part from our prior recognition of the 
normative precept from which the legal rule was determined (determinatio). But we 
can build on his discussion and borrow his insights on the effects of moral legalism.  
We begin by locating ourselves in that debate. George had argued against Hart 
that Devlin means by ‘society’ not merely the physical peaceful co-existence of 
persons within a geographical limit, but includes some form of social and 
interpersonal integration and co-ordination, all of which implies a structure built on a 
belief consensus.217 Thus, if this social co-ordination and integration is disintegrated, 
the mere peaceful co-existence that subsists would not constitute the subsistence of a 
‘society’, but something less than a society. Hence society would indeed be destroyed. 
Nonetheless Devlin’s case cannot stand as it is. The criticism George has for Devlin is 
that Devlin errs in insisting that shared morality simpliciter should be enforced and at 
the same time rejects the additional premise that such a shared morality must be 
sound.  So George writes: 
 
…even in circumstances in which social cohesion is imperiled, as 
Devlin correctly supposed it could be, by the erosion of a hitherto 
dominant morality, a concern for social cohesion per se is not a 
sufficient ground for enforcing moral obligations.218  
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George thinks the reason for Devlin’s refusal to admit the legal credentials of a sound 
morality as opposed to merely a shared morality is that Devlin is a moral non-
cognitivist.  In insisting against Devlin that moral knowledge is possible, George 
represents correctly the realist tradition he calls the Central Tradition (i.e., the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition). In the name of that tradition, George then argues that 
one should endorse the legal enforcement of sound moral norms:  
 
The justification of morals laws cannot prescind, as Devlin supposed it 
could, from the question of the moral truth of the obligations they 
enforce. A concern for social cohesion around a shared morality can 
justify some instances of the enforcement of morals, but only if that 
morality is true.219
 
We join the debate here, but to disagree with him. While a great admirer of George’s 
work on natural law, I think here is something that needs to be debated. And I too hail 
to come from the Central Tradition, so-called.  Still as a thomist very sympathetic to 
the natural law theory developed by John Finnis (and Germain Grisez) which George 
builds on, my aim is not to simply split ways with George, but really to point out that 
their very own remarks actually do not cohere with George’s own conclusion on this 
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matter.220  I will try to sieve out what I think are the many brilliant insights in 
George’s own work here in question which sanction a stronger separation between 
private morality and its legal enforcement.  I will not debate if a shared sound morality 
leads to social cohesion.  Rather my point will question if there will be a shared sound 
morality at all after the enforcement of morals.  Will people actually develop a 




George continues his analysis with the question of religious freedom because 
of its connection with any theory of ‘moral liberty’.  This is fortunate for us because a 
discussion of the question of religion freedom is also pertinent to our analysis of how 
the enforcement of religion may correct the undermining of practical reason by 
secularist denials of the Transcendent Warrant, God.  He  writes: 
I maintain that the right to religious freedom is grounded precisely in 
the value of religion, considered as an ultimate intelligible reason for 
action, as basic good. Like other intrinsic values, religion can constitute 
a reason for political action; government need not, and should not, be 
indifferent to the value of religion.  The nature of that value is such, 
however, that it simply cannot be realized or well served by coercive 
imposition.  Any attempt by government to coerce religious faith and 
                                                 
220 Finnis is in fact less enthusiastic when it comes to endorcing paternalism. See his 
Aquinas, op. cit.,  222-228. He reads Aquinas as understanding the role of the state to 
be limited only to external acts related to peace and justice, not internal dispositions. 
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practice, even true religious faith and practice, will be futile, at best, 
and likely to impair people’s participation in the good of religion. 
While religious liberty…is not absolute, government has compelling 
reasons to respect and protect religious freedom.221
 
The important point George is making here is that even though religion is a 
good, it is a good that can be participated by the subject only if he is to participate it in 
a certain manner, namely, sans coercion.  This derives from the nature of religion as a 
reflexive good, i.e., “objects of choice whose value depends on their being freely 
chosen.”222  So, “as interior acts, religious acts cannot be compelled.  If they are not 
freely done, they are simply not done at all.”223  
There is ample evidence how coercive enforcement of religion in effect short-
circuits one’s ability to experience the good of religion.  Enforcement entices the 
coerced with the objective of escaping from pain, so that it is not religion as such that 
is aimed at, but mere external compliance for the sake of other physical and hedonistic 
goods.  George writes, for example,  
 
Communion with God, if God exists, is like communion with other 
persons in its reflexivity; it is not communion unless it represents a free 
self-giving, unless it is the fruit of a choice to enter into a relationship 
of friendship, mutuality or reciprocity.  Such a relationship simply 
                                                 
221 Robert P George, op. cit.,, 220 Italics mine. 
222 see ibid., 221, note 15 
223 ibid., 221 
 235
 236
cannot, in the nature of the thing, be established by coercion. Coercion 
can only damage the possibility of an authentic religious faith, a true 
realization of the human good of religion.  Coercion deflects people 
from really choosing that human good, for it seeks to dominate their 
deliberations with the prospect of a quite different good—of freedom 
from imminent pain, loss, or other harms, or of some other non-
religious advantage.224  
 
Surely George is on the mark. Coercion is simply counter productive; in order to 
encourage anyone’s participation of the good of religion, there must be a sphere of 
freedom.  The person who has religion imposed on him through threat and complies 
tends to have his practical syllogism reduced to a quest ultimately of the good of 
freedom from pain, rather than the substantive truths of religion as such. When he 
considers why he should obey or give (superficial) assent to them, he is motivated, 
under threat, by the quest for hedonistic goods.  
It is of course possible that a person under threat might still truly seek religion. 
Yet if that were so, it is not achieved by the threat at all; such a person seeks religion 
not because of the threats, but despite the threats. He or she must already see it as a 
worthy point of interest.  Hence the threat is at least superfluous.  But it is not just 
harmlessly superfluous. It becomes a hindrance to the true participation of the good of 
religion, because it tends practical deliberation towards intentions directed at pleasure 
(or freedom from pain) rather than the good of faith.  And this is true not merely for 
                                                 
224 ibid. 222 
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threats, but for promises of pleasures as well.  This is because the increase of pleasure 
is also the removal of pains.  So just as equally, influencing a person with promises of 
honors or recognition for seeking a religion tends to displace any authentic religious 
motives and distract his practical deliberation with temptations of such non-religious, 
hedonistic motives. 
Of course, if the threat is not too violent (say, people who do not seek the good 
of religion are not entitled to tax refunds on the donations they give to charities), or if 
the pleasure is not too intense (say, people with religion are invited to a government 
funded dinner function to honor them just once a year), then the distraction is 
diminished.  And the avoidance of pain is less likely to be the only reason for 
compliance.  In any case, such things can be artfully done:  the law can have very light 
penalties for non-religiosity. Some very sensitive persons will be deflected, others will 
not be.  These other persons, then, will see the good of religion, and comply with the 
law without the mere desire to avoid the penalties.  So, if the good of religion cannot 
always be coerced successfully, there still are chances of success.   Perhaps over a 
long period of time, after repeated “soft” coercion, some will come around to see the 
point of religion as something worth seeking.   Underlying these kinds of reasoning is 
the assumption that somehow, it is possible to impress the good of religion in another.  
  But this will not work either.  This has to do with the fact that what is 
normative for me is not necessarily normative for another.   Now do not 
misunderstand.  I am not saying that the precepts of the natural law are not 
normatively true for all persons.  They are, and in this sense they are normative for me 
and for you.  But in another sense, the normativity of the natural law is not 
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transferable:  all one can do is to agree with what someone else finds normative.  Take 
a precept of the natural law, like, “one should not kill the innocent  (or what is the 
same: one should promote the good of life)”.   This precept is normative for all 
persons, because all persons, to the extent that they have the natural law, will be bound 
by it.  They will agree with its normative obligatoriness.  But they do not agree with 
the precept in the sense of passively receiving this precept; rather, they find that their 
own practical thinking coheres with this precept.   And since it is the natural law 
which obliges one to seek the good of religion, so also the obligation to seek the good 
of religion cannot be transferred or grafted into another.  The following will try to 
demonstrate this. 
 
Do You See What I See? 
John Courtney Murray once wrote: 
 
Man’s native condition as a moral subject, who confronts demands of a 
transcendent order of truth and goodness, requires that he be 
surrounded by a zone or sphere of freedom within which he may take 
upon himself the ineluctable burden—that of responsibility for his own 
existence.  This requirement for an environment of freedom is more 
stringent in what concerns man’s relation with God.  This relation is 
personal in that it is immediate, a relation of person to person.  
Therefore it is to freely entered, in response to the divine initiative.  
And in further consequence, the responsibility for the nature of the 
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response, whether acceptance or rejection, in inexorably a personal 
responsibility, not to be shared with others or assumed by others, much 
less shifted onto others.  On all these counts it clearly appears that 
coercion brought to bear upon the human subject, especially in what 
concerns his relation with God, is not only a useless irrelevance but 
also a damaging intrusion.  It does injury to man’s personal autonomy.  
It stupidly seeks to replace what is irreplaceable.  It does violence to 
the very texture of the human condition, which is a condition of 
personal responsibility.225
 
There is a point to Murray’s remark that religious choice is a personal 
responsibility that is not transferable, and I wish to recast in greater detail the point in 
the context of the (neo-thomistic) natural law theory much developed by John Finnis 
(and Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle), and brought forward by George himself—
who in writing that “no one can search for religious truth, hold religious beliefs, or act 
on them authentically, for someone else”226  makes the same point—although on 
particular conclusions further down regarding moral legalism George and I will be 
diametrically opposed.  Still I hope this be not so much interpreted as an opposition to 
their theory, but an effort to collaborate in its development. But returning to the issue 
at hand, here we delve more deeply into the nature of practical reasoning and the 
structure of its first principles—i.e., natural law, or what John Finnis calls the “non-
                                                 
225 John Courtney Murray, “The Declaration of Religious Freedom: A Moment in Its 
Legislative History”, in Religious Liberty: An End and A Beginning, John Courtney 
Murray SJ (ed), (NY: Macmillan, 1966), 39-40, italics mine. 
226 Robert P George, op. cit., 220 
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transparency of ethics”. Recall that in Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis 
maintains that there are many underived first principles of natural law: 
 
…Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that the first principles of 
natural law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil and which 
can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and not just 
by metaphysicians), are per se nota, (self evident and indemonstrable). 
They are not inferred from speculative principles. They are not inferred 
from facts.  They are not inferred from metaphysical presuppositions 
about human nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about the 
‘function of a human being’, nor are they inferred from a teleological 
conception of nature or any conception of nature. They are not inferred 
or derived from anything. They are underived (though not innate). 
Principles of right and wrong, too, are derived from these first, pre-
moral principles of practical reasonableness.227  
 
Concurrent to this understanding of natural law is a hermeneutic that Aristotle and 
Aquinas’ speculative conclusions about human nature and the metaphysics of reality 
are buttresses of a purely non-theoretical but practical moral theory. To point out that 
Aristotle and Aquinas’ moral theories are non-theoretical but practical is not to make 
a trivial point.  Although the mind is not two but one, nevertheless practical reasoning 
excludes merely thinking about what to do simply in order to know what to do.  
                                                 
227 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, op. cit., 33-34 
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Theoretical thinking, which is thinking primarily in order to know, is distinguished 
from practical thinking. In fact, practical thinking is thinking in order to act. Practical 
thinking, is really a kind of thinking which works on a different kind of logic.     
 
When discerning what is good, to be pursued (prosequendum), 
intelligence is operating in a different way, yielding a different logic, 
from when it is discerning what is the case (historically, scientifically, 
or metaphysically); but there is no good reason for asserting that the 
latter operations of intelligence are more rational than the former.228
 
This notion of practical thinking governs his interpretation of Aristotle and Aquinas.  
In Fundamentals of Ethics, when explicating Aristotle’s idea of ethics as a practical 
enterprise, he writes: 
 
The philosopher [Aristotle] who may be said to have initiated, and 
named, the academic pursuit called ethics also called that pursuit 
‘practical’.  The knowledge that one may gain by that pursuit is, he 
said, ‘practical knowledge’.  People usually water down these claims of 
Aristotle’s…The misunderstanding goes like this: Aristotle just meant 
that the subject matter in ethics is human action (praxis), or opinions 
about human action, or opinions about right human action, or right 
opinions about human action, or all of these topics.  
                                                 




…Of course, each of those topics is an aspect, more or less central, of 
the subject-matter of ethics.  But in calling ethics practical, Aristotle 
had much more in mind.  He meant that one does ethics properly, 
adequately, reasonably, if and only if one is questioning and reflecting  
in order to be able to act—i.e., in order to conduct one’s life rightly, 
reasonably, in the fullest sense ‘well’.  And doubtless he had in mind 
that the questioning and reflecting which constitute the academic 
pursuit itself are themselves actions, the actions or conduct of you or 
me or Aristotle or those of his students who took his course 
seriously.229
 
But Finnis then goes one step further: not only is practical thinking about what is to be 
done, but also what I think is to be done. This phenomenological difference in 
practical thinking and theoretical thinking is analyzed as a difference in the object of 
one’s intentionality. When I am thinking theoretically about p, my intention falls 
precisely on p as the object. Theoretical thinking about p obeys what Finnis calls 
‘transparency’, and what I gather by transparency is that the person making that 
statement in theoretical thinking is transparent. He is not included in the propositional 
string which expresses p. He is unseen, invisible. He is not included as the object of 
his intentionality in any manner. 
 
                                                 




The theorist can say to himself (1) ‘I ought to think that ‘p’ (since the 
evidence favors the conclusion)’.  Or he can say (2) ‘I think that p 
(since the evidence…)’.  But both (1) and (2) are transparent for 
assertions that omit the first-person pronoun and verb.  That is, the 
meaning of (1) and of (2) can be found in assertions of the form (3), ‘it 
is the case that [or: it’s true that] p, (since…)’, or most simply, the 
affirmation of (3’) ‘p’. In formulations in form (3) the theorist—oneself 
as a human being with one’s objective(s), one’s responsibility and 
one’s attainment—disappears from view.230
 
On the other hand, when I am thinking practically about p, my intention falls precisely 
on my act of thinking about p.231     For Finnis, practical thinking is also a self-
reflexive exercise.  The object of one’s intention when thinking practically includes 
the person who is thinking.  The focus of my attention when thinking practically is on 
me deciding what to do, and not merely about what to do.  The consideration of 
actions in practical thinking can never abstract the “me” from me-thinking-about-
what-to-do. Only thinking like this “kicks in”, as it were, the practical logic.  The 
following is most explicit: 
 
…ethics is also precisely and primarily (‘formally’) practical because 
the object one has in mind in doing ethics is precisely my realizing in 
my actions the real and true goods attainable by a human being and 
                                                 




thus my participating in those goods.  Notice: ethics is not practical 
merely by having as its subject-matter human actions (praxis).  Large 
parts of history and of psychology and of anthropology have human 
praxis as their subject matter; but these pursuits are not practical.  No: 
ethics is practical because my choosing and acting and living in a 
certain sort of way (and thus my becoming a certain sort of person) is 
not a secondary (albeit inseparable and welcome) objective and side-
effect of success in the intellectual exercise; rather it is the very 
objective primarily envisaged as well as the subject-matter about which 
I hope to be able to affirm true propositions.232
 
Practical thinking as practical therefore has a very strict phenomenological 
differentia: it is (my thinking) about what I must do, not merely about things to be 
done. The self-reflexive “I” always features directly in the object of one’s 
consciousness in practical thinking.  One might say that practical reasoning is not 
transferable; I cannot think practically what you should do. I can only think practically 
for myself. To think practically that “I should do this” is not to say that “I should do 
this no matter who thinks about it”, but “I should do this when I think about it.” The 
“I” is essential in any practical pronouncement of “I should…”: I and only I can think 
what should be done for me when thinking practically. This is not true of theoretical 
thinking: the “I” can be abstracted and the thinking remains theoretical. Thinking 
about a piece of fact as truth or falsehood is not about its truth or falsehood for me.  
                                                 
232 ibid. (Italics original) 
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Although we say “I think it is true”, the subject “I” is irrelevant: we mean to say, “it is 
true”: it is true or false independently of me thinking it.  
 
From this something rather significant follows.  Since thinking about human 
actions in a subjectively disinterested 233  fashion does not include the “I” in its 
intentionality, it cannot be practical thinking. Clearly then, results of physical 
(understood as the philosophy of nature) or metaphysical speculations about human 
nature, or about ends for human beings, or about goods for nature cannot be called 
practical, since they are subjectively disinterested conclusions about it being true that 
“human nature is such and such, ends are such and such and goods are such and such”, 
independently of any thinker.  They abstract from the “I”, in the manner we explicated 
above, and fail to surface the practical logic with its epistemic deliverances. Given that 
natural law are first principles of practical reasoning, it follows then that metaphysics 
or any philosophy of nature cannot constitute any of these principles.  Nor can 
conclusions derived from theoretical science (physical or metaphysical) be practical, 
and so cannot be (first) principles of practical reason, precisely because they are not 
the propositions of practical but theoretical thinking.  The peculiar content of practical 
reason, with its peculiar logic and epistemic deliverances will all have been absent 
from these (theoretical) truths.  It follows then that if the first principles of practical 
reasoning are to be truly practical, they cannot be the inferred from conclusions of 
physical or metaphysical speculation.  If physics and metaphysics exhaust all possible 
                                                 
233 by subjectively disinterested I do not merely mean unemotionally, but also that 
when I think about something, I think about with without a reference to myself.  The 
self, the subject, “me”, is transparent, invisible.  
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candidates for deriving practical principles, then the first principles of natural law are 
more merely not inferred from these, but are further simply not-inferred, self-
evident.234
 
But I wish to draw out another insight.  Insofar as ethics is practical, as 
defined above, and natural law consists of the first principles of practical reasoning, 
then personal responsibility and the non-transferability of ethical deliberation obtain.  
In fact we had already pointed this out in passing.  Insofar as ethical principles 
properly speaking are practical, then ethics cannot be done in proxy, by another 
person for someone else.  The logic of practical thinking operates only when I think 
thus: “I-ought to do, seek, or work for this and that”. The inclusion of the “I”, as we 
have pointed out, governs the practicality of the discourse and thought. “I” can only 
think what is good for me to seek.  Now of course I can think what is good for you, 
                                                 
234 Finnis et al defend the non-inference of practical reasons because the practical 
proposition contain the normative “ought”, which cannot be logically derived from the 
descriptive “is”.  That is simply true and I too affirm that.  But what I have done here 
is to develop an alternative approach (building on Finnis’ own analysis in his 
Fundamentals of Ethics) to show why practical reasons are not derived from physics 
or metaphysics: because different ways of thinking will yield different kinds of 
operational logics, and reveal different (though not contradictory) kinds of objects of 
thought.  Theoretical thinking, being subjectively indifferent (and thinks about “what 
is the case, does not matter for who”), yield facts.  Practical thinking, which is 
subjectively specific (and thinks about “what I ought to do”), yield meaningful points 
worth seeking for.  Hence for those who deny the “is-ought” gap (much as it is true), it 
does not follow quite yet that if the gap is fused one can now derive practical 
principles from theoretical reasons.  Even if one can derive an “ought” from an “is”, 
practical reasons, with its peculiar practical logic and epistemic deliverances, are not 
derived from these theoretical premises, the latter wherein the practical logical and its 
epistemic deliverances of practical data will be completely absent.  These kinds of 
practical data which are absent from theoretical thinking include not merely the 
“ought”, but also the various irreducibly basic, meaningful ends worth seeking.  Even 
if one could get the “ought” from the “is”, he would still have no access to the various 
meaningful points or ends which practical reason counsels as worth seeking.   
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just as I can also say, “it is good for you to…etc”, but here it is theoretical, because the 
statement is transparent—“it is good…”—and the practical logic, with its intuitively 
given premises, do not operate. The first principles of practical reasoning do not come 
to bear in this mental exercise when one ceases to think for oneself, i.e, practically. 
This should not to be confused with thinking egoistically. One can think practically 
what it is good to do to benefit another: “I-ought to help him or her…”. The presence 
of the “I” in the intentional structure is what marks the distinction, not the thought of 
benefiting the “I”. Again, in order for the practical principles to bear on my mental 
deliberation, only I can bring that about.  No one, not you nor anyone else, can do that 
for me.  To tell me that you think it is good for me to seek or do such and such is to 
give me theory, and it is not yet for me to be doing ethics, or practical thinking. It is 
not yet for me to experience the guiding force of the natural law, i.e., the first 
principles of practical reasoning. And since the participation of the basic good (of 
religion or morality) for each person presupposes his or her thinking and seeking that 
good in the manner which is expressed by a non-transparent intentional string, one in 
which the subjective “I” is included, then it would seem that the judgment that religion 
(or morality) is good is a non-transferable one, meaning that:  no one could possible 
help me intend the goodness and worth seeking-ness of religion in this way—or rather, 
at all—except myself. Unless I am motivated by the practical acknowledgment of 
religion as a good and worth seeking, i.e., “I-ought to seek the good of religion”, there 
would be no other practical motivation to seek it. If that is so, then it would be either 
futile or unreasonable or arbitrary for me to seek religion, when religion is not to me a 
good; whereas if it were to me a good, then insofar as the first principle of practical 
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reasoning “Good ought to be sought and done” directs me, it would be reasonable for 
me to seek religion.235
 
On other words, ethics or practical thinking—whether intending a good or 
resisting an evil—involves a kind of thinking which at once engages and surfaces the 
subjective self, the “I”.  This is the peculiar structure of natural law in us, the law by 
through which we experience ourselves as rational creatures sharing in the 
providential intelligence of the eternal law, and therefore with a capacity for self-
governance.  The experience of this intentional structure is peculiar to the human 
person qua rational being.  
Now, could anyone possibly make me or help me in any manner see that “I 
ought to seek the good of religion?” No: because the only way religion can be a good 
is for me to see it as good, and worth seeking, moved and directed by the self-evident 
natural law [i.e., practical first principle] in me, and moved in such a way that it is 
true for ME thinking about what to do, to seek, to work for, etc.  The natural law that 
motivates me to see and seek the good of religion is surfaced and operational only 
when I think about what “I; me” ought to do here and now or engaged with 
possibilities.  If I were to say “one ought to do this or that”, this would not be a 
reporting of a natural law’s motivation, unless it is clear that “one” refers exclusively 
                                                 
235 While only “I” can know for myself that such and such  a good is to be sought, this 
is not to be confused with saying that only my  personal instantiation  of such a  good  
is worth seeking.  Rather, only when thinking of such a universal-good (qua a good 
that is good for myself and anyone else like me), only I can know for myself such a 
value to be worth seeking.  The exclusivity is in the knowing, not in the known good.  
The good known is a universal good, but only I can know by myself and for myself that 
such a good is to be sought and to be thus reasonably motivated to seek it.  I.e., I can 
know only by myself that such a good-for-everyone is something worth seeking. 
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to me—this particular subject—when I am saying it,  and not an abstract, common and 
variable subject.  The first principles of practical reasoning which provide reasons for 
action, i.e., the natural law, are not only self-evident, they are operationally subject-
specific. While it is true that all of us, more or less share the same content in natural 
law, yet it is also true that each set of natural law in each rational subject is peculiarly 
each person’s own and normative for him or her only, in the sense that he or she can 
only be moved by those natural laws which he or she experiences in himself or herself 
through practical thinking, and not another persons’.  If some being did not have his 
or her own store of natural law, it is not for us to try to impress it upon it, but to 
relegate it to the genus of brutes.  It is in this sense that each rational person is a center 
of self-governance, and hence a subject of personal responsibility—nobody can do for 
you, or move (reasonably) for you, or indeed understand, appreciate, see for you the 
good of religion. 
I conclude that any coercion directed at a person who does not himself see the 
basic good of religion to want to seek it, with the intention of making him see the point 
of the good of religion and to seek it, is always and everywhere a waste of time and 
effort.  Such attempts fail to attend to the anthropological fact that anyone’s 
experience of normativity is always because of operationally subject-specific natural 
laws. Coercion seen in this light shows why it is a counter-productive activity.  It is a 
failure to take into account a human person as a self-moving, and self-responsible 
being.  It is to try to do for him what only he can do for himself, i.e., experience the 
normativity of and so be moved reasonably by the—indeed, his—natural law.  
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Recast this result into the context of one of our original concerns: legal 
obligation.  Recall that legal normativity derives from the natural law—indeed, in the 
light of our analysis: from his or her grasp of the natural law that is not transferable.  
This normativity is called into suspicion and undermined if we deny the existence of 
its Transcendent Warrant.  Compared to this, a society of people who are genuinely 
religious would implicitly acknowledge such a Warrant, and hence would be more 
conducive to the recognition of the normativity of practical reason. But a policy of 
coercing authentic religiosity with its implied admission of the normative Warrant will 
not be successful.  Authentic religiosity is the pursuit of the basic good of religion 
directed by non-transferable natural law, and cannot be created by coercion.  
 
Let It Be 
 
We have just discussed how the denial of a Transcendent Warrant that undermines the 
normative authority of practical reason should not be corrected by the legal 
enforcement of religion.   Let us now consider if the law should actively remedy more 
direct disregard for the authority of practical reasons.  We begin by permutating the 
various kinds of disregards for practical reasons, and consider what would be the 
effect of legal moralism in each scenario. 
Persons can dismiss practical reason’s normativity in two ways:  firstly one can 
dismiss the normativity or authority of the first principles or the natural law. Secondly 
one can dismiss the normativity of one of its derivations, or what are moral precepts 
that follow from these first principles, without dismissing the normativity of first 
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principles.  We need to consider both scenarios because law can be determined 
(determinatio) either from a general first principle or from its later derivation, and 
draw its normativity from either of these.   
 Consider the first case, which is the case of the person who does not recognize 
the normativity of practical reasons in its first principles.  This means that he does not 
agree that there are intelligible motives to seek and promote certain basic goods. Now 
the result of legal coercion here would be obvious.  As was made clear above, these 
first principles which constitute intelligible motives for activity are peculiar to the 
particular subject. I.e., these first principles, what we call natural law, are natural laws 
which are operationally subject-specific, and hence cannot be used to move any other 
person except that in which these laws inhere. This is so since the nature of human 
practical motivation is that he experiences the operation of intelligent motivation 
thanks only to his own store of the natural law, and not another’s. All these we have 
explained at length above.  So if someone does not acknowledge any intelligible 
normative direction by any self-evident principles of practical reason, then one cannot 
impress it upon the person. All such similar and equally applicable arguments we have 
expressed at length above in our discussion of the good of religion.   
Now consider the second case. Suppose one does recognize the direction of the 
first principles of practical reason.  But he or she is mistaken about what being 
practically reasonable fully entails. In which case, he or she will disregard a particular 
norm which objectively follows from the first principles.  Yet this particular norm 
which follows from the first principle is the objectively moral norm.  So such a person 
who does not acknowledge the normative authority of an objective moral norm would 
 251
 252
be the practically unreasonable person.  In contrast, a practically reasonable person 
recognizes the authority of norms that follow objectively from the first principles.   
Should we force then it on him or her, or require through law that he or she obey it?   
If we did, it would not help the person be practically reasonable.  That is, we will not 
help the person recognize the normative authority of the objectively moral norm.  To 
see this we have to consider two further possible scenarios distinguished according to 
two kinds of compliant persons: the emotionally less sensitive person, and the 
emotionally sensitive person.236
First there is the emotionally less sensitive person, who is not swayed by the 
fear of punishment or of promises of rewards.  Instead, he obeys out of sheer will.  
Here coercion does not help him become practically reasonable. The reason is this: as 
we have seen, the only source of practical normativity is to be found in the 
operationally subject specific natural law or practical reasons.  Only the natural law in 
that person moves him or her.  I.e., if he or she must experience moral obligatoriness 
in its central sense, then he or she must experience being guided by these reasons in 
him or her.    
It helps to employ the method used by some jurists (like Hart and Finnis) 
called the examination of the internal point of view. We can use this to differentiate a 
focal case of practical reasonableness from what may be called moral performance. 
Let me suggest that there is a distinct difference between the ordinary man who 
behaves and speaks as he believes and an actor on the stage. The actor need not 
believe his lines or the script he is performing.  He plays the character, but he is not 
                                                 
236 We leave out discussion of the non-compliant, since it so obviously does them no 
good when they resist with vehemence what is forced on them. 
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the character.  It is a skilled reconstruction of someone else, and not himself. The man 
on the street, however, is by and large himself.  He behaves as he is.  His actions come 
in a very real sense from him: from his beliefs, his memory, his deliberations, etc.  Of 
course he may have his beliefs and deliberations from someone else—he may be 
persuaded of someone else’s ideas.  But it is also true that these ideas have been 
appropriated by him.  They have been accepted by him.  An actor need accept nothing 
of his script; he may play a repulsive murderer, but in no way condone his character.  
Analogously, authentic reasonableness is not like that.  It is not acting; rather it is 
much like to the disposition of man on the street who behaves as be believes, or on 
beliefs he has accepted. 
An internal point of view of what it is to be practically reasonable seems to me 
to be this: to fully follow through with one’s own237 first principles of practical 
reasons, and to be moved by that normativity that finds its source in those first 
principles.  To be fully practically reasonable is not just imitating another’s morals 
script (say a point of sexual conduct made a law), disassociated with my own grasp of 
normative principles.   If I merely imitated or were forced to act out, literally, that 
script, I am not experiencing practical reasonableness.   
Someone who recognizes the normativity of practical reasons may not always 
have to motivated to act by reasons. Practical reasonableness requires merely that 
there be the guidance of reasons, and this guidance—albeit a negative one—is at work 
even if at times one acts emotionally, so long as such actions do not violate reasons 
                                                 
237 The natural law are one’s own not in the sense of one’s own invention, but as being 
in me and so operationally normative for me, and for me alone, and not for you or 
anyone else.  
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that prescribe against such action or when reasons do not prescribe some particular 
action. As Finnis explains, 
 
Aquinas’ political analogy [of civil governance as opposed to despotic 
governance] suggests…that sometimes (perhaps even often) feelings must 
be accepted as legitimate guides to choices between options which, though 
all of them rational and reasonable, are none of them required by reason 
(none is ‘dominant’.)…238
 
If I am guided by reasons, whether positively by prescribing a required course 
of action or negatively by excluding other actions (while permitting some choices to 
be settled by feelings), I am so guided because reasons are normative for me. Note 
however that  in the context of legislating morals laws, we are not legislating a course 
of action which may be permissibly settled by feelings; rather we are thinking of a 
course of action that is in fact required by practical reason. Hence our primary concern 
is solely with the positive guidance of reasons.  Still our analysis holds true for reasons 
which guide positively and negatively. If these guiding reasons constitute the 
substance of the moral script proposed to me for obedience, then for me to be 
practically reasonable, there must be a kind of continuity between that script proposed 
to me and what is the only thing that is for me practically normative to begin with, viz. 
my first principles of practical reason.  So that moral script must be integrated as an 
extension of those first principles of practical reason, such that their normativity 
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(being the only source of practical normativity for me) transits into that moral script. 
Following that, the morals script too becomes normative.   Anyone who has truly 
experienced being persuaded by another person of a reasonable course of action which 
he or she previously was not convinced of  will see clearly this transition of  
normativity.  The normativity of guiding reasons is qualitatively different from the 
imperativity found in willful acts. It differs phenomenologically from behaviors which 
are best described as acting or just mimicry. 
Thus, one may counsel, debate, discuss or even criticize severely a person who 
is immoral, but never coerce through punishments or pains.239  Discussion and debates 
are efforts to demonstrate how certain conclusions follow from one’s own store of 
natural law. Its aim is to help another see the logical continuity between the first 
principles and these proposed detailed courses of action, and how the normativity of 
the first principles in him transits also into these detailed courses of action. This will 
indeed bring about his or her practical reasonableness; this will help him or her 
recognize the normative authority of the objectively moral norm.  As long as the 
continuity between these detailed precepts and the first principles is logically 
maintained, then the normativity of the detailed norms will be recognizable. If and 
only this continuity is fulfilled, then such practical reasonableness is authentic. 
Coercion on the other hand is inattentive to the continuity, and hopes to force the 
person to merely perform the desired acts.  But precisely in succumbing willfully to 
this coercion the person does not become practically reasonable, because his 
complying acts are not motivated by the normativity of (his) practical reasons.  And 
                                                 




any act which is not so motivated falls outside the focal meaning of a practically 
reasonable act.  It is merely an act: literally, show.  The result is unauthentic, insincere 
and pretentious. So we are confident that moral legalism in this case, as a paternalistic 
public policy, is never productive.    
What about the person who is easily swayed emotionally? Under coercion an 
emotionally sensitive person may be strongly inclined240 to be moved or influenced by 
other un-reasonable motives (of fear, or of pleasure) in order to (pretend to) act 
morally.  We need not think of legal coercion merely in the negative sense of 
punishing non-conformity.  Rather it may include being promised under the law to be 
rewarded with material goods or social recognition.  Once more, in the context of 
legislating morals laws, we are not legislating a course of action which is not required 
by reason and may be permissibly settled by feelings; we are thinking of such a course 
of action that is required by practical reason.  The following analysis may not be true 
of negatively guiding reasons, because the introduction of feelings as motives does not 
detract from practical reasonableness; this however is not true of positively guiding 
reasons, which is our restricted focus here.  Where there are positive guiding reasons, 
practical reasonableness demands that we are moved by these reasons. 
It is not difficult to see how when the emotionally sensitive person gives in to 
coercions to obey positively guiding reasons, he does not become practically 
reasonable. Practical reasonableness means recognizing the normative authority of 
objectively moral norms and being motivated by these objectively moral norms. But 
here, his practical deliberation is swayed from being guided by reasons altogether. 
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Instead he is motivated by emotions. Ironically he is hindered even from being 
motivated by practical reasons.  Not only is the good of being practically reasonable 
not participated, one is constantly being deflected away from it towards other sources 
of motivation. Like the emotionally less sensitive person who willfully performs the 
act, he too suffers the lack of continuity between his first principles and the moral 
norm.  Except that his case seems worse: he has introduced between the first principles 
and the moral norm a further motivation: viz. the strong feelings that move him to so 
act in accord with the moral norm.241 To assure external acts which are in conformity 
with morality through coercion may indeed prevent immoral acts, but in this case it 
would at the same time destroy authentically moral, practically reasonable acts. This 
is because such reasonable acts require an environment of freedom from strong 
emotional influences; reasonable acts are not acts based on feelings.  Here we concur 
with George: 
 
Moral goods are, like the good of religion, reflexive.  They can be realized 
only in and by freely chosen acts (or omissions).  They cannot be realized 
by people acting solely out of fear of punishment, the hope of getting 
praise, or some other non-moral motive.242
 
However, just near the end of his book George adds: 
                                                 
241 Not all acts which are moved by feelings would be inauthentic. When there is no 
dominant reason to choose a particular course of action, acting on feelings would be 
legitimate.  However, I have in mind here a course of action where reason clearly 
requires a particular course of action, and instead of being moved by that reason, the 
person is here moved by feelings. See John Finnis, Aquinas, 76-77 




The reflexivity of moral goods does not entail, however, that no benefit 
is realized or harm prevented when laws deter people from immoral 
acts.  Obviously great good is accomplished when the victims of crime 
and other wrongs are spared the effects of actions which their 
victimizers would otherwise have committed.  Moreover, the immoral 
actors themselves are benefited, whether the acts from which they were 
deterred would have harmed others or only themselves.  For, by 
deterring such acts, the law may prevent people from habituating 
themselves to corrupting vices which will more or less gradually erode 
their character and will to resist.  Even people who might, in the 
absence of law, wish to perform the immoral act may benefit from the 
law by being gradually habituated to resist, freely and willingly, the 
very vice which they would not have attempted to resist prior to that 
habituation.243   
 
I submit, apart from the prevention of harms to other people, the reasons justifying 
paternalistic coercion are not convincing. George’s inferences about consequential 
moral benefits may not be quite as he might imagine.  To be fair to George, he 
recognizes that those who feel morally obliged to follow through with the proscribed 
low conduct will in fact suffer a deflection from the moral good, insofar as he 
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complies with the law out of fear of punishment, and here we are on the same page.244  
However, for those who do not believe that to follow through with the proscribed low 
conduct is a duty, he writes, 
 
sound morals laws [do not] deflect people from realizing moral goods.  
A sound morals law provides a person whose reason and will may be 
overwhelmed by powerful temptations…with a countervailing motive 
not to succumb to the tempting vice.245   
 
But this last is at least curious: if someone should be motivated by fear of punishment, 
which is simply a non-moral motive, how then can one still maintain that the good of 
morality is not deflected?  Obviously, the motivation is steered towards non-moral 
goals. Therefore I deny George his conclusion.  Perhaps George meant that in any 
case, such a person did not act with the intention of fulfilling morality (i.e., being 
practically reasonable) anyway, and hence the law does not deflect the choice from 
that moral good, which was never intended. And his remark that such a person would 
consider himself having a moral right rather than a moral duty seems to favor such a 
reading.246  Still in this case, the subject still ends up with non-moral motivations.  
Sure, he is technically not “deflected”, insofar as “deflection” implies being shifted 
from an original course to a different one, and here he had no original moral course so 
to be “deflected” from.  Still, could this just be a play of words?  We might say that he 
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was not “deflected” strictly speaking, but it is equally true he is not at all encouraged 
to seek the good of morality.  In fact, just in bending to the impulse of fear, the 
participation of moral good suffers hindrance. We saw this clearly with the case of the 
emotionally sensitive person.247 Hence I would rather conclude that in both instances, 
whether one feels morally obliged to carry out the proscribed low conduct, or merely 
tempted to do so, compliance with the law proscribing such conduct for fear of 
punishment in fact prevents—whether by ‘deflection’ technically speaking, or not—
realization of the moral good.   
 
In other words, in no case will legal enforcement of morality bring about the 
kind of recognition of the normative authority of objectively moral norms that an 
authentically practically reasonable person experiences.  Now if that is the case, then 
one cannot hope to strengthen the rule of law through moral legalism, since nothing it 
does actually promotes the recognition of practical reason’s normativity, from which 
the law derives its normativity.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that, if we attend to the structure of practical 
reason’s modus operandi, we see that its normativity is not transferable.  I expressed 
this by saying that natural law is operationally subject-specific.  From this I concluded 
that any kind of paternalistic coercion in an effort to make men religious or moral is 
                                                 
247 The emotionally insensitive person, of course, would not benefit, since he is not 
afraid of punishments and will go about his own business.  In any case, George is 
arguing how those who do indeed comply through fear will benefit.  
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inevitably futile, because in relation to the natural law or first principles, (a) it hopes to 
transfer the practical norm that one should seek the good of religion or other basic 
goods into the person coerced and this cannot be done.  And, in relation to the 
objectively moral norm, (b) because enforcing such acts damage the continuity of the 
prescribed moral norm with the person’s only source of normativity viz. the 
operationally subject specific natural law or (c) it introduces emotional motives which 
hinder practical reasoning.  Because of all three effects (a, b, c), it does little good for 
enhancing the rule of law. And because of the last two effects (b, c) it harmfully 
hinders authentic morality.  Thus natural law theory’s resistance of moral legalism 
comes close to the non-interventionist politics of Wang Bi.  Like Wang’s analysis, our 
recommendation was built on a philosophical theory of human nature, and not on 
metaphysics. 
Our analysis had focused on the effect of moral legalism on those who do 
indeed comply with the morals laws because the effect of moral legalism on those who 
in effect do comply is more controversial.  But this of course is just half of the story.  
For: there are still those who would refuse to comply.  And for these who will not 
comply with morals laws, the effect of moral legalism may be as follows.  Such 
persons might either openly rebel against these laws to risk arrest, or more likely find 
ways or means to get around them.   In a situation like this one could imagine the 
possible relevant response from the authorities: they may intensify enforcement, 
whatever these new forms of enforcements may be, such as increasing surveillance or 
finding more sophisticated ways of detecting offences.  But that response may in turn 
breed intensification of cunning on the part the non-compliant to get around these 
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newly applied methods of detection.  Wang’s Laozi speculates freely on this, and I see 
no reason why natural law theorists should disagree with him: 
When wisdom and intelligence emerge that great falsehood occurs 
When one employs methods and uses intelligence to uncover treachery or 
falsehood, his intentions become obvious, and the form they take become 
visible, so the people will know how to evade them.  That is why “when 
wisdom and intelligence emerge…great falsehood occurs.”248
This in turn requires that the authorities match up to these new ways of avoiding 
detection and develop even more creative or harsher ways of seeking out these 
rebels—most likely using agencies like the secret police or the military, and that in 
turn will inspire the offenders to raise the standard of their methods of evading 
detection, and ad infinitum. Thus Wang’s commentary on the Daode Jing, which had 
long foreseen this likely effect of moral legalism adds this to his list of reasons to 
denounce it: 
 
If one governs the state with governance, he will use military with 
perversity.  It is by tending to matters without conscious purpose that one 
takes all under Heaven as his charge. 
…If one governs the state with governance [zheng], perverse [ji] military 
action will begin.  But if one tends to matters without conscious purpose, 
he shall be able to make all under Heaven as his charge.  As an earlier 
section says, “One who takes all under Heaven as his charge tends to 
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matters without deliberate action.  But when it comes to one who does take 
conscious action, such a one is not worthy to take all under Heaven as his 
charge.”  Thus if one governs the state with governance, because he is not 
worthy to take all under Heaven as his charge, he will use military with 
perversity.  To govern the state with the Dao is to encourage growth at the 
branch tips by enhancing the roots.  To govern the state with governance is 
to attack the branch tips by establishing punishments. With the roots not 
firmly established, the branch tips wither, and the common folk will have 
no means to cope with life.  This is why things will surely develop to the 
point where one will “use military with perversity”249
 
We can see why Wang says that “to govern the state with governance is to attack the 
branch tips by establishing punishments.”  For: the governance of moral legalism 
harms rather than benefits society—the branch tips—through its punitive measures.   
Well then, does this mean that we should throw up our hands and do nothing?  
After all, there seems nothing we can do with the law.  We can neither enforce 
morality nor encourage it through rewards.  Wang does not think so, and neither 
should we.  To see what can be done, we move on to the next chapter, which will 
discuss whether Wang’s positive social policies can offer some suggestions as to what 
natural law theorists themselves may do. 
                                                 




Chapter  9 




In the previous chapter we saw some convergences between Wang’s non-
interventionist ziran/wuwei/nameless/formless politics and what I have argued is a 
natural law theory political rejection of religious and moral legalism. These have 
focused on what should not be done, or what one should refrain from doing. This 
chapter, we will examine what Wang recommends can be actively done, and to what 
extent his recommendations can be imported into natural law theory.  Because of what 
I regard as significant differences in both Wang’s and Finnis’ (and Aquinas’) 
conception of what constitutes the goal of moral authenticity, I will argue that the 
kinds of positive action will not be the same. 
 
Moral Relativism in the Laozi 
Aquinas’ moral theory affirms moral absolutes; the principles of practical reason 
should never be opposed.  One’s choices should never violate the principles of reason, 
on pain of being unreasonable, and hence immoral. Where there are reasons to 
promote and protect the common good of life, for example, one should never choose 
to act in a way to intentionally bring about the evil of death, which is the opposite of 
life. And there are these reasons.  The self-evident principles of natural law affirm: life 
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is a valued good, and death, its opposite, is an evil; we should intend to promote 
always the first and never the second.  Aquinas’ moral theory is not relativistic.  
Compared this Aquinas, it seems possible to read into the Daode Jing the idea that it 
promotes ethical relativism: as it were, let things be what they want to be, do not 
distinguish good from evil and whatever turns out to be is fine.  As Robert Cummings 
Neville explains, 
 
The Daoist adept—perhaps a spiritual master or a military general—can 
locate the existential nodes of spontaneous opportunity and tie into the 
cosmic creativity whereby very small subtle moves can result in large 
differences, shining with the vitality of spontaneity.  The charge of Daoist 
relativism usually comes at this point.  Here the amoral adept has 
extraordinary power to do whatever he or she wants in a heroism of 
spontaneity.250
 
The text itself is not entirely blameless if it misleads a reader.  After all,  there are the 
passages about not making judgments about good and bad—all very suggestive of the 
lack of ethical objectivity.   
But such lines of interpretation would of course be wrong. There are some of 
Wang’s passages which seem to say that one ought not have any moral judgments, that 
one should accept all acts as equally good or evil without differentiation.  Indeed, 
                                                 
250 Robert Cummings Neville, “Daoist Relativism, Ethical Choice and Normative 
Measure”, in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 29:1 (March 2002), 5-20 @10 
 265
 266
these passages seem to say that one should not distinguish good from evil.  An 
example is the following: 
 
Mine [the Daoist Sage’s] is really the heart/mind of a stupid man. 
The heart/mind of a completely stupid man are innocent of 
distinctions, and his thoughts are free of any consideration of good and 
bad. As such, my tendencies [qing] cannot be discerned.  Utterly 
compliant, I am just like him. 
Absolutely amorphous, oh! 
Innocent of distinctions I cannot be named.251
 
Yet such passages about not making judgments of good and bad actually have 
little if not nothing to do with claiming that there are no objective norms—not at least 
on Wang’s reading.  Whatever may be one’s private judgments about right and wrong, 
good or evil, the advice seems to be that one should not let that be known.  Cross 
analysis with other relevant passages is helpful in seeing that it is about not 
influencing people with your judgments rather than not having any judgments at all.  
What is especially important in getting beyond a superficial reading is to realize that 
when it uses the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’, the text is not really referring to moral 
goodness and moral evil, but is instead speaking of likes and dislikes, approvals and 
disapprovals:  
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To regard something as good is just the same as [i.e., has the same effect 
as]252 being delighted or angry with it.  Delight and anger have the same 
root, and approval and disapproval come from the same gate…253
When it says one should not make judgments of good and bad, it is not at all saying 
that one should not have moral judgments.  What it is saying is that one (i.e., the Sage 
Ruler) should not make public proclamations of what he/she likes and dislikes. The 
question of objective norms is in fact suspended; what seems to be the interest is rather 
the social effect of public proclamations of good and bad, or of approving and 
disapproving.  Wang’s commentaries on sections 49, 57 and 58 of the Laozi sit well 
with my analysis.  They lay out the desirable effects of the Sage Ruler not making 
clear his likes and dislikes:  
 [The Sage’s] heart/mind is free of any control, he “for the sake of all 
under Heaven merges his heart/mind with theirs,” so his thought is without 
tendency to favor or slight.  If there is nothing that he investigates them 
for, what hiding must the common folk do?  If there is nothing that he 
demands of them, what response must the common folk make? Free of the 
need to hide or respond, none will fail to act in accord with his innate 
tendencies [qing]254
 
Therefore, nothing in these passages is a positive claim that morals are relative, 
or that there are no objective moral judgments.  Nor is there in these passages any kind 
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of substantial remark supporting a doctrine of ethical relativity. There is no claim that 
there ought be or that there are no objective norms. Rather: (even) if there are and 
whatever they are, what its advice is would merely be that the Ruler should be 
reserved about publicly proclaiming his (moral) judgments because it can tempt the 
subjects to conform to these judgments for non-moral reasons.  An assumption is that 
subjects are often strongly tempted to peddle after the Ruler and to conform to his 
likes and avoid his dislikes: “What the sovereign desires, the common folk are quick 
to pursue.”255  When instead the subjects do not know the Rule’s approvals and 
disapprovals (because they are un-proclaimed), then they will have one less 
compelling non-moral reason to thwart their otherwise authentic moral behavior: 
“Because all I desire is to have no desire, the common folk will also become desireless 
and achieve simplicity by themselves”.256  
Again, saying that the Sage here has no desires does not mean literally that he 
has no moral preferences. It means that he seeks not to have any explicit 
proclamations of likes or dislikes: “one [i.e., the Sage Ruler] who is good at the 
conduct of government has no identifiable form, name, deliberate purpose or 
procedure.  Being completely muddled, he attains great government [dazhi] in the 
end.”257  The point is that not proclaiming Ruler’s likes and dislikes is more conducive 
in aiding the subjects practice moral behavior for its own sake, rather than merely to 
please the Ruler:  “Instead of promoting benevolence and righteousness to bring 
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solidity to flimsy social customs, it would be better to embrace the uncarved block and 
thereby bring the practice of sincerity and honesty to all”258
As a matter of fact, notice how Wang’s Laozi actually is concerned with 
promoting sincerity, honesty and authenticity over the performance of moral action 
cultivated merely “in the expectation of material advantage…[but where the praise is] 
more splendid, the more will [such a moral actor]  thrust sincerity away, and the 
greater his material advantage, the more contentious he will be.”259 If so, how then can 
it still be said to be promoting ethical relativism?  At the very least, an implicit but no 
less glaring moral precept that it embraces would be that authentic morality motivated 
by sincerity, honesty and authenticity should be promoted over kinds of moral 
behavior that are motivated by material advantage or mere cunning ploys to obtain 
human honors.  Indeed, given its attention to the different kinds of motivations and its 
differing valuations of each of these classes of motivations, it seems to me that 
Wang’s Laozi is a morally very sensitive and concerned text—concerned enough to 
repudiate in such stern terms people who even if doing good are doing so for wrong 
motivations, such as feelings of greed and other contentious and competitive desires.  
So there are things that morally ought to be.  And Wang does not stop there, 
but offers policy recommendations to achieve those goals. In previous chapters (esp. 
chapters 2, 3) we saw how not to promote those goals. We are still left with the same 
question: is there nothing to be positively done?  Should we just “let things be”? To 
say so would not be faithful to the various references in the text that do talk about 
things to be done, and exegetically it would be claiming more than the text warrants.  
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While Wang’s Laozi does advocate naturalness (ziran) and non-action (wuwei), it does 
not advocate doing nothing.  The text (in italics) at chapter 59 and Wang’s 
corresponding remarks bear this out. 
 
“For ordering the people and serving Heaven, nothing is better than 
husbandry. 
“Nothing is better than” is like saying “nothing surpasses.” 
Husbandry refers to the farmer.  The way the farmer puts his farm in 
order is to bring a single uniformity to it by earnestly ridding it of 
weeds.  He fulfills its naturalness [ziran] by preventing the threat that it 
be damaged by neglect, that is, he eliminates that which causes damage 
by neglect [weeds].  For receiving the mandate of Heaven above and 
for keeping the people content below, nothing surpasses this.”260   
 
I think a helpful distinction here in explicating in precision wuwei (non-action) 
in order to effect or promote something’s ziran (becoming so of itself), is a distinction 
between “doing nothing about something” and “doing nothing to something”.  When I 
do nothing about something, I simply do nothing at all.  But when I do nothing to 
something, this does not mean I do nothing about it.  I may still do something about it, 
but not however, directly to it.  This latter can be consistent with wuwei. 
This can also be clarified by the following. There is a difference between 
acting in such a way as to impose an alien structure on a thing so to interfere with the 
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nature of a thing, and acting in such a way as not to impose an alien structure of the 
thing. And the latter does not at all exclude supporting the nature of the thing and 
preventing that nature from being harmed.  So, for example, one can grow a plant in 
two ways: in the first, by tugging at the leaves in artificially determined directions or 
bending the shoot in particular ways.  Or, one can leave the plant in se alone, but at the 
same time support its growth by watering it, removing surrounding weeds and pests or 
by preventing it from being trampled afoot.  And so this is what the text above says, 
precisely in view of helping people or oneself develop virtue—not as if laissez faire so 
much as avoiding actions which directly alter or manipulate the inner tendential 
principles of development.  So the focus here is not letting alone per se, but more 
accurately the preservation of the original principle of development and its fulfillment, 
i.e., that the nature of the thing not be hindered from coming to its term according to 
its intrinsic designs.  Letting-be is simply one means amongst many towards  the end 
of ensuring the flowering of that nature: if letting be results in that inner principle of 
growth not developing to the full, as is the case when there are contradictory external 
influences, then it will not be a time to let be, but to act—to remove the weeds!  To 
reduce Daoism to laissez faire is to invert the means for the ends. 
Again, there is no evidence that when the Daode Jing speaks of wei, of 
“action”, it means broadly all kinds of action.  At least not on Wang’s reading.  
Rather, Wang constantly zooms in on specific types of actions.  As pointed out in the 
previous chapters, these kinds of actions include applying institutional instantiations of 
various moral forms (xing), using the punitive power of law to carve or shape (xing, 
form) people morally, or enticing them to behave well with promises of honors (ming, 
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names).  Thus the polarity between youwei and wuwei, if understood as a standoff 
between “all action” and “no action at all” would be a gross oversimplification.  More 
accurately, to recommend wuwei over youwei is to recommend not engaging in 
particular types of action over engaging in particular types of action.  Such actions are 
those which are either ineffective and self-defeating or lead to bad social 
consequences.  The wei therefore refers to these specific actions, and the wu simply 
negates these and these only. 
 
What is to be done? 
 
So, what can then be done?  Well, it depends on what one wants to get done. 
First of all, if we are interested in defending a person from bodily harm, one can 
physically ward off an aggressor either on his behalf or in self-defense.  So there are 
things that physically one can in fact do, and do effectively.  There is nothing futile or 
self-defeating about going to war to fight an enemy, if this is the only way to protect 
the life of the political community.   
Hence the Laozi never preaches absolute pacifism: 
 
[Laozi:] One good at this [military operations] desists when the result is 
had and dares not use the opportunity to sieze military supremacy 
[Wang Bi:] Guo [result] means ji [relief].  This says that the good military 
leader sets out to relieve people from danger and then desists.  He does not 
use military force to gain power over all under heaven. 
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Have result but do not take credit for it; have result but do not boast about 
it; have result but do not take pride in it; 
I do not regard the Dao of military leadership worthy of esteem and use it 
only when there is no other choice, so what is there to take credit for or 
boast about? 
Have result but only when there is not choice; have result but do not try to 
gain military supremacy. 
In other words, although one sets for to succeed and relieve people from 
danger, this should only be done in cases where there is no other choice 
and only to quell violent insurrection.  One should not go on to take 
advantage of such results to gain military supremacy.261
 
Wang’s Laozi advocates against military campaigns because its consequences 
are generally tragic, even if one wins the war.  In this passage to which Wang appends 
no commentary, it writes: 
 
[Laozi:] Weapons are instruments of ill omen; they are not instruments of 
the noble man, who uses them only when there is no choice.  It is best to be 
utterly dispassionate about them, and even if they bring victory, one 
should not praise them.  Nevertheless, to praise them means that one 
delights in slaughtering people, and one who delights in slaughtering 
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people, of course, can never achieve the goal of ruling all under 
heaven…262
 
Consistent with recommending the policy of wuwei, Wang’s Laozi has always in 
mind the effects of one’s political actions. Just like a youwei policy of actively trying 
to moralize people through rules and promotions leads to self-defeat, military 
campaigns have self-defeating effects as an effort to obtain compliance: “if one inflicts 
violence on all under Heaven th[r]ough the use of stiff military power, he will be 
despised by the people.  Then he surely will fail to enjoy victory.”263  Hence Wang is 
always admonishing that we seeking out other better, more effective, more beneficial 
strategic policies for one’s goals, unless there is no better way about it.  In which case, 
going to war would be approved.   
 But again this is highly qualified:  one goes to war only to obtain the results 
which it does or will very likely obtain—viz. to relieve people from danger.  Here 
military operation works.  It gets the goal.  But if one is thinking about governance, 
military repression will not work, and so is to be rejected.  
 We may leave the discussion on military campaigns and world conquests here.  
Let us return to the more localized project of governing the state.  As we already know 
so well, the kind of society Wang seeks to promote is the authentically moral state.  
His goal is promoting authentic people.  His policy of wuwei warns about things not to 
do when trying to promote it.  What about things to be done?  Consistent with his 
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general strategic methodologies we can anticipate him thinking along the lines of what 
works.  
 The answer to this for Wang lies in what the Ruler can do to himself.   This is 
to minimize his own desires.  Wagner’s analysis  brings it out very well.  I quote at 
length: 
Already the Wang Bi Laozi…writes that this agenda of non-acts and 
counter acts [i.e., the interfering political acts of promulgating laws to rule 
people and enticing them with honors] of “rejecting” and “discarding” is 
insufficient,” because in this way the people have nothing to “go by” or to 
“attach themselves to”… The argument is made in Laozi 19.1: “If [the 
ruler] were to discard wisdom and to reject intelligence, the benefit for the 
people would be a hundredfold.  If [the ruler] were to discard benevolence 
and to reject righteousness, the people would return to filial piety and 
parental love.  If [the ruler] were to discard craftiness and reject [lust for] 
profit, there would be no robbers and thieves. These three [pairs of values 
whose rejection by the ruler is advocated] are as statements still not 
sufficient.  Therefore to let [his subjects] have something to go by [he 
would] manifest simplicity, embrace the Unadorned, and, by way of 
minimizing [his] private interests, reduce [his] desires.” Again, the public 
nature of the Sage’s performance is stressed.  Beyond the specific non-use 
of government devices expected of him, he makes a positive public 
performance of non-acts.  The terms used in this context, “manifesting 
simplicity”, “embracing the unadorned”, “by way of minimizing [his] 
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private interests”, “reducing [his] desires”, share the same agenda with the 
non-acts described above, but they give a more specific guidance to the 
public political performance…264
 
What the Ruler should do and what he should not do have a very close 
connection.  As has already been pointed out, the common folk are constantly attentive 
of what the Ruler approves or disapproves of, his likes and dislikes, and they follow 
these judgments  Revealing his likes and dislikes through political acts lead to their 
adopting these likes and dislikes, which then lead to all other effects like contention 
and materialistic desires.  How the former leads to the latter need not be repeated.  On 
the issue of not revealing his normative judgments, there are some things which he 
should not do, encapsulated in Wang’s wuwei policy.  There one “acts” by not acting 
(in these particular ways): wei wuwei. But similarly, there are some other things he can 
do in order to further keep his normative judgments from influencing the common 
folk—precisely by not having any desires in the first place, and hence no normative 
judgments.  This however, is not entirely the same as the first policy of not acting. 
Here the Ruler does not merely desist from a certain action; rather, he actually actively 
pursues it.  He actively pursues in his own person simplicity, authenticity and the 
virtuous freedom from false egotistic desires.  In this way, even if the common folk do 
come to know what his likes and dislikes are, they will find that there is nothing except 
simplicity and a ruler with minimal desires to emulate.    
  
                                                 




What To Do in Natural Law Theory 
What about natural law theory?  Is there something we can prudentially do 
without self-defeat?  Well, certainly when it comes to defending ourselves from 
physical assaults and other kinds of violence against oneself, the application of violent 
resistance may be the only way about it, just as Wang’s Laozi admits that applying 
military force has its place.  Hence the law certainly may legislate and enforce, 
without futility, the prevention of physical harms to people. The same logic would 
hold true in the prevention of physical harms to other persons who are unable to 
defend themselves, and so outlawing abortions, intentional assaults and other such like 
other-regarding acts of violence are things that can be done.  Threats of punishment 
and fear in such cases are the only way to prevent harms to others, and in preventing 
these one is not engaged in the kind of self-defeating enterprise that a paternalistic 
morals law would be.   For here, the person we intend to protect does get protected, 
whereas in paternalistic moral legalism, the person we hope to reform with  morals 
laws does not become moral or legally complaint—but instead the reverse occurs: his 
becoming moral or practically reasonable is hindered and his moral growth is 
frustrated, and thus too his becoming a fully legally compliant citizen is thwarted.   
 
But protecting other’s physical good is not the only thing one can effectively 
do.  Like Wang’s Laozi, we may have something to say about positively aiding the 
moral cultivation of persons for the sake of the Rule of Law.  Wang was interested in 
bringing about the cessation of contentions and greedy desires, and proposed that the 
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ruler positively, actively minimize his own desires.  This he believed would aid the 
lessening of the desires of the common folk.  
 Can contemporary new classical natural law theory today also take a lesson or 
two from Wang’s positive strategy of minimizing desires in his wuwei policy? Largely 
no. There are difficulties in straightforwardly adopting Wang’s strategies and 
recommendations for natural law theory for today.  Some of these difficulties are not 
the result of theoretical differences between natural law theory and Wang, but because 
of the different social contexts in Wang’s time and in contemporary society. Wang 
was interested in removing the causes of contentious desires.  But it was only given 
his historical context that he could commend his particular strategy.  Because:  the 
common folk are always looking towards the ruler to imitate him, and they (compete 
to) take on his desires and favors or disfavors. Wang’s admonishment to the ruler was 
that he should himself become desire-less, or at least minimize his own desires. He 
should exemplify desireless simplicity. When this is achieved, the common folk will 
seek to emulate his desires, and they too would attain simplicity—precisely because 
they find in their ruler no desires for them to match.  Since they did not have any 
desires to match, they would have nothing to compete for, and hence, they would not 
develop contentious, wrangling and competitive feelings. The context may be true in 
his time, but as premises for constructing our political strategy in contemporary 
society these suppositions would be suspect.  
Firstly, Wang was thinking of a monarchical society when he had in mind the 
ruler who commands the attention of the common folk.  In contemporary society, there 
is not always the king or president who commands the following of the masses.  The 
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focus of attention is diffused.  We live in a world of a plurality of attention points, and 
a plurality of models for the people.  We may say this is a kind of a post-modern 
situation, where there are many incommensurable centers of attraction, all contending 
for attention.   If that is the case, these many various personages will each influence 
their followers and admirers in their own way.   We may then have to admonish each 
of these to temper their own desires, and to what extent this would succeed seems to 
me a matter of speculation. Secondly, it is also not clear to what extent it is true that 
the people of today would compete to take on the desires of their role models.  Since, 
as already pointed out, there are so many incommensurable centers of modeling, there 
is just no basis for a competition.  Each person has his or her own target, with its own 
rules; each is doing his or her own thing. Hence Wang’s positive strategy of requiring 
the (political) role model(s) to minimize his or her desires or to exemplify simplicity 
may not be something we can adopt to any benefit.  
 The difficulty in adopting Wang’s positive strategy is especially complicated 
by different goals.  This second difficulty is intrinsic to the theoretical differences in 
these two philosophical traditions. Even though both Wang’s Laozi and Natural Law 
Theory seek to promote authentic morality, what constitutes “morality” in both these 
traditions differs.  In Natural Law theory morally authentic action is performed as a 
response to the normative weight of practical reasons. However, the talk of practical 
reasons as the source of practical normativity seems extremely foreign to Wang’s idea 
of what constitutes the moral ideal.  For: compared to Finnis and Aquinas’s “such and 




“..the more splendid the praise, the more he will thrust sincerity away, and 
the greater his material advantage, the more contentious he will be inclined 
to be.  The heartfelt feelings that fathers, sons, older brothers, and younger 
brothers should have for one another will lose their authenticity.  
Obedience will not be grounded on sincerity, and kindness will not be 
grounded by actuality…”265
 
For Wang, the goal is having the right kinds of feelings, like sincerity, or the 
kinds of authentic feelings that fathers, sons and brothers should have for one another, 
whatever such feelings may be.  The moral aim is to have certain kinds of feelings. It 
is less important to spell out these different feelings than it is to note that for Wang, 
certain kinds of feelings form an important core of how behavior is right.  To have 
these feelings forms a basis of the the rightness of a proposed course of action. A 
practical direction to seek to do X rather than Y has normative hold on a person only 
because the correct feelings are present. To behave or act rightly is not merely to 
fulfill a certain moral or normative principle, but to have certain feelings.  Having 
certain kinds of feelings are important. 
 By contrast, for Finnis’ account of Aquinas’ moral theory, feelings are 
incidental.  Being moral is not in the final analysis about acting on feelings, but 
choosing to fulfill a practical reason, either positively by obeying its direction or 
negatively by not violating its direction.   Indeed in Finnis (following Aquinas), 
feelings have a useful though unnecessary part to play in our acting rightly or wrongly.  
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This is true even if, as pointed out, where there is no dominant reason to do act, 
feelings can decide the matter.  Because: when feelings decide, the decision may not 
be wrong, but neither is it morally right; matters decided based on feelings where there 
are no dominant reasons to guide fall out of the purview of morality.  When it comes 
to right action, reasons determine the rightness.  Reasons determine right and wrong 
on their own account, whether or not we feel strongly about them.  The distinction 
between feelings and normative reasons is of great importance in Finnis’ (and 
Aquinas’) natural law theory: one cannot get from a fact that one has such experiences 
(feelings) to the precept that such and such a course of action ought to be done.  No 
“ought” from an “is”.  Feeling and having sensational experiences is one thing, and 
understanding that one’s practical directions have normative weight is another.  Even 
if one felt very intensely about a proposed practical direction, this mere feeling does 
not make the practical direction right.  John Finnis says it well: 
 
It remains that, as Aquinas makes clear, any adequate critical account of 
ethics (and therefore, of politics) must acknowledge the profound 
difference between rational and emotional motivation.  And one’s grasp of 
that difference will not be adequate unless one understands that inherent 
independence of rational motives (reasons for action), and the way such 
motives can be either supported and reinforced or undermined and 
disrupted by emotional motivations.  The difference between acting for 
reasons and acting on emotions which have subjugated reasons to their 
objectives (as rationalizations) is a difference so impressive to Aquinas—
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that most stalwart defender of the unity of human nature—will even say 
that in the human person ‘there are two natures, the intellectual and the 
sentient {sensitive}’.266
 
Wang’s account of moral psychology, however, differs somewhat from Aquinas’ 
sharp division between feelings and reasons.  As Chad Hansen points out, unlike in the 
Aristotelian and Western paradigm which privileges the logos (or reason) over 
emotions, Chinese philosophy, including Daoism largely has no such bifurcation.  So 
unlike in Greco-Western philosophy, Chinese moral philosophy seeks to reject 
motivations by feelings not in order to preserve rational motivations, but rather to 
protect motivations by other kinds of feelings: 
 
The Daode Jing reminds us of an assumption behind Mencius’ innatist 
theory: Action should be guided only by natural desires. Thus although yu 
(desires) anchors the attack on the possibility of any constant Dao, it also 
anchors the alternative possibility of a natural, non-conventional, constant 
Dao. Presocial desires could constitute a protonatural Dao. These desires 
guide how we would act if no one has ever instilled relative social 
distinctions in us.  … Despite this positive possibility, the dominant tone 
of Laozi’s analysis, like that of Western rationalists, is antidesire.  His 
reason, however, is not desire’s effect on calm reason but its social, 
linguistic origin and effect.  The socially induced desires dominant his 
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 282
 283
treatment because, in his view, they are the problem.  Socially induced 
desires both enslave our natural drives and lead to destructive competition 
and strife.  Natural desires, he optimistically assumes, would lead to 
human harmony.267
   
Hansen’s analysis is true of Wang’s interpretation of the Laozi. In several 
important places of the Laozi, Wang’s commentary makes the point that some desires 
are to be discouraged: 
 
“What the sovereign desires, the common folk are quick to pursue.  
Because all I desire is to have no desire, the common folk will also 
become desire-less and achieve pristine simplicity by themselves.”268
 
A parallel commentary explains why Wang thinks these desires should be 
discouraged. His reason is that such desires lead to “contention”, “becom[ing] 
thieves”, “disorder” and “going astray”: 
 
                                                 
267 Chad Hansen, “Qing in Pre-Buddhist Chinese Thought”, in Emotions in Asian 
Thought: A Dialogue in Comparative Philosophy, Joel Marks and Roger T Ames (ed.), 
(1995: SUNY, NY), 192-193.  Also of interest is Chad Hansen’s “Should the Ancient 
Masters Value Reason?” in Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts, Henry 
Rosemont Jr. (ed.), (Ill: Open Court, 1991), which plays up the difference between the 
Asian concern with feelings (understood as descriptively-factual states which is at the 
same time also evaluative and so action guiding) and the Western emphasis on 
rationality (which respects the Humean distinction between the descriptive “is” and 
the normative “ought”), and Graham’s “Reply”, which classifies Hansens’  “Asian 
Rationality” as “Correlative Thinking” and then argues that there is nothing 
specifically Chinese about it.  
268 Wang Bi, The Classic, Section 57, pg 159 
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“Because he [the sage] does not exalt the worthy and the resourceful, the 
common folk do not contend.  Because he does not value goods hard to 
get, the common folk do not become thieves.  Because he does not allow 
them to see desirable things, the hearts/minds of the common folk are not 
subject to disorder.  It is because he keeps the hearts/minds of the common 
folk from desire and from going astray that ‘no one is discarded’.”269  
 
Apart from not developing desires which lead to contention, natural desires that 
lead to a natural bonds and harmony will also naturally arise.  This is clearly implied 
by Wang’s explanation of what is lost when there is social intervention: 
 
If the virtues of honesty and the uncarved block are not given prominence 
but the splendors of reputation and conduct are instead publicized and 
exalted, one will cultivate that which can exalt him in hope of the praise 
involved and cultivate that which can lead to it in the expectation of the 
material advantage involved.  Because of hope for praise and expectation 
of material advantage, he will conduct himself with diligence, but the more 
splendid the praise, the more he will trust sincerity away, and the greater 
his material advantage, the more contentious he will be inclined to be.  The 
heartfelt feelings that fathers, sons, older brothers, and younger brothers 
should have for one another will lose their authenticity.  Obedience will 
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not be grounded in sincerity, and kindness will no longer be grounded in 
actuality…270
 
This difference will explain how an adaptation of Wang’s policy of minimizing 
desires will obtain a more limited result vis-à-vis the promotion of the “authenticity” 
that natural law seeks to promote.  In Wang authenticity seems nothing more than the 
absence of certain contentious feelings or desires.  With regards our conception of 
moral authenticity, it is acting on practical reasons, present or absent these desires.  In 
Wang, authenticity is achieved once these contentious desires are absent; thereafter the 
natural and desirable feelings will develop.   For us, even with these desires absent, it 
is not sufficient; people need to appreciate the normative authority of reasons and act 
on these reasons.  We may examine this more closely. 
 
Two Different Goals of Authenticity 
 
As was shown in the previous chapter, the effect of moral legalism and religious 
coercion includes more than what it does not achieve in the service of the rule of law.  
Its effects include creating “moral behavior” that is inauthentic.  Hence a statesman 
who applies a policy of moral legalism would not merely do little good in the direction 
of promoting the rule of law; he may risk promoting inauthentic moral action.  Similar 
points are made in Wang’s Introduction to the Laozi and in sections 5 and 27 of the 
Laozi where Wang Bi comments how the Sage Ruler avoids a policy of multiplying 
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punitive restraints and promises of honors, which lead to insincerity and contention 
rather than authentic behavior: 
 
The benevolent [ren] have to establish institutions and influence behavior, 
for they are prone to use kindness and conscious effort. But when 
institutions are established and behavior influenced, people lose their 
authenticity…271
 
If the virtues of honesty and the uncarved block are not given prominence 
but the splendors of reputation and conduct are instead publicized and 
exalted, one will cultivate that which can exalt him in hope of the praise 
involved and cultivate that which can lead to it in hope for praise and 
expectation of material advantage involved.  Because of hope for praise 
and material advantage, he will conduct himself with diligence, but the 
more splendid the praise, the more he will thrust sincerity away, and the 
greater his material advantage, the more contentious he will be inclined to 
be.   The heartfelt feelings that fathers, sons, older brothers, and younger 
brothers should have for one another will lose their authenticity.  
Obedience will not be grounded on sincerity, and kindness will no longer 
be grounded in actuality…272
 
This is how the sage is always good at saving people, so no one is discarded.  
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The sage does not establish punishments and names in order to impose 
restraints on the people.  Nor does he create promotions and honors in 
order to cull and discard the unworthy.  He enhances the natural state of 
the myriad folk but does not serve as the starting point for them.  Thus the 
text says, “no one is discarded.”273   
 
Firstly we need to attend to what exactly Wang means by “authenticity”. Wang’s 
many passages speak of preserving authenticity, and often this occurs in the context of 
his discussion of the uncarved block.  By examining parallel passages, we can get 
quite an accurate sense of what he means by “authenticity”. So for instance, we read 
under section 28: 
 
When the uncarved block fragments, it turns into implements. As the sage 
would make use of them, he stands as chief of officials over them. 
The uncarved block [pu] is authenticity [zhen].  When authenticity 
fragments, many different kinds of behavior emerge, and many types of 
people appear, just like a variety of implements…274              
  
Here authenticity is related with the uncarved block. Parallel passages give light 
into what exactly this uncarved block entails. Much of it has to do with the absence of 
desires. Thus in Section 37 we read: 
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 If any lord or prince could hold on to it, the myriad folk would undergo 
moral transformation spontaneously.  Once nurtured, should desire arise, 
I would press down on it with the nameless uncarved block. 
In “once nurtured, should desire arise,” “arise” means the formation of 
desire. “I would press down on it with the nameless uncarved block” 
means that I would not play the master.  
With the nameless uncarved block, they too would stay free of desire. 
There would be no desire or contention.275
 
Thus it seems that the uncarved block, which refers to the method of “not 
try[ing] to carve [people] into shapes according to forms external to them” through 
punitive measures and promises of promotional prestige276, brings about the absence 
of desires. Better: such methods avoid stirring up certain desires. As Wang explains, 
 
The sage does not establish punishments and names in order to impose 
restraints on the people.  Nor does he create promotions and honors in 
order to cull and discard the unworthy…Because he does not value goods 
hard to get, the common folk do not become thieves.  Because he does not 
allow them to see desirable things, the heart/minds of the common folk are 
not subject to disorder.  It is because he keeps the hearts/minds of the 
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common folk from desire and from going astray that “no one is 
discarded”277
 
But the uncarved block was related to authenticity. Is it then the case that 
authenticity is about the absence of desires? Indeed this seems the case.  Wang’s 
commentary on Section 3 is most explicit: 
 
Do not exalt the worthy, and so keep the common folk from contention.  
Do not value goods hard to get, and so stop the common folk from 
becoming thieves.  Do not let them see desirable things, and so spare the 
hearts/minds of the common folk from disorder.    
…because we exalt the worthy and make their names illustrious, giving 
more honor than their offices deserve, people act as if they are always in 
shooting contests, trying to determine who is more able, and, because we 
put more value in goods than their use warrants, those who covet such 
things compete to rush after them, even digging through or climbing walls 
to ransack chests, risking lives in thievery.  Therefore if desirable things 
are not seen, hearts/minds will not be subject to such disorder. 
…[The Sage]  keeps the common folk free from the capacity for knowing 
and from feeling desire. 
He preserves their authenticity.278
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Here the sage is said to preserve the authenticity of the common folk, precisely 
by keeping certain things from their knowledge so as not to stir up their covetous and 
contentions feelings or desires.  And part of this includes not creating promotions and 
honors which could possibly become objects of contentious desires. And creating 
promotions and honors to tempt people to behave is precisely what the uncarved 
block, which refuses to try to carve people into shapes, will not do. 
 So what this means then is that for Wang, preserving the authenticity of the 
common folk means avoiding stirring up their desires.  But this can mean one of three 
versions authenticity. There are two strong versions of authenticity. On the one hand, 
authenticity may mean: not having these desires, and not having these desires ipso 
facto entails that people will not be moved by such desires they do not have. This is 
the first strong reading of authenticity. There is a second strong reading of 
authenticity: not only do these people not have these contentious and insincere 
feelings, they have further other natural feelings which lead to sincerity and harmony. 
Compared with these two strong readings of authenticity, a weaker version of 
authenticity may simply mean that people who are authentic are not moved by such 
desires.  This state of affairs may co-exist with their actually experiencing these 
feelings tugging at their will, without them giving in to these desires.  That means, 
they may have these desires, but they are not moved by them.  This is a weaker 
reading of authenticity, because it demands less.  It permits the authentic person to 
experience these feelings, insofar as they do not move him. On the first two strong 
readings of the authentic person, he cannot even have these feelings.  
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It is not immediately clear which account of authenticity is Wang’s.  But much 
of what he says suggests that for him the connection between having these desires and 
being moved by them is tight.  We know that philosophically or logically there is no 
necessary entailment between having a desire and being moved by it.  But for all 
practical purposes, for Wang it seems to me that he takes it that the probability that a 
person will be moved by these desires is high.  This can be discerned from his 
recurrent discussions of the presence of desires and deviant behavior. These two states 
of affairs are often discussed together.  Hence, it is likely that Wang thinks that having 
these desires quite naturally leads one to act on them, and so, modus tollens, if one 
does not act on them, one must not have had them in the first place. This suggests that 
one of the stronger readings may be warranted.   
That is to say, authentic people for Wang are those people who are without 
these desires, and from this it follows that they will not be motivated by them.  Still, 
this is not to say they are absolutely without any desires at all.  Recall already noted 
much earlier in chapter 3 that Wang would condone and even encourage some other 
kinds of desires such as those feelings of love between fathers and sons and brothers.  
So while authenticity entails not having those desires which motivate one to act in 
ways which for Wang are contentious or insincere, it may also include having those 
other kinds of feelings of desires like sincere fraternal bonds.  And these sincere 
feelings would subsequently motivate action, which are described as behavior that is 
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authentic. Therefore the second strong version of authenticity I would argue is 
Wang’s.279  
 This notion of authenticity comes close to what we I have meant here by moral 
authenticity.  Like Wang, authenticity as I have meant it includes not being moved by 
strong emotional feelings or desires.  Still, for Wang this is the result of the absence of 
some particular kinds of desires.  This however would be too strong for my account of 
authenticity: for insofar as the person is not moved by these feelings or desires, he 
remains on my account authentic even if he has these feelings.  Thus my version of 
authenticity is the weaker sense as contrast with Wang’s stronger sense. But this 
difference cannot be overstated.  If we agree with Wang that as it plays out in reality, 
having strong desires tends to very likely lead one to act on them, then it is reasonable 
to seek to remove these desires if we are to achieve the weaker sense of authenticity.  
That is to say, in order to achieve my weaker version of authenticity, we may need to 
promote and pursue also the stronger version of authenticity.  So though we have 
slightly different conceptions of what “authenticity” constitutes, in seeking to promote 
each these different versions of authenticity, we nevertheless need to promote Wang’s 
stronger version of authenticity.  That is, just as Wang would seek to promote 
desirelessness in people for its own sake, so I would seek to promote desirelessness in 
                                                 
279 In the context of discussing the emotive state of the Sage, Alan Chan points out that 
it is not necessary for the Sage to not have desires, but merely he be not “fettered” (lei) 
by them. (Two Visions, 81) Since the Sage is spoken as being authentic, who then 
spreads this authenticity to the common folk, it would seem that Chan’s analysis 
corroborates our analysis of the meaning of authenticity in Wang in this respect:  we 
both agree that the common folk need not be completely without desires. However, we 
go further than Chan by distinguishing wrong feelings (such as those which lead to 
contention and greed, or other acts deplored by Wang) from other feelings that are not 
wrong.  So when a person is authentic, he is not only not fettered by feelings, but not 
fettered by wrong feelings.  See Two Visions, 80-82 
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them also, only that unlike Wang, this is not for its own sake, but for the sake of not 
tempting their choices with these feelings.  
 There may be another difference. Like Wang, my weaker sense of authenticity 
does not exclude having some other approvable strong feelings.  Because authenticity 
is about not being moved by feelings, conceptually it matters not if one merely has 
these feelings. All that is requires is that one does not act merely on them. For natural 
law theory, authenticity has the positive dimension of acting reasonably.  This means 
acting on the direction of practical reason rather than on emotions.  Thus a person has 
to have the positive quality of understanding the reasonableness of a proposed course 
of action in acting on it in order to be authentically reasonable. Bearing in mind that 
we are concerned only with positively guiding reasons, this also means that a person 
who merely acts on feelings will not be authentic even if the feelings move him to act 
in the direction of a practically reasonable course of action.  That is to say, he may act 
in accord with morality, and so not act immorally.  But this does not quite yet make 
his action authentically moral.  Authentic moral action is reasonable action.  This does 
not mean one should be stoic; it does mean however that even if there are strong 
feelings in the right direction, ultimately the reason why I act the way I do must be the 
result of a choice to fulfill a practically reasonable precept (to the extent that there is 
one).  I must act on reasons, even if my feelings are there to support me. Now this 
differs from Wang. As pointed out above for Wang, acting merely on these approved 
feelings does not make one inauthentic. Nothing else seems required for Wang’s 
notion of authenticity to be true in an acting agent because Wang’s version of 
authenticity is a largely negative notion.  Wang does not speak of the need of acting on 
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reasons.   Wang’s notion of authenticity requires positively less, although it excludes 
more. (But we need to note that this does not mean that to be authentic the person 
must be moved by those good feelings.  He may be, but he need not.)  
 Hence compared to Wang, my theory seeks to promote a more restricted 
version of authenticity, viz. acting on reasons.  Thus while we both agree that moral 
legalism and a program of promises of prestige should not be condoned, the reason for 
this differs somewhat.  Wang is ultimately interested in removing the causes which stir 
up the wrong desires.  Without these wrong desires, natural and good desires can 
develop and authenticity is obtained.  For this reason Wang renounces moral legalism 
and denounces the program of tempting good behavior with promises of prestige.  We 
have already seen how for Wang these leads to insincere, materialistic and contentious 
desires.  Promulgating rules expressing moral guidance tell the common folk what 
virtues the promulgating ruler favors, and so they are tempted to compete to align 
themselves with these virtues, perhaps in the hope of some reward.  Thus they are 
motivated by this materialistic desire to obtain benefits.  The same is true with 
promises of honors for good behavior: men are motivated primarily by greed for the 
material benefits.    
Like Wang, for natural law this tragic state of affairs with men driven by these 
desires will be a state of inauthenticity.   Moral legalism, through introducing these 
motivations of desires, impedes authenticity, both in my and Wang’s sense.  This is 
particularly true of the emotionally sensitive person, since for the emotionally 
sensitive it introduces emotional motives that sets up a wall between the first 
principles and the moral norm and so prevents any continuity between the two. But I 
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am not interested merely in the fact that people may be tempted by desires for material 
rewards so to act on that account. Because my concern is not merely to ward off bad 
emotional influences, I go further than Wang in denouncing moral legalism because I 
see other effects that moral legalism has, which are more pertinent to the destruction 
of authenticity as I mean it.  Thus, as I have argued, in the case of the emotionally 
sensitive, it disrupts the continuity between the first practical principles and the 
proposed action by introducing feelings as motives. For the emotionally less sensitive 
who performs the act, authenticity also not achieved.  But this is not because there are 
emotional interferences; rather it is because such an act lacks the understood 
connection between the first practical principles and the proposed action.   
Again, if a person cannot even admit that it is normatively binding to follow 
reasons, then of course, no enforcement would make him or her practically reasonable 
either, since this norm is just not transferable.  
 Therefore, Daoism and natural law theory will draw different conclusions 
concerning what needs be done.  For: minimizing feelings or desires in natural law is 
not the issue; developing moral reasons are.   And when it comes to developing the 
appreciation of the normative authority of reasons, reflective philosophical education 
seems to me the only way to achieve this result.   Open philosophical discussion and 
demonstration of the logical connections between a proposed course of action, say a 
certain law, and one’s store of practical first principles help persons to see for 
themselves how the prescribed law has normative force for him, insofar as it is 
rationally connected with his own source of normativity.  
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 In other words, natural law theory cannot fruitfully adopt the policy that the 
political ruler minimize his desires.  something else needs to be done: to promote open 
philosophical education which helps people see the kinds of logical connection 
between the reason of the law and their own grasp of reasonableness.  Natural Law 
theory’s recommendation for cementing a politics of a Rule of Law is to promote 
philosophical education.  It is through philosophical education that people come 
gradually to see the point of their own actions, the normative authority inherent in 
their own principles of practical thinking, and to come to recognize how that those 
principles relate through determinatio to the Rule of Law as its goal. (See chapter 5)  
At the same time, philosophical education that encourages reflection on the 
substantive normative force (the “ought”) of their own practical reasons will reveal the 
logical necessity of affirming the existence of some external Ontological Warrant or 
Norm, or God, and ipso facto the inconsistency of espousing a naturalistic atheism, 
which undermines the credibility of practical reasons and the force of the Law. (See 




In this chapter we have examined some differences between Wang and 
Aquinas’s political strategies.  While Wang like Aquinas does not advocate ethical 
relativism, there remain significant differences in the moral theories of both traditions. 
For Wang, the ruler’s personal exemplification of desireless-ness can help stall the 
spread of desires and hence disorder amongst the common folk, and hence enhance the 
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goal of promoting moral authenticity amongst the masses.  Natural Law, however, has 
a different notion of moral authenticity that is defined by reasonableness (and not 
merely the having of natural feelings). Thus, it cannot fruitfully adopt Wang’s policy 
of desirelessness.  It needs instead to promote philosophical reflection, which reveals 
to the reflecting person the normative authority in his practical thinking, how that 
normativity is related to the Law, and how that normativity implies a Transcendent 










Forgetting the Trap Once the Rabbit is Caught: 
The (Ir)relevance of the Metaphysics of  Dao/God 
 
Introduction 
We have arrived at the final chapter of this thesis.   Our tour of John Finnis’ New 
Classical Natural Law Theory which develops Aquinas’ natural law theory and Wang 
Bi’s commentarial reading of the Laozi had aimed to compare the ways metaphysical 
speculation of some Transcendent Being (be it God in Aquinas or the Dao in Wang) 
are relevant or irrelevant for political theorizing in these two traditions.   We had 
argued that when it comes to arriving at political and ethical precepts, when deciding 
what is to be done, what political policies to adopt, metaphysical speculation plays a 
limited, if not negligent role.  Neither in Finnis nor in Wang do the conclusions of 
metaphysical speculation of God and the Dao become premises for thinking about 
what to do.  For Finnis, ethical and political thinking begins with self-evident ethical 
practical reasons; for Wang it begins with an appreciation of human behavior.  At the 
same time, however, metaphysical speculation has its place.  In Finnis’ natural law 
theory (as I have developed it), ethical and political reflection can lead to some 
metaphysical affirmations of God, and the explicit denial of God’s existence can have 
dire consequences for ethics and politics.  Wang on the other hand weaves in 
metaphorical interpretations of the Dao’s description with the political doctrine of 
non-interference.  By exploiting the terms “Nameless(ness)” (wuming) and 
Formless(ness)” (wuxing), the master of the literary craft offers an ingenious 
 299
 300
“inference” from linguistics through politics and ethics towards a metaphysics of the 
Dao, and argues that we “apply” the Dao (qua the Nameless and Formless) in political 
deliberation.  So, metaphysical speculation is not irrelevant.  Or is it?    
 
Metaphysics Not Equally Relevant 
Philosophically, it is easier to say that metaphysical speculation is relevant in 
Finnis’ natural law theory: after all the metaphysical claims and conclusions work as 
corollaries which cannot be denied on pain of contradicting central premises in natural 
law theory.   This is certainly not the case with Wang’s metaphysics of the Dao.  
While Wang does weave relevant metaphysical claims through his literary craft into 
the political theorizing, their relevance is just that: literary.  The metaphysical doctrine 
of the Ontological Dao works as a metaphor or heuristic mind-map for the political 
doctrine of non-intervention.   Philosophically or logically, there is no mutual 
entailment.  Neither implies the other—at least there is nothing in Wang which 
suggests that he thought so.  As I have consistently argued in this thesis, Wang saw the 
metaphysics of the Dao and the politics of non-intervention related via the playful 
literary equivocation of the “Nameless and Formless (Dao)”, which signifies on the 
one hand the shapeless and unnamable ontic source of all things, and on the other 
hand, the politics of not using names or prestige nor institutional forms to generate 
moral and law abiding behavior.  
Even when constructing his inference from names and forms all the way to the 
Dao, the discussion shifts completely from one theme to another and the links between 
these themes are at best trivial.   Recall how the inference proceeds. The idea that 
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“actuality-forms give rise to names and not the other way around” in semiotics works 
as a platform for introducing the political discussion, which also insists that “forms 
give rise to names and not the other way around”, albeit in a completely different 
sense: that renown or name should follow actual moral forms, and actual moral forms 
do not arise from lures of names or prestige.   The political discussion, which is the 
most important discussion in Wang, then concludes that the way to encourage the 
moral and desirable political community is to adopt political policies of non-
intervention.  That is, one should be or adopt the policy of “nameless(ness) (wuming)  
and formless(ness) (wuxing)”, which then results in the desired society. But the 
nameless and form is also equivocally the Dao, which is metaphysically formless and 
hence nameless.  So also the Dao is the ultimate source of the desired society.    But 
notice that the discussion on political governance is related to the theory of language 
and the metaphysics of the Dao merely through the almost coincidental fact that they 
share some common terms, not because of any strong philosophical reasons. Each 
thematic discussion—whether it be the correlative doctrine of names and forms, the 
politics of non-intervention, and the metaphysics of the Dao—is in fact self-contained, 
and philosophically independent of each other. None of the conclusions of the 
discussion on one theme becomes philosophical premises for any other.    
Fundamentally, Wang’s political discussion is literally superimposed onto both 
the discussion of language and the discussion of the metaphysics of the Dao.  That 
very same text, those very same characters and the very same words are used to 
express two (or more) distinct ideas, one on top of the other. There is no explicit 
logical connection.    
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While one may be impressed with this grand display of literary genius or 
ingenuity, one must also realize (perhaps with some disappointment) that the 
metaphysics of the Dao is philosophically redundant in the Wang Bi Laozi’s  political 
theorizing, even if it is cleverly incorporated into the text.   After all, the reasons for 
arriving at the political policies and conclusions have nothing philosophically to do 
with the metaphysics of the Dao.   The deliberations were based on an analysis of 
human behavior.   
Why then did Wang’s Laozi bother crafting such an ingenious metaphysical 
metaphor for the political doctrine?  What did Wang think was the purpose of the 
Laozi’s use of metaphysics of the Dao to metaphorically signify the politics of non-
intervention?   My answer to that is largely conjecture, but turning to Wang’s 
introductory chapter to the I-Ching (Yijing), one finds some clues.  There, he explains 
clearly what he thought the role of images, analogies, words and metaphors are.  For 
Wang, images, analogies, words and metaphors were but tools or means to yield the 
meanings, and when the meaning is understood, these tools were to be forgotten or 
discarded.   In other words, metaphors and images were of mere instrumental value.  
Their purpose is purely pedagogical.  He writes, and I quote at length: 
“Images are the means to express ideas.  Words [i.e., the texts] are the 
means to explain the images.  To yield up ideas completely, there is 
nothing better than the images, and to yield up the meaning of images, 
there is nothing better than words. The words are generated by the images, 
thus one can ponder the words and observe what the images are.  The 
images are generated by the ideas, thus one can ponder the images and so 
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observe what the images are.  The ideas are yielded up completely by the 
images, and the images are made explicitly by the words.  Thus, since the 
words are the means to explain the images, once one gets the images, he 
forgets the words, and, since the images are the means to allow us to 
concentrate on the ideas, once one gets the ideas, he forgets the images.  
Similarly, “the rabbit snare exists for the sake of the rabbit; once one gets 
the rabbit, he forgets the snare.  And the fish trap exists for the sake of the 
fish; once one gets the fish, he forgets the trap.” If this is so, then the 
words are snares for the images, and the images are traps for the ideas.”280
 This passage states clearly what Wang thinks of the images or metaphors 
which capture the ideas they image.  As tools for grasping the “real” message which it 
images, these images can be forgotten.  They are philosophically not essential.  They 
are mere means or pedagogical aids for grasping the ideas they image.   Now the 
metaphysical doctrine of the formless and nameless Dao is the metaphor or imagery 
for the political doctrine of non-intervention.  As an image the metaphysics of the Dao 
“captures” the political doctrine of non-intervention; and, once one arrives and grasps 
the political ideas through the metaphysical image, one forgets the metaphysical 
imagery.  
Indeed, the metaphysics of the Dao’s mere utilitarian value is made clear if we 
take seriously Wang’s criticism of those who remain fixated on the image.   For Wang, 
once one gets the idea, one should let the imagery fall out of view.  If one remains 
                                                 
280 Wang Bi, “General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou (Yijing)” in The Classic 
of the Changes: A New Translation of the I-Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi, Richard 
John Lynn (trans), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 31 
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absorbed with the imagery, one has failed to get to the real message, viz. the idea that 
the imagery images.  The fact that these metaphorical analogues are called “images” 
implies for Wang Bi their mere use-value, and their destiny to be lost sight of once 
they serve their use: 
“someone who stays fixed on the words will not be one to get the images, 
and someone who stays fixed on the images will not be one to get the 
ideas. The images are generated by the ideas, but if one stays fixed on the 
images themselves, then what he stays fixed on will not be images as we 
mean them here.  If this is so, then someone who forgets the images will 
be the one to get the ideas, and someone who forgets the words will be one 
to get the images.  Getting the ideas is in fact a matter of forgetting the 
images, and getting the images is in fact a matter of forgetting the 
words.”281
This means in effect that once a person who reads the Laozi has understood the 
text, then he would have grasped the ideas that the images capture, and would have 
forgotten or lost sight of the images.  When one truly understands the text, he loses 
sight of the metaphysical imagery of the Dao, and sees in it only idea of the politics of 
non-interference. Ironically then, when one is concerned with the metaphysics of the 
Dao, then it is a sign that he has not grasped the true meaning of the text, which is the 
political doctrine of non-interference.   As an analogy, think of someone trying to see 
one of two images in a gestalt figure. When one sees one image, he cannot at the same 
                                                 
281 Wang Bi, General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou, op. cit., 31-32 
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time be seeing the other image.  Similarly, when one engages the text with the idea in 
mind, then the imagery of the text is “forgotten”.  
 And because the images can be forgotten, and have no intrinsic use of 
themselves, it does not quite matter which imagery one uses to capture the ideas so 
long as they work.  Thus, Wang:  
“…although the images were established in order to yield ideas 
completely, as images they may be forgotten…That is why anything that 
corresponds analogously to an idea can serve as its image, and any concept 
that first with an idea can serve as a corroboration of its nature.  If the 
concept involved really has to do with dynamism, why must it only be 
represented in terms of a horse?  And if the analogy used really has to do 
with compliance, why must it only be represented in terms of the 
cow?...”282
Although he made these remarks in the specific context of the YiJing, they 
express his general philosophical position on the variability of the image of any idea. 
We might hence further conjecture Wang Bi sees there is no special reason for using 
the metaphysics of the Dao as the analogical metaphor for the political theory of non-
intervention.  If there were any other usable analogue, that could have replaced the 
metaphysical imagery.  Indeed as we have seen, Wang applies not the metaphysics of 
the Dao as the imagery for the political doctrine of non-intervention, but also the 
imagery of the correlative theory of names to capture the reasons for the politics of 
non-intervention.  Crudely put, one can use whatever comes in handy.  
                                                 
282 Wang Bi, General Remarks on the Changes of the Zhou, op. cit., 32 
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So it would seem that the metaphysics of the Dao is merely a pedagogical tool, 
and, apart from its usability, it is an arbitrarily chosen one.   In other words, the only 
reason why the metaphysics of the Dao was chosen to be crafted as a metaphorical 
analogue of the political doctrine of non-intervention seems to be its utility—its 
coincidental suitability for analogously mapping the political theory.  The fact that the 
image is a metaphysical speculation of the Dao does not seem at all to feature as a 
reason for its being chosen as an image.  Thus we see how seriously mistaken 
Wagner’s reading of the Wang Bi Laozi is when he argues that Wang engages in the 
metaphysical speculation of the Dao for developing his political theory, and presents 
that as a radical departure from previous Chinese philosophical thinking.  Wagner 
suggests that for once in Chinese thought, metaphysical or ontological speculation 
becomes an appreciated study, as if its subject matter has anything special to 
contribute to political theorizing.  Yet for Wang Bi, the substance or content of the 
metaphysics of the Dao is completely irrelevant; the words are what Wang Bi’s Laozi 
finds useful, since they capture metaphorically the political doctrine.  If the content of 
the metaphysical speculation on the Dao had completely contradicted the present 
metaphysical conclusions of the metaphysics of the Nameless and Formless Dao, then 
to the extent that the words expressing that new metaphysics can equivocally and 
metaphorically capture the political doctrine, then that (new) metaphysics of the Dao 
would be used as the imagery.   
Hence it seems when Wang Bi’s Laozi pictures the Sage as modeling the Dao, 
there is nothing especially dignified about this.  Had a fly and its metaphysics been 
found suitable for metaphorically capturing the politics of non-interference, then the 
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metaphysics of the fly too would have been used.  And the Sage would have been 
described as modeling the fly.    
 
Natural Law and Metaphysics 
 
Like Wang Bi’s Laozi, in Natural Law theory, metaphysical speculations of 
God do not serve as premises for the political theory.  Rather reflections on political 
theory, starting with the precept of the natural law that common goods ought to be 
promoted, lead to such a metaphysics.  Because the metaphysical claims follow from 
the political reflection as corollaries, they are philosophically and logically related.   
Similarly, like Wang Bi’s Laozi, the natural law theorist can draft out analogical 
similarities between the way God is or operates and the way the natural law theorist or 
political leader should act.   When I discussed (in Chapter 6) the normativities of the 
principles of practical reasons and argued that it implied some form of Creator or 
metaphysical Source which was Itself Normative, I pointed out that we might get a 
glimpse of what the nature of the metaphysical Norm is—namely, that it is one such 
Ontological Principle, that intended and intends our human functions which generate 
such and such a certain precept with its substantive norm.    
Suppose we call this Ontological Principle “God”. In terms of His normative 
effects—i.e., its intending or designing things to be one way rather than another—we 
may perchance be able to say something about it.  God is that which intended and 
designed a certain function which in turn generates a certain precept, say x: “one 
ought to promote life”.  But normativities like intentions and designs are not random 
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acts; in choosing things to be one way rather than another God shows Himself to be 
someone who chooses the function which generates x  rather than a certain other 
function which generates a different precept, say y: “one ought to destroy life”.  Here 
we approach a (very poor) grasp of the kind of Being God is: that he is One who 
would sanction through his choice x rather than y.    
Now a Being that would sanction x rather than y seems not just any Being but 
an intelligent being, with a Mind that would judge x in favor of y.  Yet also our mind 
and our grasp of the first principles of practical reasoning would also have judged x in 
favor of y. Have we not here, in the human practical intellect, then, a certain sharing 
and con-geniality with the Mind of God?  Therefore the principles of practical reason 
hence are always grasped as principles sanctioned and determined by a Transcendent 
Warrant, a Normativity, a Mind that shapes the normativity which human beings 
experience.  If we call this Transcendent Source of Norm or Warrant God, or a Mind, 
then our normativities and mental proclivities qua products of Its determination, 
would be some kind of a sharing of that Normativity or (God’s) Mind.   At the least, it 
would be a mitigated similitude (but not equality!) of that God.  Our own practical 
norms and God’s normative intentions would cohere and be harmoniously aligned.   
For: what my first practical principles direct me to do, are what God Himself agrees 
ought to be done.    
 Hence someone who understands this similitude or analogy between my 
practical first principles, which are practical norms, and God’s very own Normative 
Orientation would also grasp that as he or she fulfills these first practical precepts (i.e., 
act with practical reasonableness), he or she is in fact not merely fulfilling the 
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normative direction of his or her practical reasons, but at the same time sharing, 
imitating, and indeed fulfilling God’s very own Normative orientations, also his Will.  
Specifically, as he or she follows through completely with the normative direction of 
practical reasons, which entails adopting the appropriate policies as means or 
strategies (chapter 8 and 9) to fulfill practical reason’s directions  to  promote common 
goods through the Rule of law, he or she understands that he or she is in fact also 
fulfilling God’s Will. Thus Finnis writes, concurring with my analysis: 
 
“In what ways, then, is Aquinas’ social and political thought informed by 
affirmations about God?...The principles of practical reasonableness 
are…understood as having the force and depth of a kind of sharing in 
God’s creative purpose and providence.  The good of practical 
reasonableness is now understandable as good not only intrinsically and 
for its own sake but also as a constituent in the good of assimilatio and 
adhesio to the omnipotent creator’s practical wisdom and choice.  The 
truth of the practical principles is now understandable not only as the 
anticipation of the human fulfillment to which they direct us, but also as 
their conformity to their most real of all realities, the divine creative mind, 
which is nothing other than the very reality of that pure and simple act, 
God.”283
 
                                                 
283 John Finnis, Aquinas, 308-309 
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Even better, with this understanding, he or she arrives at a new motivation (on 
top of the original normative motivation of practical reasons) for responding to his or 
her practical normativities.  John Finnis explains: 
 
“Practical reasonableness itself can also be seen…in a new light.  It has the 
further overarching point, which subsumes, embraces, confirms, and 
explains all the other reasons for action, and which like all practical 
reasons is both individual and common, a reason both for individual and 
for interpersonal, group choices and actions.  This further, more ultimate 
point {finis} is: to be like God as human persons can be.”284
 
It is important that this realization is possible only with the metaphysical 
understanding of God or that Creative Ontological Principle as one such “Being” with 
Normative Orientations similar to that of our first practical principles, as we have 
explained.  Someone without this speculative grasp of the God as a Metaphysical 
Normative analogue of our substantively normative practical reasons would never 
arrive at this new understanding that as he or she fulfills the principles of practical 
reason, he or she is at the same time imitating God.   Nor ipso facto would he or she 
have the “imitation of God” as a new and additional reason for following through 
with practical reason’s direction.   
In this way the knowledge of the metaphysical affirmations of God shifts our 
appreciation of political governance which is consistent with and grounded in practical 
                                                 
284 John Finnis, Aquinas, 315 
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reasons (or natural law) to a more noble level.  We understand that as we fulfill in a 
practically reasonable manner the precepts of the natural law by adopting the 
appropriate policies to promote the common goods, we are not merely doing that, but 
also being like God.  Further, we are not only like God though practically reasonable 
governance, but we can do so in order to be like God, assuming that this is something 
worth doing. 
That last qualification, “assuming that being like God is something worth doing” 
is of course an assumption.  If being like God was not something worth doing, then 
even if practically reasonable governance is a likening of God, that very likening of 
God would not become a reason for governing well. Similarly, if you told me I was a 
chip of the old block, I may take that as a compliment, or I might take that as an insult.  
It all depends whether I think the old block is something worth matching up to.  For 
Aquinas and Finnis, the assumption is a warranted one, and I am on their side.   
Aquinas’ metaphysical investigations informs us that that God is Unlimited pure 
Actuality or Completeness, having no potentiality or undevelopment (see Chapter 7).  
 
Modeling the Great Dao 
This brings us back to the Wang Bi Laozi. As I pointed out, Wang’s remarks 
suggest that the metaphysics of the Dao was chosen merely for its literary usefulness 
in mapping out the political doctrine.   His General Remarks on the Yijing lead us to 
conjecture that there was no special reason apart from this that the metaphysics of the 
Dao was used.  At least it seems as if there was nothing about the metaphysics of the 
Dao as metaphysics of the Dao which lead to its being adopted as a suitable imagery; a 
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metaphysics of a fly, if useful, might well have been used.   But if we consider how 
natural law theory appreciates the way metaphysical affirmations of God can totally 
transform our appreciation of political activity, we might not think that the use of the 
metaphysics of the Dao as an imagery was that thoughtless.    
Clearly Wang Bi’s Laozi sees the Sage Ruler’s political governance and 
strategies of non-interference as modeling the Dao.   But it is also likely that it also 
sees that Sage Ruler’s modeling of the Dao as a reason for the Sage Ruler to practice 
those very political strategies of non-interference.   If this is so, then the metaphysics 
of the Dao (as compared, for instance, to a metaphysics of the fly) makes perfect sense 
as an imagery: the Sage Ruler’s very practice of Daoist political strategies becomes 
(also) motivated by an aspiration to approach the likeness of the Dao. In other words, 
like the case with natural law theory, it is my hypothesis that Wang’s Laozi grasps that 
the politics of non-interference is not merely a modeling of the Dao, but is practiced in 
order to model the Dao.   Certainly the metaphysics of the Dao and modeling of the 
Dao is no basis for inferring the politics of non-interference (see chapter 2).  However, 
with an appreciation of the analogical parallels between the metaphysical Dao and the 
politics of non-intervention, the modeling of the Dao then becomes an additional 
reason for practicing the politics of non-intervention.  In this way the Sage Ruler is 
urged to practice the politics of non-intervention not only because it works and is 
efficacious in promoting the desired society, but also because it is a way to model the 
Dao.  
But why would the Wang Bi Laozi think that the Sage would be interested to 
model the Dao for its own sake?   Why would the Sage Ruler be even interested in 
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imitating the Dao for imitating the Dao?  Because analogous to Aquinas’s admiration 
for God, the Wang Bi Laozi had great admiration for the Dao because of its reach in 
all myriad things, and the efficaciousness of its operations:  
 
[Laozi:] Forced to give it a name, we call it “great” 
[Wang Bi:] The reason we style it “Dao” is that, of all the terms that might 
be used to address it, this one has the broadest meaning.  Seeking the 
reason why this  style name was assigned to it, we find that it is connected 
with the notion of greatness… 
[Laozi:] “Great” refers to the way it goes forth. 
[Wang Bi:] “Go forth” means “operates,” so the meaning here is not 
restricted just in the single sense of great as in “great body.” As it operates 
everywhere, there is no place it does not reach.  Thus the text says “goes 
forth.”  
[Laozi:] “Goes forth” describes how it is far-reaching, and “far-
reaching” describes its reflexivity. 
[Wang Bi:] “Far-reaching” means to reach the ultimate.” As it operates 
everywhere, there is both nothing that lies beyond its infinite reach and no 
particular direction it favors over any other.  Thus the text says:  “far-
reaching.”  Because it does not subordinate itself  to that which it goes, as 





“[Laozi:] Man takes models from Earth; Earth takes models from Heaven; 
Heaven takes its models from the Dao; and the Dao takes it models from 
the Natural. 
[Wang Bi:]  “To take models from” means “to follow the example of.”  It 
is by taking his models from Earth that Man avoids acting contrary to 
Earth and so obtains perfect safety.  It is by taking its models from Heaven 
that Earth avoids acting contrary to Heaven and so achieves its capacity to 
uphold everything.  It is by taking its models from the Dao that Heaven 
avoids acting contrary to the Dao and so achieves its capacity to cover 
everything.  It is by taking Its models from the Natural that the Dao avoids 
acting contrary to the Natural and so realizes its own nature…The 
“Natural” is a term for that for which no equivalents exists, an expression 
for that which has infinite reach and scope…” 285
 
Thus modeling the Dao or imitating the Dao is a good reason to act.  For Wang 
Bi, the modeling of the Dao is a noble achievement because one becomes like that 
which is great, and which one admires. If we interpret Wang Bi’s Laozi this way, then 
we may be inclined to think that the metaphysics of the Dao is not that superfluous 
after all.  Unlike other imageries, the imagery of the metaphysics of the Dao should 
not be simply forgotten and ignored once the idea of political non-intervention is 
grasped as the text’s central doctrine.  Rather, by having in mind the analogical 
parallels between the metaphysics and the political theory, one understands the Sagely 
                                                 
285 Wang Bi, The Classic, 95-97 
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governance is a modeling of the Dao, and further, Sagely governance can be practiced 
in order to model the Dao.    Thus also, the Laozi’s choice of the metaphysics of the 
Dao (as compares with the metaphysics of a fly, for instance) as the appropriate 
imagery for the politics of non-intervention would not seem trivial and arbitrary: while 
no one would think much of modeling a fly, the Sage Ruler’s modeling of the Dao is 
of great moment and a good reason and motivation for action.  
 The obvious problem with this hermeneutic of the Wang Bi Laozi is that 
Wang’s analogies are not all ontological. (See chapter 2) For sure, his analogies 
developed in the “Straw Dogs” passage highlight out similar patterns of behavior in 
the real operations of the Dao and the Sage, and there truly the Sage parallels the 
“non-benevolent” Dao by practicing the wuwei policy of non-interventionism, leading 
thus to the people becoming moral of or by themselves (ziran).  But beyond these his 
other analogies are metaphorical, and not ontological.    Thus when the Sage models 
the Dao by being nameless (wuming) and formless (wuxing), “Nameless(ness) 
(wuming)” and “Formless(ness) (wuxing)” refer equivocally to radically different 
things.  When applied to the Dao it refers to its metaphysical structure, when applied 
to the sage it refers to his political strategy.   The only relation between these two 
meanings of “Namelessness and Formlessness” is that fact that they are both signed by 
the same style words, wuming and wuxing.    If we have these two radically different 
significations in mind when we assert that the Sage models the Dao by being wuming 
and wuxing, just as the Dao is wuming and wuxing, then we are really stretching the 
claim that the Sage models the Dao.  For: there is just no ontological analogy.   
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 Therefore there are limits to the interpretive theory that: the choosing of the 
metaphysics of the Dao as the appropriate imagery for the politics of non-intervention 
was motivated by the fact that the Sage Ruler could hold the vision of his modeling of 
the Dao in mind and have that as an additional motive for practicing the politics of 
non-intervention.  It cannot fit parts of the Wang Bi Laozi text where the analogies are 
only metaphorical.   Perhaps we might say that where the analogies are metaphorical, 
the metaphysics of the Dao should be forgotten, and where the analogies are 
ontological, the metaphysics of the Dao could be kept in mind to remind us of the 
glorious motive of modeling the Dao.    
Yet given as I have argued, Wang’s particular contribution through his own 
reading of the Laozi text is his ingenious literary use of metaphors (see chapter 2 and 
3). Beyond the Straw-Dogs passage, the rest of his commentary is dominantly 
concerned with applying and crafting the metaphysics of the Dao as a metaphorical 
imagery to capture and also surface the political doctrine of non-intervention. So it is 
likely that Wang considered the metaphorical parallels between the Sage and the Dao 
as central to his reading of the Laozi, and not the ontological parallels.   For Wang Bi 
what is fascinating is that literal superimposition of one radically different idea on 
another, made possible by the “transparency” of those same words and phrases which 
allow both sets of ideas to appear through them.  The importance of the metaphysics of 
the Dao as an appropriate imagery (as opposed to any other image) seems therefore 
much played down. Also, the idea that the practice of the political strategy of non-
intervention can be a way of modeling the Dao for its own sake (even if not only for 
its own sake) was probably not very much considered, and was not much exploited 
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and emphasized.    To paraphrase Wang, as snares for the rabbit, once the rabbit is 
captured, the snare is forgotten. 
Hence for Wang Bi’s Laozi the Sage Ruler who practices good politics is 
indeed a modeler of the Dao: in the sense that his actions are analogous to or 
metaphorically captured by the “Dao” qua the “Nameless and Formless”.  For the 
Natural Law Theorist, this too is true: fulfilling practically reasonable political 
precepts is indeed imitating the Practical Reasonableness of God/Dao.  But there is 
more.  The practically reasonable political strategist does not merely coincidentally, as 
it were, imitate God/Dao; he can do so as an intention, deliberately.  Hence he may 
model God not by chance but for modeling God’s sake.   In this sense, under Finnis’ 
natural law theory (as I have developed it), the sense of good governance as modeling 
of God is much richer: when fulfilling practical reasons in the political arena, the 
practically reasonable politician is modeling God/Dao, and knows that that is what he 
is doing, and does it for that reason (even if not only for that reason).   
 
Conclusion 
I have suggested that Wang Bi’s Laozi largely sees the choice of the 
metaphysics of the Dao as an imagery for the politics of non-intervention as a mere 
consequence of its literary usefulness.  And once the metaphysics of the Dao has 
served its pedagogical purpose, it is to be forgotten.  Natural Law theory, on the other 
hand, exploits the real ontological analogies between the metaphysical affirmations of 
God and the very practice of fulfilling the precepts of the natural law or practical 
reasons.   As the natural law theorist or political governor goes about fulfilling the 
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directions of the natural law to promote common goods without violation of these 
precepts (i.e., in a practically reasonable manner), he can do so because of the 
normative direction of practical reason, or better: to imitate God.   Remember that we 
argued (in chapter 7) that the thomistic God could be called “Dao”.  Here, in thomism, 
we truly have an instance where the Practically Reasonable Political Governor is 






We have come to the end of our thesis.   In this thesis I have tried to analyze and 
illuminate the place metaphysical speculation has in the political and social theorizing 
of two great philosophical traditions as developed by its respective scholars and 
commentators: Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory as defended by the New Classical 
Natural Law Theorists, and Wang Bi’s commentarial reading of the Laozi.   
Comparing them, I have argued that both traditions do not develop metaphysical 
claims in order to infer political strategies; rather the reverse is true (though not in the 
same manner!).  Natural Law starts with self-evident precepts and moves towards a 
metaphysics of God, whereas Wang’s Laozi begins with a study of human behavior, 
develops political conclusions and integrates metaphysical claims of the Dao with the 
political doctrine of non-intervention through a clever play of literary metaphors, and 
offers an “inferential trace” to the Dao as the ultimate origin or source of the desired 
community and of words and names.   I also argued that there are strong similarities 
between the metaphysics of the Dao and the thomistic metaphysical doctrine of God. 
And while both traditions share similar negative strategies informed by their 
appreciation of  the limits of the use of coercive action to create the desired society, 
there remains differences when it comes to applying positive strategies. These 
differences are not the result of metaphysical premises of God or the Dao, but are the 
result of different theories of what constitutes desirably authentic moral action.   
Finally, I explained how metaphysics re-enters in the natural law theorists’ political 
theorizing: by attending to the realization that practically reasonable political action is 
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an analogous likening and fulfillment of God’s very own Normative Being and Will, 
the natural law political theorist has a new motivation to act reasonably in politics:  to 
imitate God.  This however, does not feature very much in Wang’s Laozi, which 
seems to recommend that the metaphysics of the Dao be forgotten once the central 
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Chang     常 
Cheng     称 
Dang     當 
Dao     道 
Dao deJing     道徳经 
Dao ke dao,    道可道, 非常道 
Fei chang Dao 
De     德 
Fei     非 
Ke     可 
Laozi     老子 
Ming     名 
Ming ke ming,    名可名, 非常名 
fei chang ming 
Shi     实 
Shiji     史记 
Wang Bi    王弼 
Wu     无 
Wuwei     无为 
Wuxing    无形 
Xing     形 
Xuanxue    玄学 
Zheng ming    正名 
Zi     字 
Ziran     自然 
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